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Introduction
This thesis collects ﬁve studies that are related to population aging. Population
aging is a predictable trend. However, unfortunately there are no standard
recipes that describe how our society should deal with the social and economic
consequences of aging. These ﬁve studies aim to contribute to the under-
standing of aging related issues. This introductory chapter ﬁrst provides the
motivation for this research (1.1). Second, I will present the research questions
(1.2), after which section 1.3 summarizes the main ﬁndings of this thesis. All
chapters in this thesis can be read independently.
Motivation 1.1
Population aging, caused by an increased life expectancy, the retirement of
the baby boom generation, and a decreased birth rate, has a large impact on
our society. Around 2040 the old age dependency ratio will have increased
to around 55 (starting from 29 in 2010), meaning that in 2040 for every 100
persons of age 15–64 there will be about 55 persons over the age of 65.
Aging has raised concerns about the sustainability of the welfare state.
Reforms are needed to keep the Dutch public and private pension system, and
the health care system viable. In addition, the recent ﬁnancial crisis has shown
the vulnerability of the pension system and has increased the priority of pension
reforms.
One of the directions to alleviate the pressure that aging has on our public
ﬁnances, is to raise tax revenues by increasing the labor force participation of2 Introduction Chapter 1
women and the 55+ population. In the last decades the female labor force
participation has expanded considerably and the question arises what we can
expect for the future. Chapter 2 of this thesis addresses this question. The
labor force participation of the Dutch 55+ population declined during the
1980s and 1990s, due to generous early retirement schemes. Whereas the
male participation rate was about 80% during the 1970s, it dropped to around
40% in 1995. As from the mid nineties the generosity of early retirement
schemes has been diminishing. As a result, the labor force participation of
the 55+ population increased again, up to about 64% of the 55–64 male
population in 2010, and 51% of the total 55–64 population in 2010. The
effectiveness and political support for new reforms aimed at increasing the
labor force participation of the 55+ population, depends (among other things)
on the health status of the elderly non-employed, which will be investigated in
chapter 3.
A negative byproduct of an increase in the labor force participation of
women and the 55+ population may be that the number of hours of informal
care given by these groups decreases. This may be an unfortunate side effect
as aging is expected to bring about increases in long term care spending1 and
labor shortages in the health care sector. The encouragement of informal care
and labor force participation are two conﬂicting goals. For the development
of effective policies, information is needed about the decision making process
of adult children to provide informal care to their parents and to participate
in the labor market. This decision is investigated in chapter 4. This chapter
explicitly pays attention to the nature of the interactions between siblings.
The strong increase in the old age dependency ratio is problematic for our
public and private pension system. Public pension beneﬁts are paid on a pay-as-
you-go (PAYG) basis. Without policy reforms, the public pension expenditures
will increase from about 4.7% of GDP in 2009 to 8.8% in 2040. Occupational
pension schemes, on the other hand, are based on capital funding and are
therefore less sensitive to the expected increase in the old age dependency
ratio. However, occupational pension schemes are more sensitive to investment
risks, such as ﬁnancial crises and inﬂation. The recent ﬁnancial crisis had a
large impact on the capital reserves of the Dutch occupational pension funds.
1The European Commission (2009) predicts that the long term care expenditures in the
Netherlands increase from 3.5%-points of GDP in 2010 to 8.1%-points of GDP in 2060.Section 1.2 Research questions 3
Also, the number of contributing members of the pension funds has declined,
such that an increase in the pension premium has become a less effective
measure to bear ﬁnancial risks faced by the pension funds. The ﬁnancial crisis,
the relatively low number of contributing members, and the unexpected high
rise in the life expectancy call for reforms to keep the Dutch pension schemes
sustainable.
To assess the viability of proposed reforms to increase the sustainability
of the public and private pension system, information is needed about the
development of the income distribution of the elderly. Chapter 5 therefore
describes the development in the income distribution for Dutch pensioners in
the past, and predicts the income distribution of the Dutch elderly until 2020
in the absence of pension reforms.
When redesigning pension schemes, we have to be aware of the fact that
low-income individuals have lower life expectancies than high-income individ-
uals and therefore receive pension beneﬁts for a shorter period of time. This
has an adverse effect on the redistribution from the ﬁnancially better to the
ﬁnancially worse off, which is the aim of public pension policies in many coun-
tries. For example, a rise in the statutory retirement age will reduce pension
entitlements relatively more for low-income individuals than for high-income
individuals. Chapter 6 examines differences in the remaining life expectancies
of low- and high-income individuals after the statutory retirement age of 65 in
the Netherlands.
Research questions 1.2
This thesis deals with ﬁve topics that were raised in the motivation of this thesis.
This section presents the main research questions of this thesis more speciﬁcally.
The research questions addressed in chapter 2 are
2. Which factors were important in the increase of the female labor force
participation in the Netherlands in the last two decades? And what can we expect
for the future female labor force participation rates?4 Introduction Chapter 1
The research question handled in chapter 3 is
3. To what extent are pathways to retirement, such as early retirement and
unemployment, associated with adverse health conditions?
Chapter 4 deals with the following research questions
4. How do adult children decide how much informal care they want to give to
their parents, and how many hours they want to participate in the labor market?
Do siblings make a cooperative or a non-cooperative decision to care for their
parents? And what gains can be achieved from cooperation between siblings?
The research questions addressed in chapter 5 are
5. How did the income distribution of the elderly evolve over the last two
decades? And how will the income distribution of the Dutch elderly develop in the
coming decade in the absence of pension reforms?
The last research questions, that are answered in chapter 6, are
6. What is the association between income and the remaining life expectancy
after the statutory retirement age of 65 in the Netherlands? And is it only individ-
ual income, or also the income of the spouse that is associated with mortality risk?
1.3 Main ￿ndings
This section provides the answers to the research questions presented in sec-
tion 1.2.
Chapter 2 Female participation rates have increased considerably in
recent years, from about 46% in 1992 to 59% in 2004 and 63% in 2010.
Chapter 2 presents a decomposition of the female participation growth between
1992 and 2004, based on a binary age-period-cohort model. As age, period,
and cohort effects cannot be disentangled, we have used several strategies to
identify the model. The results show that most of the growth (40%) in the
female participation rate between 1992 and 2004 can be attributed to the fact
that female participation has become less sensitive to the presence of childrenSection 1.3 Main ￿ndings 5
(the negative effect of children has decreased). Secondly, about one quarter of
the total growth is due to so called ‘unobserved cohort effects’, which reﬂect
factors like social norms. They have increased the labor force participation of
women up to the cohort born in 1955. The increased education level of women
accounts for about one sixth of the total growth, and about 12% of the growth
can be explained by the more favorable market conditions in 2004, relative
to 1992. For the future, the growth of the female participation rate will slow
down, in particularly because cohort effects have stabilized for generations
born after 1955. Between 2005 and 2050 a further growth of 7–10%-points
can be expected, which would alleviate the structural deﬁcit caused by the
aging of the population by about 1.0–1.5%-points of GDP .
Chapter 3 One of the most important concerns related to the labor force
participation of the elderly, is that nonemployed individuals have health limita-
tions that prevent them from remaining employed up to the statutory retirement
age. Chapter 3 of this thesis investigates whether pathways to retirement such
as early retirement and unemployment are associated with adverse health con-
ditions, using cause speciﬁc mortality risks after the age of 65 as an objective
measure for health status. We ﬁnd that, compared to individuals who remain
employed during the three years preceding the statutory retirement age, those
who are early retired, unemployed, self-employed, or nonparticipating do not
have a signiﬁcantly different mortality risks for cancer, cardiovascular diseases,
or other diseases. This ﬁnding suggests that the effectiveness of reforms of
early retirement schemes and unemployment schemes to increase employment
among older workers may, on average, not be adversely affected by health
conditions. On the other hand, persons who receive disability beneﬁts dur-
ing the last three years before the statutory retirement age have signiﬁcantly
higher mortality rates after the age of 65. Their probability of dying before
age 75, conditional on being alive at age 65, is almost two times higher than
for persons who have been employed up to the statutory retirement age of
65. These results are derived from a competing risk model, that conditions
not only on observed characteristics but also on unobserved individual speciﬁc
effects. The model therefore takes into account that with increasing age, the
sample becomes more selective in terms of both observed and unobserved
characteristics. A methodological contribution of this chapter is the use of
multiple causes of death statistics in the context of a competing risk model to6 Introduction Chapter 1
allow the impact of unobserved individual characteristics to differ across the
cause-speciﬁc mortality risks.
Chapter 4 Chapter 4 analyzes the decision making process of adult chil-
dren to provide informal care to their parents. In the ﬁrst part of the chapter a
structural model is developed in which adult children without siblings maximize
their utility over leisure, consumption and the amount of care their parents
receive, subject to a time and a budget constraint. The model is estimated
using two datasets from 12 European countries and estimates the preferences
of adult children for consumption, leisure and informal care, without having to
make assumptions about interactions between siblings.
The parameter estimates show that the preference for informal care in-
creases when parents are in bad health. Women have higher preferences for
informal care than men, and higher educated adult children have signiﬁcantly
lower preferences for informal care than lower educated adult children. Also
cultural and institutional differences between countries play a role, and the
(negative) wage elasticity of informal care supply appears to be small. The
latter implies that ﬁscal policies that affect net wages have negligible effects
on informal care (while they do inﬂuence labor supply). To increase informal
care as well as labor supply a reduction of the geographical distance between
adult children and their parents would be effective. For example, the social
rent sector could weigh informal care in their assignment of houses, and senior
houses could be built in residential areas.
In the presence of siblings, their choices also play a role in the caregiv-
ing decision. In the literature it has been emphasized that modeling family
decisions as a bargaining process is important to improve our understanding
of these decisions. The question arises whether this bargaining process be-
tween siblings is cooperative or non-cooperative. Do siblings maximize their
total utility? Or do they maximize their own utility, given the behavior of
their siblings? While in the literature it is often assumed that siblings behave
non-cooperatively, chapter 4 presents a ﬁrst attempt to identify the nature of
the bargaining process between siblings. The results show that 71% of the
siblings have a higher probability to behave non-cooperatively than coopera-
tively and 47% of the siblings even have a 10%-points higher probability to
behave non-cooperatively than cooperatively. Examining the characteristics
of cooperative and non-cooperative siblings reveals that two brothers have onSection 1.3 Main ￿ndings 7
average a 10.5%-points higher probability to behave non-cooperatively than
two sisters. Pushing families into their cooperative equilibria increases informal
care, but decreases labor supply.
Chapter 5 Also without pension reforms the income distribution of the el-
derly changes, as a result of changing household composition, developments in
the labor market (e.g. the increased female labor force participation), produc-
tivity differences between cohorts resulting in income differences, differential
mortality, and increased longevity. Chapter 5 describes the income distribution
of the elderly in the past, and predicts the income distribution of the elderly
until 2020 in the absence of pension reforms, using a dynamic microsimulation
model. The results show that equivalized household income of the elderly in
the age group 65–90 is expected to increase on average by 0.5% per year for the
10th percentile, 1.2% for the median, and 1.0% for the 90th percentile. Income
inequality grows in the lower part of the income distribution, but declines in
the upper part of the distribution. The contradictory movements in the lower
and upper part of the distribution underline the importance of investigating
the whole income distribution, here achieved using a microsimulation model,
instead of only analyzing an inequality index such as the Gini coefﬁcient. Our
microsimulation model deviates from traditional microsimulation models by
explicitly paying attention to the modeling of income shocks and the persistence
of these shocks, and taking into account that younger cohorts are different
than older cohorts, for example with regard to female employment and divorce
rates.
Chapter 6 Low-income individuals live shorter than high-income individ-
uals. This implies that low-income individuals have a lower rate of return from
uniformly priced pension plans than high-income individuals. Chapter 6 quan-
tiﬁes the association between income and the remaining life expectancy after
the statutory retirement age of 65 in the Netherlands. The results are obtained
using a mortality risk model that allows for dynamic selection based on both
observed and unobserved characteristics. This means that we take into account
that the population at risk changes with age, and that only those with relatively
advantageous observed and unobserved characteristics survive (survivorship
bias). The results show that individual income is about equally strong and
negatively associated with mortality risk for men and women. Furthermore,
only for women, spouse’s income is weakly associated with their mortality risk.8 Introduction Chapter 1
For both men and women, the difference in the remaining life expectancy at
age 65 between low-income individuals with only a public retirement pension
and high-income individuals with twice the median income is about 2.5 years.
This difference adversely affects the redistribution of income from high-income
individuals to low-income individuals and underscores the importance to allow
for a retirement window, that is part of the proposed pension reforms in the
Netherlands. A retirement window2 increases people’s free choice and can
mitigate the adverse income redistribution effects that result from differential
mortality.
2E.g. a retirement window in which people can choose their retirement age between 65
and 67, and in which public pension beneﬁts are adjusted in an actuarially fair way.2
The Trend in Female Labor Force
Participation:
What can be Expected for the Future?
This chapter is published as a paper in Empirical Economics (Euwals, Knoef,
and Van Vuuren 2011).
Introduction 2.1
Over the last decades, many countries experienced an increase in the labor
force participation of women. The Netherlands are an exceptional example, as
female participation more than doubled, from 31% in 1975 to 69% in 2006
(OECD, various years). This development reﬂects a major change in the Dutch
society and has several dimensions. First, an important social dimension is
that women are becoming more integrated into formal production. Although
women lag behind men considerably in terms of (full-time) employment and
wages, like in many other countries, at least they are catching up. Second, an
important economic dimension is that an increase in the female contribution
to formal production leads to higher economic growth. The high growth rates
of the Dutch economy at the end of the 1990s can be attributed partly to the
substantial increase in female participation. Third, the developments have a
ﬁscal and demographic dimension. It is widely believed that an increase in the
participation rate contributes to the ﬁscal sustainability of the welfare state,
which is under pressure due to the aging of the society. An important portion
of the foreseen ﬁscal gap could be prevented by an increment in the labor force
participation (Aaberge et al., 2004, Apps, 1991, Van Ewijk et al., 2006).10 The Trend in Female Labor Force Participation Chapter 2
The ﬁrst goal in this chapter is to decompose the growth in the female
participation rate over the period 1992–2004. Do younger cohorts have a larger
probability to be employed than older cohorts, holding age and year effects
constant? Did the favorable economic conditions in the late 1990s encourage
women to participate in the labor market? Our modeling approach allows us to
make a full decomposition of the observed growth during the period mentioned.
Our second aim is to determine which factors will remain important in the
coming decades. While some factors may not be as important for future growth
as they have been in the past, others are likely to remain important. The effects
of the various factors on the future development of the participation rate are
quantiﬁed in two scenarios. As an aside, we will also give some indication on
the effect of the prospected participation increase on the ﬁscal sustainability of
government ﬁnances in the Netherlands. Typically, most studies on the impact
of aging on government ﬁnances do not assess the partial impact of participation
growth on ﬁscal sustainability, but rather take as given one central projection
(see e.g. Cournède and Gonand, 2006, Roeger, 2002, Rother et al., 2002).
To answer these research questions, we estimate a binary choice model for
the labor force participation of women born between 1925 and 1986 on the
basis of the Dutch Labor Force Survey 1992–2004. We employ two different
identiﬁcation strategies to disentangle the participation growth into age, period,
and cohort effects. According to our interpretation, the age effect includes
individual life-cycle decisions, like the timing of education and marriage. Pe-
riod effects include cyclical and instantaneous effects, e.g. effects of policy
changes. Cohort effects, that is different participation rates among different
generations of women, are linked to societal changes in the orientation towards
paid employment. These cohort effects can for instance be related to a higher
educational attainment or lower fertility of younger generations.1 Apart from
such ‘observed’ cohort (and period and age) effects, the model also allows for
‘unobserved’ cohort effects which are not directly related to variables included
in the model. These unobserved cohort effects are mainly related to the evolve-
ment of social norms or the availability of oral contraceptives, or a combination
of both. Social norms are an appealing explanation as sociological research
on social norms and attitudes with respect to the combination of employment
1Note that there is some ambiguity in the distinction between period and cohort effects.
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and family care responsibilities ﬁnds an almost identical development over the
cohorts (SCP/CBS, 2006). Furthermore, birth control may also have played a
role as oral contraceptives became available in the years the cohorts born in
the 1950s became mature (Goldin and Katz, 2002).
Estimation results show that both the observed and unobserved cohort
effects have been crucial in spurring the female participation rate. Time
effects have also played an important role during the 1990s. The negative
relation between the unemployment rate and the participation rate suggests
an ‘encouraged worker effect’, i.e. the favorable market conditions during
the 1990s have induced many females to participate in the labor market. An
important ﬁnding is that observed factors (such as education and household
situation) can fully ‘explain’ participation growth of generations born after
1955, but that unobserved cohort effects play an important role for the older
cohorts. This means that unobserved factors, like social norms, have only
been important for cohorts born before 1955. This ﬁnding is consistent with
both sociological studies, which ﬁnd important shifts in societal preferences
until the 1950s cohorts but not thereafter, and with studies focusing on oral
contraceptives as an explanation for increasing participation rates of women.
The outcomes give us some important indications about the future prospects
of the labor force participation of women. To make this point explicit, we
construct long term scenarios. Apart from a ‘basic scenario’, where attitudes
towards the combination of paid work and care for children stabilize, we
construct an ‘emancipatory scenario’, in which these attitudes shift in favor
of combining paid work with raising children. It is not made explicit though
whether this shift is the result of a policy change or due to a further change in
social norms. The scenarios predict that female participation rates grow with
a further 7 and 10%-points, respectively. Using these scenarios, we estimate
that the rising female participation rates compensate for about one third of the
total ﬁscal sustainability gap2 in the Netherlands.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses
some relevant literature on female labor supply. Section 2.3 discusses the data.
Section 2.4 discusses the empirical strategy, and in particular the identiﬁca-
2The ﬁscal sustainability gap is deﬁned as the structural deﬁcit given current institutions
and future demographics. As a result of the aging population, government expenditures will
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tion strategies used. Section 2.5 discusses the empirical ﬁndings, section 2.6
discusses future projections and the consequences for ﬁscal sustainability, and
section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Literature
In many countries female labor force participation has increased substantially
over the last few decades. The literature has paid a lot of attention to this
development, resulting in a large number of empirical studies. The approach
in these studies varies from structural modeling of ﬁnancial incentives and
life cycle decision making (for an overview, see, e.g. Blundell and MaCurdy,
1999) to the historical analysis of changing life courses of women (see, for
example, Goldin, 2004, 2006). Our study will take a reduced form approach
that is related to the last type of studies. This section will therefore not discuss
the extensive structural literature, but instead focus on studies which describe
changes in labor market behavior over a longer time period on the basis of
panel data and repeated cross sections. labor market behavior due to cyclical
changes – the discouraged worker and added worker effect – plays an important
role in our model, and is therefore brieﬂy addressed at the end of this section.
2.2.1 The increase in female participation rates
Female labor market participation increased substantially in many countries
over the past decades (table 2.2.1). The Netherlands stands out with an in-
crease of about 40%-points over de last three decades, together with Spain
with an increase of almost 30%-points over the same period. The empirical
literature contains many studies on the increase in particular countries, and
we discuss studies for the Netherlands, Germany, the UK and the US. We do
not discuss the studies on Scandinavian countries, as these mostly focus on
the high full-time employment rate of women (see, for example, Pfau-Efﬁnger,
1993, Sundström, 1991).
The labor market participation rate of Dutch women started to increase
from the 1970s onwards. Hartog and Theeuwes (1985) used the Terms of
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Table 2.2.1: Labor force participation (%), women 15–64 (source:
OECD Statistical Database)
1977 1987 1997 2007
Denmark 65 77 75 76
France 53 56 60 64
Germany 51 54 62 70
Italy 38 43 44 51
Netherlands 32 49 62 73
Spain 33 38 48 62
Sweden 70 79 75 78
United Kingdom 56 63 67 68
United States 56 66 70 70
They conclude that wage growth contributed substantially to the explanation
of the increase in participation in the years after the Second World War. Note
that at that time the female participation rate was clearly below the average of
the OECD countries.
From 1979 until 1987 the female participation rate has increased to about
50%, and Groot and Pott-Buter (1993) use the Supplementary Beneﬁts Surveys
1979 and 1987 to investigate this increase. They conclude that changes in
preferences must have induced the increase in female participation. Note that
in these years real wage growth was low due to the economic crisis and the
Dutch wage moderation policy.
Female participation kept increasing during the 1990s, and Cörvers and
Golsteyn (2003) use the Socio-Economic Panel 1994–1999 to investigate this
increase. Like the previous authors, they ﬁnd that preferences must have played
an important role. During that period wage growth was still low due to wage
moderation. Henkens et al. (2002) use the Housing Demand Surveys 1989/90
and 1998/99 to compare married and cohabiting women. They ﬁnd that in
particular the participation of married women has increased. This again hints
at a change in preferences, and in particular the preferences of married women.
The female participation rate in Germany increased by almost 20%-points
during the last three decades. Fitzenberger et al. (2004) and Fitzenberger
and Wunderlich (2004) use the Micro-Census to investigate the increase. The
studies ﬁnd an increasing time trend for low and medium skilled women,
implying an absence of an increase over cohorts. Only for high-skilled women14 The Trend in Female Labor Force Participation Chapter 2
they do ﬁnd a cohort effect. Women entering the labor market after 1975
have a higher probability to participate than older cohorts. The second study
furthermore concludes that the increase in the participation rate is concentrated
in part-time employment and, most importantly, this increase is mainly due to
the changing age and skills composition.
Both the UK and the US experienced an increase in female labor market
participation of about 10%-points during the last three decades. Excellent
census data made early studies possible. In both countries, economists were
particularly interested in the question whether the increase in real wages
could explain the increase in female participation. For the UK, Layard et al.
(1980) used cross-section data from the UK Household Survey 1974 in order to
estimate the wage elasticity, and concluded that wages explained about a third
of the increase in female participation during the period 1973–1977. Joshi et al.
(1985) turned to repeated census and survey data for the period 1850–1980.3
They isolate a clear cohort effect. They conclude that wages only explain a
minor part of the increase in female participation. The authors offer some
tentative explanations, such as falling prices of domestic services, changing
fertility, and long-term changes in the roles women see for themselves in life.
On the basis of US census data 1890–1980, Smith and Ward (1985) con-
clude that rising real wages account for 60 percent of the total growth in the
female labor force after 1950 in the US. Nevertheless, they are not able to
explain why participation did not increase earlier in history despite the fact
that wages did increase too. They argue that other factors must have been
important as well, and tentatively mention fertility, schooling, and changing
attitudes towards women’s work. Coleman and Pencavel (1993) use census
data and the Current Population Survey (CPS) for the period 1940–1988, and
they report strong cohort effects in female participation. Female working hours
did not change substantially over the different cohorts, and the authors con-
clude that gender differences in work behavior are becoming less manifest
in the US. Pencavel (1998) uses the CPS 1975–1994 and again ﬁnds that in
particular participation has increased substantially, while working hours have
increased only slightly. He furthermore ﬁnds that in particular participation
3The special issue of the Journal of Labor Economics contains several articles that use
repeated cross sections or repeated census data, including Smith and Ward (1985) for the US,
Hartog and Theeuwes (1985) for the Netherlands, and Colombino and De Stavola (1985) on
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of high-skilled women has increased. Attanasio et al. (2008) use the PSID
1969–1998 to calibrate a life-cycle model for three generations of women. They
conclude that in particular shifts in the costs of children relative to life time
earnings are the most likely explanation for the strong increase in labor supply
over the generations of women.
Another strand of the US literature discusses changes in life cycle labor
supply behavior of women over generations. Goldin (2004), Goldin (2006),
Fernandez et al. (2004) and Fogli and Veldkamp (2007) discuss theories in
which younger generations of women learn from older generations. In partic-
ular the last study explicitly models and tests the slow process in which each
generation updates their parents’ beliefs on maternal employment by observing
the children of employed women. The results offer an explanation for the slow
S-shaped rise in maternal employment in the US. Goldin and Katz (2002) claim
that birth control technology (‘the pill’) played an important role as well. On
the basis of differences in the date of ﬁrst availability between states in the US,
they ﬁnd an impact of the pill on educational attainment and employment over
successive generations of women.
Overall, conclusions on the Netherlands seem to direct towards changes
in labor supply preferences of women. A similar result is found for highly
educated women in Germany, and also for the UK and the US there is evidence
in this direction. The tendency in preferences of Dutch women is addressed
by Vendrik (2001), who employs the theory of social custom of Akerlof (1980)
to describe the potential importance of evolving norms within society for the
increase in labor market participation of women. This explanation ﬁts in the
US literature. On the basis of this ﬁnding from the literature, we may expect
to ﬁnd an ‘unobserved cohort effect’ in our empirical analysis. The size and
duration of this effect may play an important role in the long term development
of female labor force participation.
The discouraged and added worker e￿ect 2.2.2
The business cycle affects many participants and potential participants to the
labor market at the same time. For modeling purposes (see section 2.4) it
is important to control for the impact of the business cycle on labor supply16 The Trend in Female Labor Force Participation Chapter 2
behavior. The business cycle effect may take place through the ‘discouraged
worker effect’ and/or through the ‘added worker effect’.
The discouraged worker hypothesis states that potential participants with-
draw from the labor market because they believe that their chances to ﬁnd
suitable employment are low because of an unfavorable labor market situation.
Several studies using time series analysis (Benati, 2001, Darby et al., 2001,
Gregg, 1994, Tachibanaki and Sakurai, 1991) indeed show that participation
displays a pro-cyclical pattern.
The added or additional worker hypothesis states that unemployment of
the husband induces the wife to participate. As unemployment is high dur-
ing economic downturns, it counteracts the discouraged worker effect. The
existence of this effect is however questionable, and may at best be small. No
evidence for an added worker effect is found on the basis of the PSID 1976
and 1982 (Maloney, 1991, 1997). On the basis of displaced workers in the
PSID 1968–1992, Stephens (2002) ﬁnds that the long-run increase in the wife’s
labor supply accounts for about 25% of the husband’s lost income. On the basis
of the European Panel Household Survey 1994–1996, Prieto-Rodriguez and
Podriguez-Gutierrez (2000) ﬁnd that only in a few countries the participation
of wives is related to the husbands’ labor market status.
2.3 Data
The data used in this chapter are from the Dutch Labor Force Survey 1992–2004
(DLFS; in Dutch ‘Enquête Beroepsbevolking’). The DLFS is a survey conducted
among persons living in the Netherlands, with the exception of those living in
institutions like nursing homes and prisons. Every year, a random sample of
about 1% of the Dutch population aged 15 and older is interviewed. A new
random sample is drawn every year, so that we do not observe multiple obser-
vations for a given individual. The DLFS collects information on the individual
labor market situation and on individual and household characteristics.
From 1992 onwards, deﬁnitions and methods in the DLFS have changed
radically, which means that prior years could not be used in our analysis. In
the new deﬁnition, only persons working at least 12 hours a week and persons
actively searching for a job of at least 12 hours a week belong to the labor force.Section 2.3 Data 17
Table 2.3.1: Summary statistics (source: DLFS, 1992–2004)
Mean Min. Max. # Obs.
Participate 0.53 0 1 516298
Position in household
Married 0.60 0 1 516298
Cohabiting, been married 0.02 0 1 516298
Cohabiting, never been married 0.11 0 1 516298
Single, been married 0.10 0 1 516298
Single, never been married 0.09 0 1 516298
Living with parents 0.07 0 1 516298
Other 0.01 0 1 516298
Children
No children 0.57 0 1 516298
Age youngest child 0–3 0.12 0 1 516298
Age youngest child 4–11 0.13 0 1 516298
Age youngest child 12–17 0.09 0 1 516298
Two children < 18 0.16 0 1 516298
Three or more children < 18 0.07 0 1 516298
Both children < 18 and  18 0.05 0 1 516298
Only children  18 0.10 0 1 516298
Education womana
Primary 0.14 0 1 516298
Lower secondary 0.27 0 1 516298
Higher secondary 0.39 0 1 516298
Tertairy 0.20 0 1 516298
Education male partnera
Primary 0.08 0 1 380686
Lower secondary 0.15 0 1 380686
Higher secondary 0.30 0 1 380686
Tertairy 0.18 0 1 380686
Age 41 18 67 516298
Period (year) 1998 1992 2004 516298
Cohort (year of birth) 1957 1925 1986 516298
a The education levels are deﬁned as follows: ‘Primary’ = no secondary educa-
tion completed (just primary shool); ‘Lower secondary’ = lower vocational or
general school completed (in Dutch: VMBO); ‘Upper secondary’ = advanced
vocational or general school completed (in Dutch: MBO, HAVO, VWO); ‘Ter-
tiary’ = academic or vocational colleges completed.18 The Trend in Female Labor Force Participation Chapter 2
We use this deﬁnition of the gross participation rate, as it is the ofﬁcial deﬁnition
used in the Netherlands. In 2004, about 6% of the Dutch women between the
ages of 15 and 64 were working positive hours, but less than 12 hours per week
(Euwals et al., 2006). That is, the participation rate would be about 6%-points
higher according to the internationally accepted deﬁnition of working at least
1 hour per week. The average participation rate in our sample equals 53%.
The resulting data set contains 516,298 observations of women, which
amounts to nearly 40,000 observations per year. The oldest cohort was born in
1925, and the youngest cohort was born in 1986 (table 2.3.1). Each cohort (age
group) contains about 8,000 (10,000) individuals. The number of observations
is somewhat lower for the oldest age categories and cohorts due to mortality.
Furthermore, note that the smallest category (‘Other household member’)
still counts more than 5,000 observations. More than half the sample has no
children living at home. About one out of eight women have at least one child
younger than 4 years old living at home. Note that these and other variables
on children in the household are not mutually exclusive.
We add education-speciﬁc delayed unemployment rates to the individual
records, so that we will be able to assess the combined impact of discouraged
and added worker effects (see the previous section). The labor market situation
given educational attainment is thus represented by the one-year delayed
unemployment rate given that education level. We have chosen the one-year
delayed unemployment rate because non-participating women are not likely to
have up-to-date information on their labor market prospects.
The observed participation rates by cohort and age are shown in ﬁgure 2.1.
Participation rates are increasing steeply until age 25. Until that age the
youngest three cohorts show no difference in participation rates. As from age
25 a gradually decreasing pattern appears. From the overlapping segments
at a given age it can be seen that increments of about 10%-points between
subsequent ﬁve-year cohorts are not uncommon. These ‘jumps’ are combined
cohort and period effects. Between age 25 and 35 there appears to be a
‘motherhood dip’. This dip seems to become less strong for younger cohorts.
In the following section we investigate whether this is related to a drop in the
fertility rate or a changing attitude towards the combination of working and
caring for children.Section 2.4 Empirical strategy 19


















Note: Cohorts in 5-year groups, from cohort born in 1980–1984 (left in ﬁgure)
to cohort born in 1930–1934 (right in ﬁgure). Source: DLFS, 1992–2004.
Empirical strategy 2.4
In this section, we specify the statistical model that is used to estimate the
determinants of female labor force participation. Indicating individual i and
(discrete) time t by corresponding subscripts, our model speciﬁes the propensity
to participate in the labor market as
p

it = 0 +1xit + ga(ait j a)+ gc(ci j c)+ gt(t j t)+"it, (2.1)
where xit is a vector of control variables, ait, ci, and t are age, cohort, and year
effects, respectively, and corresponding transformation functions are denoted
by g. We specify the probability of observing individual i participating in the
labor market at time t as a binary Logit (i.e. we assume that "it follows a
standard logistic distribution)
Pr(pit = 1 j xit,ait,ci,t) = Pr(p

it > 0 j xit,ait,ci,t) =
exp(0 +1xit + ga(ait j a)+ gc(ci j c)+ gt(t j t))
1+exp(0 +1xit + ga(ait j a)+ gc(ci j c)+ gt(t j t))
, (2.2)
where pit equals unity if individual i participates at time t, and zero otherwise.20 The Trend in Female Labor Force Participation Chapter 2
A well-known complication in (2.1) is that not all parameters can be iden-
tiﬁed whenever all transformation functions ga, gc, and gt contain a (param-
eterized) linear term. The reason is that the following identity holds for any
individual i at time t
ci + ait = t. (2.3)
Whenever two terms in (2.3) are known then the third is known as well. A large
literature going back to the 1970s has examined the problem of identifying
age, period, and cohort effects. For instance, Hall (1971) identiﬁed his model
by assuming that the two most recent cohorts were identical. Essentially,
assumptions are needed to identify the model. To avoid arbitrary results, these
assumptions have to be based on some a priori knowledge, for instance from
economic theory. In the present case, we expect that period effects largely
correspond with discouraged and added worker effects (see section 2.2). It is
therefore conceivable that period effects can be well represented by a variable
which is directly related to both these theories: the unemployment rate. In the
literature this kind of procedure is often called the proxy variable approach,
and is e.g. applied in Smith and Ward (1985) and Kapteyn et al. (2005). In
practice, this means that we specify gt(t j t) = tUNEMPt, where UNEMPt
is the unemployment rate per education group at time t.
A second approach is based on the a priori expectation that increases in
participation rates over subsequent cohorts are diminishing. This is not so
much a theoretical identiﬁcation assumption but rather a technical one, as
participation rates are likely to grow less fast when the strict upper bound
equalling unity is approached. In this respect, we assume cohort effects to
follow a logarithmic pattern over time. This identiﬁcation approach, which is
often called the ‘functional form approach’, assumes that the g-functions follow
a prespeciﬁed functional form for which the model parameters in (2.1) are
identiﬁed. This kind of strategy was e.g. used in Fitzenberger et al. (2004). In
practice, this means that we specify gc(ci j c) = c ln(ci).
A ﬁnal approach is to deﬁne the g-functions as step functions of the form
g(y) =
PK
k=1k1fy = ykg, where K is the total number of categories for
variable y, and 1fAg is the indicator function for event A. Additional restrictions
on the parameters (k) are imposed in order to achieve identiﬁcation. ThisSection 2.5 Estimation 21
widely used approach, which was ﬁrst introduced by Mason et al. (1973), was
however criticized for the arbitrariness of the imposed restrictions, and the fact
that it is not testable whether the restrictions are valid. We will therefore not
apply this approach in the current chapter.4
Having estimated a model speciﬁcation as described above, we may de-
compose the growth in female participation for different years. Denoting the
probability in (2.2) by qt (and omitting the individual subscript), we compute




and approximate the change in participation as a result of a change in factor x j
at time t by
ejt = qt(1 qt)jx jt, (2.4)
where qt denotes the predicted probability that an average female is partici-
pating at time t, and x jt denotes the average value of covariate j at time t.
We will employ this formula in the next section when making a decomposition
of the aggregate growth in female labor force participation during the period
1992–2004.
Estimation 2.5
This section discusses the estimation results of the speciﬁcations explained in
the previous section. The coefﬁcients reported in table 2.5.1 and the appendix
represent the impact of a variable on the probability of participation. For
example, the positive coefﬁcients for cohabiting women imply that this category
is more likely to participate in the labor market than married women. We start
with an interpretation of the estimation results for Model I, and then proceed
with the results for the alternative speciﬁcation (Model II).
The ﬁrst speciﬁcation uses the proxy variable approach, where period effects
are proxied by the variable ‘delayed unemployment rate’ (Model I). The delayed
4We have experimented with this methodology and indeed found the results to be sensitive
for the identiﬁcation restrictions.22 The Trend in Female Labor Force Participation Chapter 2
Table 2.5.1: Probability of participation in the labor market, estima-
tion results for model I (proxy variable approach) and
model II (functional form approach)a
Model I Model II
Coef. S.e. Coef. S.e.
Position in household
Married
Cohabiting, been married 0.50 0.03 0.50 0.03
Cohabiting, never been married 0.91 0.03 0.91 0.02
Single, been married 0.25 0.05 0.25 0.04
Single, never been married 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.04
Living with parents 0.51 0.08 0.52 0.05
Other 0.20 0.07 0.20 0.06
Children
No children
Age youngest child 0–3 -1.66 0.11 -1.66 0.03
Age youngest child 4–11 -1.27 0.11 -1.26 0.03
Age youngest child 12–17 -0.81 0.11 -0.79 0.03
Only children  18 -0.34 0.04 -0.34 0.01
Two children < 18 -0.42 0.02 -0.41 0.01
Three or more children < 18 -0.89 0.02 -0.89 0.01
Both children < 18 and  18 -0.11 0.04 -0.10 0.02
Interaction: single & child < 18 -0.14 0.03 -0.14 0.02
Interaction: single & child  18 0.32 0.04 0.32 0.03
Interaction: lower secondary &
child < 18 -0.05 0.04 -0.04 0.02
Interaction: upper secondary &
child < 18 -0.02 0.06 0.00 0.02
Interaction: tertiary & child < 18 0.37 0.05 0.39 0.03
Interaction: period & child < 18 yes ** yes **
Education
Education woman yes ** yes **
Education male partner yes ** yes **
Interaction: woman & male partner yes ** yes **
a Estimates for the education and interaction effects, and the unobserved year
and age effects in Model II can be found in the appendix. The unobserved
cohort and age effects in Model I are shown in ﬁgures 2.2 and 2.3. The ‘**’
indicate that corresponding dummy variables are jointly signiﬁcant at the 5%
conﬁdence level (F-test).
b Note that in computing standard errors, we have taken into account that the
unemployment variable is not observed at the individual level, but rather per
year and per level of education. The standard error for the variable would
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Table 2.5.1: Probability of participation in the labor market, esti-
mation results for model I (proxy variable approach)
and model II (functional form approach) (continued)
Model I Model II
Coef. S.e. Coef. S.e.
Age
Dummies yes ** yes **
Period (year)
Dummy variables yes **
Unemployment -0.05 0.01
Cohort (year of birth)
Dummy variables yes **
Ln(cohort-1924) 1.27 0.06
Log likelihood -272180 -272607
Pseudo-R2 0.239 0.237
# Observations 516298 516298
unemployment rate is known by education level (see section 2.3). The estima-
tion results show that women are less likely to participate when the level of
unemployment is high, implying that the discouraged worker effect is stronger
than the added worker effect. This is in line with the empirical literature
discussed in section 2.2. Furthermore, being married is negatively related to
the labor force participation of women. On the other hand, women who are
part of an unmarried couple have a relatively high probability to participate.
Children have a negative effect on female participation, and this negative
impact is particularly strong in the presence of children under 4 years of age.
Participation goes up once the youngest child attends primary school, and again
when it attends secondary school (in the Netherlands this usually occurs at
the ages of 4 and 12, respectively), and once again when it reaches the age of
18. The negative participation effect of having children increases in magnitude
when more children are present.
From the interaction terms between having children and the year of obser-
vation (shown in the appendix), we learn that the negative effect of raising
children has decreased importantly between 1992 and 2004. Participation
rates of women with children are rapidly converging to that of women without
children. By 2004, the negative participation effect of a youngest child between
the ages of 12 and 17 (-0.81) is canceled out by this trend effect (0.78). The24 The Trend in Female Labor Force Participation Chapter 2
decrease of the negative child effect may be the result of the increase in the
availability and affordability of child care facilities, which is partly the result of
higher subsidies from the government. Another explanation may be a change
in attitudes towards the combination of paid employment and caring for chil-
dren.5 Note that the reported coefﬁcients should not be interpreted as causal
effects, as both participation and children (as far as it is a choice) may be the
result of a simultaneous decision. Therefore, the causal effect of children on
participation may be smaller in magnitude than the point estimates reported.6
A high level of education leads to more participation. Within the context
of our model, the individual’s educational attainment principally serves as a
proxy variable for her wage rate. The control for educational attainment means
that we do take into account the increase in real wages due to an increase
in the level of education. We are however not able to correct for real wage
increases given the level of education, as we have no data available on this. To
have some idea of the concerning effect we collected some aggregate data on
real wage trends (Loon Structuuronderzoek; LSO). We ﬁnd that between 1997
and 2002 real gross wages have on average increased by 0.5% for elementary
education, and 8.3% for university education.7 In our model speciﬁcation it
is most likely that the increased participation level due to wage increases per
education level is part of the cohort effect, because year effects are correlated
with unemployment and not with structural wage changes.
The level of education of the partner also plays a role in the decision to
participate in the labor market. For primary to upper secondary education (of
the partner) a higher level of education of the partner has a positive effect on
females’ participation rates.
The estimated unobserved cohort and age effects are shown in ﬁgures 2.2
and 2.3. These ﬁgures contain the participation probabilities in equation (2.2)
with explanatory variables at their sample average values, except for the cohort
and age dummy variables. In this way the unobserved cohort and age effects can
be interpreted in terms of participation growth. Note that each birth year / age
5Note that compared to other countries, Dutch women traditionally have a rather negative
attitude towards the use of child care facilities (Kremer, 2005).
6In addition, estimates of the effect of children on the participation decision typically suffer
from omitted variable bias, as having children is likely correlated with unobserved taste factors
(Nakamura and Nakamura, 1994).
7Separate ﬁgures for men and women are not available for this time period.Section 2.5 Estimation 25
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Note: Estimated probabilities to participate, where the mean of the data is taken
for all characteristics except for the cohort dummy variables.
is represented by a unique dummy variable, implying that both cohort and
age effects are estimated with a maximum degree of ﬂexibility. From the ﬁrst
ﬁgure it can be seen that the unobserved cohort effect has increased almost
linearly over the cohorts born between 1935 and 1955. This means that the
variables included in our model cannot ‘explain’ the entire participation growth
for these cohorts, and hence, other forces are at work. On the other hand,
the unobserved cohort effect remains remarkably stable for cohorts born after
1955, implying that the included variables on educational attainment, children,
and household situation (and interactions) are able to ‘explain’ increasing
participation rates for younger cohorts. This ﬁts well into the story of evolving
social norms and better birth control opportunities (see section 2.2). The
pattern we ﬁnd is strikingly similar to results from sociological research on
social norms. On the basis of repeated surveys from 1970 to 2004, SCP/CBS
(2006) ﬁnd that the generations born before the 1950s found it less and less
problematic that women with children are employed, while the more recent
generations of the 1970s and 1980s nowadays have about the same opinion as
the generation born in the late 1950s.
From ﬁgure 2.3, it can be seen that unobserved age effects increase until
the age of 25. They are more or less constant between ages 25 and 40, and26 The Trend in Female Labor Force Participation Chapter 2
decrease from the age of 40 years. Comparing this ﬁgure with ﬁgure 2.1 we see
that the child-related variables make the dip disappear, so that the ‘motherhood
dip’ around the age of 30 is indeed explained by the presence of children. It
is however remarkable that the age proﬁle already starts decreasing around
the age of 40. Complementarity of leisure time with that of an older partner
could be an explanation for relatively early retirement of women (Hurd, 1990,
Schirle, 2008). It may also be the case that some delayed effect is taking
place. Women who have lost attachment to the labor market while taking
care of young children may ﬁnd it difﬁcult to reignite their careers, and in
the end decide to withdraw from the labor market altogether. As our model
speciﬁcation does not include a delayed effect of having children, this effect is
part of the unobserved age effect.
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Note: Estimated probabilities to participate, where the mean of the data is taken
for all characteristics except for the age dummy variables.
In ﬁgure 2.4, we compare the actual growth of female participation rates
with model predictions. For most years the predicted growth rates are quite
accurate; for 1993, 1998, and 2000 the model overestimates growth by more
than one %-point, and for 1994 and 2004 the model underestimates growth
by nearly a %-point. During the years 1998–2002 the model underestimates
participation growth, which could well be related to the strong economic
upturn during that period.Section 2.5 Estimation 27
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Note: predicted growth rates are based on marginal effects, i.e. ﬁrst order
approximations. Deviations between predicted and actual growth rates may thus
be the consequence partly of second and higher order effects.
Table 2.5.1 also reports the results for the second speciﬁcation, which is
based on the functional form approach (Model II). This speciﬁcation postulates
that the unobserved cohort effects follow a logarithmic pattern over time. An
attractive feature of this functional form is that its derivative tends to zero as
time passes by, implying that the increase in participation rates over subsequent
cohorts becomes smaller and smaller, which is expected. Moreover, results
from the previous speciﬁcation suggest that this functional form is not a strong
assumption. As can be read from the table, parameter estimates for both models
are mostly qualitatively the same. Results on the unobserved age and cohort
effects are similar as well, except for the cohort effect being obviously much
more smooth compared to the effect in ﬁgure 2.2 as a result of the functional
form assumption. The pseudo-R2 of Model II equals 0.2374.8 Compared to
the score of 0.2386 in Model I this is a minor reduction, given that Model I
contains 60 more parameters than Model II.
The decomposition of participation growth for the years 1992–2004 based
on Model I is reported in table 2.5.2. The respective elements of the decom-
8The pseudo-R2 is deﬁned as 1 - [the log likelihood of the model] / [the log likelihood of
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position have been computed as in equation (2.4). That is, average values
for all variables are determined both in 1992 and 2004, and the difference
is used to predict the change in the female participation rate. To interpret
results correctly, we take unemployment as an example: 1.6% is the change in
participation for an ‘average woman’ in 1992 which sees the unemployment
rate decrease to the 2004 level. As the initial decomposition does not add up
precisely to the observed change in the female participation rate due to second
and higher order effects, we spread out the difference between the predicted
and actual participation change in proportion to the ﬁrst order effects. The
unobserved age and cohort effects are in fact computed as composition effects.
As the 2004 sample contains more younger cohorts than the 1992 sample, the
younger cohort dummies receive a larger weight in 2004 and a positive overall
cohort effect results.
Table 2.5.2: Decomposition of female participation growth 1992–2004
Growth in Share
participation of total
rate (%-points)a S.e. growth (%)
Total growth 1992–2004 13.1 100
Household position 0.8 (0.0) 6
Having children -0.1 (0.0) -1
Having children 
household position 0.0 (0.0) 0
Having children  education 0.3 (0.0) 2
Having children  year 5.3 (1.1) 40
Education 2.1 (0.3) 16
Education partner 0.3 (0.1) 2
Education  education partner 0.2 (0.1) 2
Unemployment 1.6 (0.5) 12
Unobserved age effects -0.6 (0.4) -4
Unobserved cohort effects 3.3 (1.5) 25
a Decomposition is based on marginal effects derived from parameter estimates for
Model I (reported in tables 2.5.1 and 2.A.1). Second and higher order effects were
spread out over all components according to shares reported in the last column.
The total change in the participation rate amounts to 13%-points over the
period 1992–2004. It can be seen that nearly half of this effect has to do with
the household situation. In particular, the participation decision has becomeSection 2.5 Estimation 29
less sensitive for raising children, i.e. women with children decide to participate
in the labor market more often. On the other hand, the participation growth
since 1992 is not related to women having less children. Another household
effect predicted by the model results from the increasing share of single women
and cohabiting women. According to the model, both these categories show
higher participation rates than married females. The share of single women
increases from 18% to 20% between 1992 and 2004, and that of cohabiting
women from 9% to 15%, whereas the share of married women decreases from
63% to 57%.
The second most important factor explaining the increasing participation
rates are the unobserved cohort effects, which account for one quarter of
total growth. During the period 1992–2004 many women from the pre-1955
generations retired from the labor market, while at the same time younger
cohorts with relatively high unobserved cohort effects entered the labor market.
According to our model, this composition effect led to an increase in the overall
female participation rate by 3.3%-points.
Third, increasing levels of education account for about one sixth of total
growth, and an encouraged worker effect of one eighth of the total growth
is found. The encouraged worker effect results from the decrease in the
delayed unemployment rate, which was 7.4% in 1992 and 5.7% in 2004. As
a result, quite some women were attracted to the labor market (1.6%-point).
Other effects, like the education of the partner, are less relevant in explaining
participation growth.
In terms of statistical signiﬁcance at the common 5% level, we may conclude
that the demographic composition of households, education, changing effect of
having children, unobserved cohort effects, and a cyclical encouraged worker
effect have all contributed to the growth of the participation rate during the
period.
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the age composition does not have a signif-
icant effect on the development of the participation rate. This may however
change in the future, when the share of elderly in the population will increase
further. To illustrate this, we have depicted the development of the age effect
over time in ﬁgure 2.5. The trend is clearly negative, and will continue to
be negative, so that statistical signiﬁcance of a negative age effect appears to
be just a matter of time. It also appears from the ﬁgure that the impact of30 The Trend in Female Labor Force Participation Chapter 2
the unobserved cohort effects decreases over time. This ﬁnding is particularly
important for the future development of female labor force participation.
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Note: the lines show the effects of changing age and cohort compositions on the
aggregate female participation rate.
2.6 Projected growth in two scenarios
In this section, we make a projection for the coming decades by substituting
future projections for variables and unobserved age and cohort effects into
Model I. Projections for all household variables and variables related to children
are based on the long-term forecasts of Statistics Netherlands (Van Agtmaal-
Wobma and van Duin, 2007). The demographic (long-term) projection is also
taken from Statistics Netherlands (De Jong, 2005). Unemployment is ﬁxed
at the estimated equilibrium rate of 4.4% (CPB, 2006). An overview of the
projections for the underlying variables is provided in table 2.6.1.
The fraction of women who live in a household without children increases
by 4%-points. Furthermore, there will be more single women, more cohabiting
women, and less married women. The fraction of higher educated women
rises from 25 to 34%, and for male partners the same share of highly educated
is achieved. This increase goes together with a decrease in the fractions ofSection 2.6 Projected growth in two scenarios 31
Table 2.6.1: Assumptions made in scenarios
Variable(s) Projection assumed
Household situation Fraction of married women decreases to 0.42;
fraction of cohabiting women who have (have
not) been married increases to 0.04 (0.17);
fraction of single women who have (have not)
been married increases to 0.15 (0.15)
Having children Fraction of women in a household without
children increases slightly to 0.59, and
consequently all categories of households
with children show a small decrease.
Having children  year No change (Basic scenario) or further
participation increase among women with
minor children (Emancipatory scenario): the
post-2004 increase equals the estimated
trend between 1998 and 2004 (see Table 2.A.1)
Education Fraction with tertiairy education continues to
grow to 0.34; fraction with primary (lower
secondary) education continues to fall to 0.06
(0.20).
Unemployment Convergence towards equilibrium
unemployment rate (4.4%)
Unobserved age effects No changes (only compositional effects)
Unobserved cohort effects No changes compared to cohorts born after
1955 (see Figure 2.2)
primary and lower secondary educated individuals, with both groups showing
a similar decrease by about 4%-points.
One of the most crucial parameters in the future projection is the develop-
ment over time of the effect of having children. As the estimation results hardly
provide any clue where this trend will stop, we have to make a rather arbitrary
assumption on this. In order to investigate the impact of such an assumption, we
construct two different scenarios. In the basic scenario we assume that there are
no further developments in this parameter, i.e. the child effect remains constant
at the 2004 level. In the alternative scenario, we assume that the remaining
growth (after the year 2004) equals the growth during the period 1998–2004.9
9In the basic scenario the parameter for ‘Having children under 18  Year’ is kept at the
value of 0.78 (table 2.A.1). In the emancipatory scenario, this parameter is set at the value of
1.13 (= 0.78+(0.78 0.42)).32 The Trend in Female Labor Force Participation Chapter 2
An important argument for not postulating too large a growth is that child care
facilities – especially government subsidies for families with children – are cur-
rently already at a high level (Jongen, 2010). While the introduction of these
facilities has contributed to the past growth of the female participation rate, it
seems unlikely that it will continue to do so. We postulate that the main driver
of the increasing child effect is a more favorable attitude of women towards
the combination of paid work and care for children. This may, for example, be
the result of dynamics in these attitudes as nowadays non-employed women
with children see more and more women with children that are employed.
Finally, we presume that both the unobserved cohort and age effects remain
constant for future generations. The ﬁrst was strongly suggested by the estima-
tion results shown in ﬁgure 2.2, which shows that the unobserved cohort effect
has been stable since the generation born around 1955. The second implies that
unobserved age effects remain the same for future generations. A change in the
participation rate for a given age is therefore assumed to occur only as a result of
a change in exogeneous variables, such as the presence of children. There may
still be an unobserved age effect at the aggregate level, due to a changing de-
mographic composition. Likewise, an aggregate cohort effect is expected when
the generations born before 1955 will be replaced by younger generations.
The resulting projected growth of the female participation rate is shown
in table 2.6.2. The household situation, the fact that there will be less house-
holds with children, the increasing level of education, and a structurally lower
unemployment rate all help to increase the participation rate from 2004 on.
The effect of each of these factors is about 1.6%-points. These four factors are
thus equally important for the future growth of female labor supply in the basic
scenario.
The aggregate unobserved age effect is negative as the share of elderly
women will rise. The aggregate unobserved cohort effect is positive since a
part of the pre-1955 cohorts with relatively low participation rates will still be
replaced by younger cohorts. As both effects have about the same size, they
cancel out. In sum, the projected growth in the basic scenario amounts to
7%-points, which equals about half of the growth during the period 1992–2004.
In the ‘emancipatory scenario’, there is a large effect of changing attitudes
towards the combination of paid work and family responsibilities, so that the
projected participation growth equals nearly 10%-points.Section 2.6 Projected growth in two scenarios 33
Table 2.6.2: Decomposition of projected female participation growth
1992–2050 (%-points)
2005–2050 1992–2004
sc. Ba sc. Ea
Total growth 7.0 9.8 13.1
Household position 1.5 1.5 0.8
Having children 1.6 1.6 -0.1
Having children  household position 0.0 0.0 0.0
Having children  education 0.2 0.2 0.3
Having children  year 0.0 2.9 5.3
Education 1.6 1.6 2.1
Education partner -0.1 -0.1 0.3
Education  education partner 0.4 0.4 0.2
Unemployment 1.6 1.6 1.6
Unobserved age effects -3.1 -3.1 -0.6
Unobserved cohort effects 3.3 3.3 3.3
a B refers to the basic scenario, and E refers to the emancipatory scenario.
We have also checked the sensitivity of the basic scenario with respect to
the education projection (not reported in the table). An important difference
with the child/time-effect is that the education variables cause less uncertainty
as a result of ‘natural bounds’ (e.g. it seems unlikely that the share of highly
educated will exceed one half). For instance, if the growth in higher education
participation is only half as great as described above, then total participation
growth is lowered by just one %-point (in both scenarios).
A further increase in the female participation rate has important conse-
quences for the government budget. Many industrialized countries have unsus-
tainable government budgets given their aging populations. The main reason
is that most social arrangements, like e.g. health care, social insurance, and
pensions, are predominantly ﬁnanced on a pay-as-you-go basis, whereas the
elderly relatively often make use of these arrangements. An increasing fe-
male participation rate leads to higher employment, and this boosts economic
growth. As a result, tax revenues will increase. To illustrate this for the Nether-
lands, an increase in the female labor participation rate by 7%-points as in the
‘basic scenario’ would improve the ﬁscal sustainability by about 1%-point of
GDP .10 In the ‘emancipatory scenario’ this would become 1.5%-points of GDP .
10A 2%-points increase in the labor force participation rate of women implies an improvement34 The Trend in Female Labor Force Participation Chapter 2
Compared to the entire structural deﬁcit in the Netherlands, this implies that
about one third would be alleviated as a direct result of the increasing female
participation rate.11
2.7 Conclusion and discussion
In the Netherlands, the female participation rate has increased considerably
over the last decades. A further increase will help to alleviate the problem of
ﬁscal sustainability due to the aging of the society. Which factors have played a
role in the increase of the female participation rate between 1992 and 2004,
and which further increase may we reasonably expect in the next decades? In
order to answer these questions, we estimate a binary age-period-cohort model
for the participation of women born between 1925 and 1986 on the basis of
the Dutch Labor Force Survey 1992–2004. We use demographic forecasts of
Statistics Netherlands to make an educated guess for the future development
of female participation rates.
The estimation results indicate that the female participation rate is higher
when the labor market is relatively tight. Between 1992 and 2004 the business
cycle caused an increase in the female participation rate by nearly 2%-points.
With regard to the household situation, single and cohabiting women have
a relatively high probability to participate, while women with children have
a relatively low probability to participate. The effect of having children is
different for singles and for women part of a couple. Between 1992 and 2004
participation has become less sensitive for the presence of children, and this
has played an important role in the increase of the participation rate. During
the period under consideration, the availability and affordability of child care
facilities improved substantially, and this may explain an important part of this
effect. Furthermore, the increase in the education level between 1992 and
2004 has caused one sixth of the total increment in the female participation
rate between 1992 and 2004.
of the ﬁscal sustainability by 0.3%-points of GDP , keeping other factors ﬁxed (Van Ewijk et al.,
2006).
11The sustainability gap is estimated at 3.4% of GDP keeping the female participation rate
ﬁxed (Van Ewijk et al., 2006).Section 2.7 Conclusion and discussion 35
Changes in unobserved cohort effects are very important for the cohorts
born between 1935 and 1955. These effects account for about one quarter of
the total increase in the female participation rate between 1992 and 2004. The
estimated unobserved cohort effects are rather constant for the generations
born after 1955. Note that the unobserved cohort effects should be interpreted
with care as they may pick up time trends that we did not correct for. An
obvious candidate for such a time trend would be the increase in real wages
per level of education as it may have encouraged women to participate in the
labor market. This may explain part of the increase in participation over the
successive cohorts.
Although our research does not explicitly address the role of social norms
and attitudes towards paid employment, it is conceivable they play a role
in explaining the development of participation over successive cohorts. The
reason is that sociological research on social norms and attitudes with respect
to the combination of employment and family care responsibilities ﬁnds a
development over the cohorts which is practically identical to the development
we ﬁnd for participation (SCP/CBS, 2006). The developments of participation
over generations has been addressed in the international literature as well.
Fernandez (2007) confronts a model of culture and intergenerational learning
with the increase in US female participation. She concludes that culture can
explain the particular pattern of the increase in participation. And there is
evidence for the US that birth control has played a role as well. Goldin and
Katz (2002) ﬁnd that oral contraceptives, which became available in the years
the generations born in the 1950s became mature, did affect family formation
and the careers of women of this generation.
Using our estimation results, we have given some indication of the future
prospects of female labor force participation. The female participation is likely
to increase at a much lower rate, in particular as cohort effects have stabilized
for the generations born after 1955, and we ﬁnd no indications that social
norms with regard to paid employment will evolve again. In the two scenarios
we construct, the female participation rate increases by 7 and 10%-points,
respectively, depending on the assumption made on the evolvement of attitudes
towards the combination of paid work and children. A simple calculation shows
that this increment alleviates the structural ﬁscal deﬁcit caused by aging of the
population by 1.0 to 1.5%-points of GDP .36 The Trend in Female Labor Force Participation Chapter 2
2.A Extended estimation results
Table 2.A.1: Extended estimation results for table 2.5.1: education param-
eters and interaction effects
Model Ia Model IIa
Variable Coef. S.e. Coef. S.e.
Child(ren) < 18  1992
Child(ren) < 18  1993 0.10 (0.09) 0.13 (0.03)
Child(ren) < 18  1994b -1.13 (0.09) -1.10 (0.03)
Child(ren) < 18  1995 0.29 (0.10) 0.26 (0.03)
Child(ren) < 18  1996 0.30 (0.11) 0.28 (0.03)
Child(ren) < 18  1997 0.38 (0.11) 0.31 (0.03)
Child(ren) < 18  1998 0.42 (0.11) 0.46 (0.03)
Child(ren) < 18  1999 0.42 (0.11) 0.41 (0.03)
Child(ren) < 18  2000 0.39 (0.11) 0.44 (0.03)
Child(ren) < 18  2001 0.47 (0.12) 0.49 (0.03)
Child(ren) < 18  2002 0.59 (0.12) 0.56 (0.03)
Child(ren) < 18  2003 0.67 (0.13) 0.59 (0.03)
Child(ren) < 18  2004 0.78 (0.14) 0.60 (0.03)
Primary education (E1)
Lower secondary education (E2) 0.55 (0.09) 0.78 (0.03)
Higher secondary education (E3) 0.73 (0.16) 1.09 (0.02)
Tertairy education (E4) 1.12 (0.14) 1.52 (0.03)
Partner: Primary education (EP1)c -0.13 (0.06) -0.14 (0.05)
Partner: Lower secondary educ. (EP2)c 0.13 (0.07) 0.12 (0.05)
Partner: Higher secondary educ. (EP3)c 0.30 (0.06) 0.29 (0.05)
Partner: Tertairy education (EP4)c 0.19 (0.06) 0.18 (0.07)
a Model I refers to the proxy variable approach, and Model II to the functional form
approach.
b The interaction effect “Child(ren) < 18  1994” also contains the general effect of
having at least one child younger than 18 in that year (see the three coefﬁcients on
“Age youngest child” in table 2.5.1). The reason is that the age of the youngest child in
the year 1994 was not observed in the data set.
c It is possible to identify a full set of coefﬁcients for the education level of the partner,
because we can use single women as the reference category (for which all related
dummy variables equal zero). As a consequence, the coefﬁcients of four interaction
dummy variables are not identiﬁed and need to be set to zero.Section 2.A Extended estimation results 37
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E2  EP1 -0.26 (0.06) -0.25 (0.04)
E2  EP2 -0.37 (0.06) -0.36 (0.03)
E2  EP3 -0.37 (0.07) -0.35 (0.03)
E2  EP4 -0.28 (0.06) -0.29 (0.06)
E3  EP1 0.12 (0.09) 0.16 (0.04)
E3  EP2 -0.04 (0.09) 0.00 (0.03)
E3  EP3 -0.06 (0.09) -0.02 (0.03)
E3  EP4 -0.09 (0.08) -0.07 (0.06)
E4  EP1 -0.04 (0.13) -0.03 (0.09)
E4  EP2 0.04 (0.08) 0.06 (0.05)
E4  EP3 -0.05 (0.07) -0.03 (0.04)
E4  EP4 0.02 (0.06) 0.03 (0.06)
a These dummy coefﬁcients are set to zero for iden-
tiﬁcation; see note c in the previous table.38 The Trend in Female Labor Force Participation Chapter 2
Table 2.A.2: Extended estimation results for table 2.5.1, model
II (functional form approach): year and age dummy
coefﬁcients
Var. Coef. S.e. Var. Coef. S.e. Var. Coef. S.e.
1992 0.00 - age 26 2.73 (0.04) age 47 2.70 (0.06)
1993 -0.05 (0.02) age 27 2.80 (0.04) age 48 2.61 (0.06)
1994 -0.10 (0.02) age 28 2.86 (0.04) age 49 2.48 (0.06)
1995 -0.12 (0.02) age 29 2.89 (0.04) age 50 2.35 (0.07)
1996 -0.14 (0.03) age 30 2.92 (0.04) age 51 2.26 (0.07)
1997 -0.10 (0.03) age 31 2.91 (0.04) age 52 2.20 (0.07)
1998 -0.18 (0.03) age 32 2.95 (0.04) age 53 2.12 (0.07)
1999 -0.08 (0.03) age 33 2.98 (0.04) age 54 2.00 (0.08)
2000 -0.11 (0.03) age 34 2.97 (0.04) age 55 1.87 (0.08)
2001 -0.07 (0.03) age 35 3.03 (0.04) age 56 1.78 (0.08)
2002 -0.04 (0.03) age 36 3.07 (0.04) age 57 1.57 (0.08)
2003 -0.04 (0.04) age 37 3.06 (0.04) age 58 1.44 (0.09)
2004 -0.04 (0.04) age 38 3.09 (0.05) age 59 1.18 (0.09)
age 18 0.00 - age 39 3.11 (0.05) age 60 0.79 (0.10)
age 19 0.37 (0.03) age 40 3.11 (0.05) age 61 0.35 (0.11)
age 20 0.80 (0.03) age 41 3.07 (0.05) age 62 0.16 (0.11)
age 21 1.17 (0.03) age 42 3.06 (0.05) age 63 -0.10 (0.12)
age 22 1.57 (0.04) age 43 3.00 (0.05) age 64 -0.18 (0.13)
age 23 1.92 (0.04) age 44 2.93 (0.05) age 65 -0.69 (0.16)
age 24 2.27 (0.04) age 45 2.90 (0.06) age 66 -0.49 (0.17)
age 25 2.57 (0.04) age 46 2.79 (0.06) age 67 -0.52 (0.18)3
Pathways to Retirement and
Cause-Speci￿c Mortality Risks in
the Netherlands
This chapter is based on Kalwij, Alessie, and Knoef (2010).
Introduction 3.1
The aging of the Dutch population has raised concerns about the sustainability
of the welfare state as it increases public expenditures on, for instance, long-
term care and retirement pensions (Van Ewijk et al., 2006). One means of
alleviating the burden of an aging population on public ﬁnances is to increase
labor force participation and so raise social security contributions and tax
revenues. Since the 1990s, social security programs and pension schemes are,
therefore, being redesigned to create stronger incentives for continued work at
older ages. These reforms, together with the increased labor force participation
of women, are likely to have contributed to the rising participation in the
workplace of the 55–64 population from under 30% in the mid-1990s to 45%
in 2007 (Euwals et al., 2009, Van Oorschot, 2007). Recent reforms like the
2004 introduction of job search requirements for older unemployed persons
(De Vos et al., 2010), the abolishment of the favorable ﬁscal treatment of early
retirement contributions (CPB, 2005) and a tax exemption for individuals who
continue working after age 62 (Stimulansz, 2009), as well as the proposed
rise in the statutory retirement age from 65 to 67 (CPB, 2009 and 2010), are
expected to further increase employment among the 55+ population.
Nevertheless, the success of, and the political support for, policies aimed
at keeping older workers in employment depends, among other things, on the40 Pathways to Retirement and Cause-Speci￿c Mortality Risks Chapter 3
health conditions of these workers. One particular concern is that workers who
leave employment before the statutory retirement age of 65 may have health
conditions that prevent them from remaining employed until age 65. An obvi-
ous group of such older workers is those drawing disability insurance beneﬁts,
but the concern extends to other groups like early retirees who for health rea-
sons may have chosen to leave the labor force before age 65. Although several
empirical studies have addressed this issue by estimating the impact of health
on employment, the ﬁndings appear to depend, among other things, on the
available health measures such as self-reported health status, (objective) health
conditions or (future) mortality risk. For instance, for the Netherlands Kerkhofs
et al. (1999) ﬁnd no effect of an objective health indicator on the transition
from employment to early retirement while Lindeboom and Kerkhofs (2009)
ﬁnd that individuals in bad health are more likely to leave employment to early
retirement when using a self-reported work-related health measure. The ﬁnd-
ings for the U.S. in Bound et al. (1999) and for Canada in Campolieti (2002)
are in line with this latter result. These studies often employ an instrumental
variables approach to take into account that, for reasons such as measure-
ment error and simultaneity, the health measure is likely to be an endogenous
explanatory variable in an employment equation (e.g., Stern, 1989).1
An alternative approach to assess whether individuals who leave employ-
ment early may have health conditions that prevent them from remaining
employed, and the one taken in this study, is to estimate the association be-
tween the different labor market states before retirement and mortality risk
during retirement. A few empirical studies have taken this approach and the
ﬁndings are contradictory. For instance, Tsai et al. (2005) and Bamia et al.
(2007) ﬁnd an increased mortality risk among early retirees in the U.S. and
Greece, respectively, whereas Brockman et al. (2009) and Litwin (2007) ﬁnd
no such increased risk among early retirees in Germany and Israel, respectively.
Likewise, Iversen et al. (1987) have shown an increased mortality risk among
unemployed individuals. One reason to expect a priori that older workers who
leave employment to early retirement or unemployment have, on average, no
increased mortality risk in countries like the Netherlands, is the presence of
a disability insurance scheme that selects individuals with health conditions
1See, for instance, Bound (1991) and Baker et al. (2004) for a critical discussion of this
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that limit their work capacity out of the labor force. This selection implies an
increased mortality risk among individuals drawing disability insurance bene-
ﬁts. Empirical support for this implication is available for Germany (Brockman
et al., 2009), Norway (Gjesdal et al., 2007), and Sweden (Karlsson et al., 2007,
and Wallman et al., 2006).
This study contributes to the literature on the health conditions of the
unused labor capacity among the 58–64 population in the Netherlands by
taking the alternative approach discussed above and using a large individual-
level administrative dataset that contains information on labor market status
before retirement and mortality during retirement. Accordingly, we estimate the
association between the pathways to statutory retirement at age 65 and cause-
speciﬁc mortality risk after the statutory retirement age of 65. The pathways
to retirement delineated here are the years of being employed, self-employed,
unemployed, nonparticipating, early retired, or on disability insurance beneﬁts
between the ages of 58 and 64. This latter pathway concerns individuals who
leave employment early because of health conditions that limit their work
capacity. We relate these pathways to three competing causes of death – cancer,
cardiovascular disease (CVD), and other diseases. Differentiating these three
causes of death may yield additional insights as, for instance, early retirement
is often related to CVD mortality risk (e.g., Bamia et al., 2007).
Based on estimated associations we draw conclusions concerning the health
conditions that may limit the work capacity of older workers who leave employ-
ment early and this requires three assumptions. First, we assume, in line with
Grossman’s health stock model (Grossman, 2000), that pre-retirement health
conditions are related to later life health and mortality risk. Empirical support
for this is provided in, for instance, Portrait et al. (2001). Second, we assume a
positive association between pre-retirement health conditions and health con-
ditions that limit a person’s work capacity.2 Lindeboom and Kerkhofs (2009),
for instance, provide empirical support for this assumption. Third, and perhaps
most importantly, we assume that an early withdrawal from the labor market
has no health-preserving effect. If individuals who leave employment improve
their health relatively to individuals who remain employed then mortality risk
during retirement overestimates their health status at the time they left employ-
2This does not mean we exclude the possibility that some pre-retirement health conditions
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ment. Recent empirical evidence that uses (exogenous) variation in retirement
policy to identify a possible causal effect of early retirement on mortality risk,
however, suggests the contrary. For instance, Coe and Lindeboom (2008) ﬁnd
no causal effect of early retirement on mortality risk in the U.S., Kuhn et al.
(2010) ﬁnd a positive causal effect of early retirement on CVD mortality risk
in Austria for men (but not for women) and Coe and Zamarro (2008) report
for Europe a health-preserving effect of retiring at age 65 but not of retiring at
younger ages. The ﬁndings of Snyder and Evans (2006) for the U.S. suggest
that post-retirement part-time work may have a health-preserving effect. In
addition, it has been shown that early retirement has a negative causal impact
on cognitive health (Rohwedder and Willis, 2010, and Bonsang et al., 2010).
Likewise, Sullivan and Von Wachter (2009) and Eliason and Storrie (2009)
show that job displacement increases mortality risk.
The recent empirical literature supports the above mentioned assumptions.
This implies that if, for example, we would ﬁnd no increased mortality risk after
age 65 among early retirees, that they have, on average, no worse health and
reduced work capacity than individuals who remained employed. Alternatively,
in this example, if we would ﬁnd an increased mortality risk after age 65 among
early retirees then it can be that the relatively unhealthy workers (with reduced
work capacity) retire early or that early retirement causes a higher mortality
risk.
Our methodological framework for analyzing the associations between
the pathways to retirement and cause-speciﬁc mortality risk is a dependent
competing mortality risks model. The model allows for dependencies between
the different competing risks by conditioning on both observed characteris-
tics and an unobserved individual speciﬁc characteristic (see, e.g., Katsahian
et al., 2006).3 The model therefore takes into account that with age the sam-
ple becomes more selective in terms of both the observed and unobserved
characteristics (e.g., Van den Berg, 2001). In addition we use information
on multiple causes of death to allow the impact of the unobserved individual
speciﬁc characteristic to differ across the cause-speciﬁc mortality risks.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the data. Sec-
tion 3.3 outlines the statistical model, and section 3.4 reports the empirical
results. Section 3.5 summarizes the main ﬁndings and concludes the chapter.
3For example, an unobserved individual speciﬁc characteristic such as smoking behavior
affects mortality risks for lung cancer as well as for cardiovascular diseases.Section 3.2 Data 43
Data 3.2
The data are taken from the 1989–2007 Income Panel Study of the Netherlands
(IPO, Inkomens Panel Onderzoek, CBS 2009a) and the 1997–2008 Causes of
Death registry (DO, Doodsoorzaken, CBS 2009b), both gathered by Statistics
Netherlands. The IPO, a representative sample of the Dutch population, con-
sists of an administrative panel dataset of, on average, about 95,000 selected
individuals per year who are followed longitudinally. Sampling is based on
individuals’ national security number, and the selected individuals are followed
for as long as they are residing in the Netherlands on December 31 of the sam-
ple year. Individuals born in the Netherlands enter the panel for the ﬁrst time
in the year of their birth, and immigrants to the Netherlands in the year of their
arrival. The main advantages of using this administrative dataset compared
to using survey data for our analysis are, apart from the large sample size,
twofold. First, the IPO dataset includes individuals living in institutions for the
elderly, such as nursing homes, who are usually absent or underrepresented
in household surveys. Second, an individual only exits the panel on death or
emigration from the Netherlands. To summarize, the IPO sampling framework
guarantees a representative sample of the population and, therefore, our analy-
sis is not compromised by possible sample selection issues that may be related
to individuals’ health status or mortality risk.
The IPO contains data on gender, age, marital status, income, homeowner-
ship, and labor market status. These data are obtained from ofﬁcial institutions,
most particularly, the population registry and the tax ofﬁce. The DO, on the
other hand, provides information on the date of death and at most four causes
of death for all residents deceased during the 1997–2008 period. Multiple
causes of death include a primary cause and up to three secondary causes.
These data, all registered using version 10 of the International Classiﬁcation of
Diseases (ICD10),4 are provided by medical examiners who are legally obliged
to submit them to Statistics Netherlands. The DO dataset also assigns a per-
sonal identiﬁer that allows determination of whether an individual in the IPO
has died by the next calendar year and, if so, the causes of death.
We select individuals who turned 65 during the 1996–2007 period, meaning
that individuals from the oldest cohort (born in 1931) are included in the
4http://www.who.int/classiﬁcations/apps/icd/icd10online44 Pathways to Retirement and Cause-Speci￿c Mortality Risks Chapter 3
data for at most 12 years and individuals from the youngest cohort (born in
1942) are included for only 1 year. This selected sample consists of 57,757
observations for 10,013 individuals. We remove 3.8% of the observations
because of negative or zero income or missing values on the variables included
in the empirical analysis. The hypothesis of the same mortality rate among
the individuals excluded and those included is not rejected,5 which implies no
endogenous sample selection. Panel attrition for reasons other than mortality
(mainly emigration) is about 0.12% per year. The resulting sample consists
of 55,553 observations for 9,618 individuals, 1,147 of whom died during the
sample period.
3.2.1 Variable de￿nitions and descriptive statistics
We deﬁne age as the individual’s age on January 1 of each year because in the
Netherlands, the calendar year is also the ﬁscal year for income measurement,
meaning that this choice ensures that income at age 65 is measured over the
ﬁrst entire calendar year of retirement. The dependent variable in our analysis
is cause-speciﬁc mortality after the statutory retirement age of 65. For this
variable, we distinguish between the two major causes of death, cancer (ICD10
code C00-D48) and CVD (ICD10 code I00-I99), and refer to all other causes
of death as “other diseases”. These latter, which include infectious diseases,
diabetes, pneumonia, diseases of the digestive system, and fatal injuries, cannot
be further disaggregated because small numbers of persons in our sample die
from each of these diseases. The explanatory variables are gender, marital
status at age 65, homeownership at age 65, standardized household income
at age 65, and labor market status from age 58 onward. Table 3.2.1 describes
how these variables, deﬁned below, relate to cause-speciﬁc mortality rates.
Table 3.2.1 conﬁrms the accepted pattern that men have a higher mortality
rate than women: the three rightmost columns show that differential mortality
with respect to gender appears to be equally strong for the different causes of
death. The marital status variable distinguishes between widowed individuals,
other single adult households including divorcees (hereafter, single), and
married or cohabiting couples (married). As table 3.2.1 shows, individuals
5The corresponding p-value is 0.214.Section 3.2 Data 45
Table 3.2.1: Cause-speciﬁc mortality rates by socioeconomic group
Cause-speciﬁc mortality ratea
Sample Other
proportion All causes Cancer CVDb diseases
% % % % %
All 100 2.1 0.9 0.6 0.6
Gender
Men 48.4 2.7 1.2 0.8 0.7
Women 51.6 1.5 0.7 0.4 0.4
Marital status at age 65
Single 12.7 2.8 0.9 1.0 0.9
Widowed 11.9 2.4 1.0 0.6 0.8
Married 75.4 1.9 0.9 0.5 0.5
Birth cohort
1931–1935 38.9 2.4 1.0 0.7 0.6
1936–1942 61.1 1.6 0.8 0.4 0.4
Homeowner at age 65
No 49.9 2.5 1.0 0.7 0.8
Yes 50.2 1.6 0.8 0.5 0.3
Labor market status at age 58
Employed 29.3 1.9 1.0 0.5 0.4
Self-employed 7.6 2.2 1.5 0.4 0.3
Unemployed 11.2 2.4 0.9 0.9 0.7
On disability 13.1 3.2 1.1 1.0 1.1
Early retired 14.4 2.0 0.9 0.5 0.6
Nonparticipating 24.4 1.5 0.7 0.4 0.4
Labor market status at age 62
Employed 10.6 2.0 0.9 0.6 0.5
Self-employed 5.8 2.1 1.4 0.4 0.3
Unemployed 8.9 2.3 0.9 0.8 0.7
On disability 14.3 3.3 1.2 1.1 1.0
Early retired 36.6 2.0 1.0 0.5 0.5
Nonparticipating 23.7 1.4 0.6 0.4 0.4
Standardized household income Sample mean (euros)
1st quartile 11,208 3.0 1.1 1.0 0.8
2nd quartile 15,438 2.0 0.9 0.5 0.6
3rd quartile 19,251 1.7 0.9 0.4 0.4
4th quartile 32,320 1.6 0.8 0.4 0.4
a The mortality rate is deﬁned as the probability of death within one year (in %).
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married at age 65 have relatively lower mortality rates for CVD and other
diseases but about the same cancer mortality rate as individuals who are single
or widowed at age 65. Homeowners at age 65 have a lower mortality rate
than renters, an observation particularly related to the mortality risks for other
diseases, but also for CVD.
The IPO income data, which are based primarily on records from the tax
ofﬁce and institutions that pay out (insurance) beneﬁts, contain detailed and
accurate information on all income components on an individual level. The
income components are the total yearly amounts received from the different
income sources. Based on the largest income component, Statistics Netherlands
assigns one of the following labor market statuses to each individual: employed,
self-employed, unemployed (receiving unemployment insurance or assistance
beneﬁts), disability (receiving disability or (long-term) sickness insurance
beneﬁts),6 early retired (receiving pension income before the age of 65), or
nonparticipating (receiving no labor income, pension, or beneﬁts). Eligibility
for disability insurance beneﬁts is assessed by a medical doctor based on
health conditions that adversely affect individual work capacity.7 We separately
distinguish the self-employed since they have an own responsibility to take out,
for instance, disability insurance and this may affect the possible pathways to
retirement.
Although our selected sample starts in 1996, the IPO dataset also contains
information on the labor market status for all individuals in our sample from
1989 onward, meaning that we observe labor market status for all these
individuals from age 58 onward. As shown in column 1, table 3.2.1, the 36.9%
employment rate for 58-year-old individuals drops to 16.4% by age 62, while
the proportion of those on disability increases slightly from 13.1% at age 58
to 14.3% at age 62. Between ages 58 and 62, the percentage of early retirees
increases from 14.4% to 36.6%. We also observe a higher mortality rate related
6The disability insurance scheme is referred to as the WAO or WIA and the (long-term)
sickness insurance scheme as the ZW (see www.uwv.nl). If, for example, an individual is
partially disabled but the main source of income is employment, we classify this person as
employed.
7Since the early 1990s, the disability insurance system has been reformed toward stricter
eligibility conditions (see, e.g., De Vos et al., 2010), which may have caused individuals who
begin claiming disability insurance beneﬁts to become, on average, less healthy over time.
However, in our empirical analysis we found no evidence for this assumption when testing if
the impact of the pathway “years on disability” on mortality during retirement varies with the
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primarily to CVD and other diseases among individuals on disability but a
higher mortality rate from cancer among the self-employed. Apart from these
observations, no clear pattern emerges on cause-speciﬁc mortality rates by
labor market status at ages 58 and 62.
For both the individual and the spouse (when present), we use income
at the age of 65 as a proxy for lifetime income, which the health-economic
theory suggests is associated with mortality risk (see, e.g., Grossman, 2000).
Standardized household income is deﬁned as an individual’s lifetime income to-
gether with that of the spouse when present, gross of taxes and social insurance
contributions, measured in 2005 euros using the consumer price index and,
for married individuals, divided by the equivalence scale provided by Statistics
Netherlands (Siermann et al., 2004).8
As table 3.2.1 shows, in line with the ﬁndings of other European studies
(see, e.g., Kalwij et al. 2009, for a summary), the mortality rate is about twice
as high among individuals in the lowest quartile of the income distribution
than among individuals in the highest quartile (3.0% versus 1.6%). Income
also appears most strongly associated with CVD mortality and most weakly
linked to cancer mortality. These ﬁndings conform, to those of, for instance,
Huisman et al. (2005) who, using data from eight European countries, report
higher mortality risk among low- than among highly educated groups for all
causes of death other than prostate cancer for men and lung cancer for women.
Although the cause-speciﬁc mortality rates given in table 3.2.1 refer to the
so-called primary cause of death, medical examiners also report up to three
contributing causes often termed secondary causes of death (see table 3.2.2).
For example, if an individual with a fatal form of cancer dies from CVD, the
medical examiner reports CVD as the primary cause of death and cancer as
the secondary cause (as in 11 cases listed in table 3.2.2). Nevertheless, given
the level of aggregation, the secondary cause of death may be the same as
the primary one; for instance, an individual may suffer from two different
cancers, making cancer both the primary and secondary cause of death (as
in 22 cases given in table 3.2.2). About one-third of the recorded deaths in
8We exclude income from other household members, present in about 12% of the households
but mostly children. This exclusion does not affect our results. Although income includes
pension, labor, transfer, and capital income for individuals 65 and older, over 90% of income
consists of public retirement pension beneﬁts (independent of past earnings) and occupational
pension income (see Knoef et al., 2009, for further details on the income measures in the IPO).48 Pathways to Retirement and Cause-Speci￿c Mortality Risks Chapter 3
our sample have a secondary cause of death that is different from the primary
cause. The next section discusses how we use this additional information to
allow an unobserved individual speciﬁc characteristic to have different impacts
on the cause-speciﬁc mortality risks. For a detailed discussion of the multiple
causes of death and Statistics Netherlands’ method for recording them we refer
to Mackenbach et al. (1995, 1997).
Table 3.2.2: Multiple causes of death
Cell: number of deaths Secondary cause of death
Other
Primary cause of death Cancer CVDa diseases
Cancer 512 22 56 135
CVD 329 11 73 112
Other diseases 306 9 68 158
All causes 1,147 42 197 405
a CVD = cardiovascular diseases
3.3 Cause-speci￿c mortality model
Our empirical model for analyzing cause-speciﬁc mortality risk is a discrete-
time competing risks model that allows for dependency across these risks
through time-invariant observed and unobserved heterogeneity. The dependent
variable is whether an individual is deceased by the next calendar year and if
so, whether the cause of death is cancer, CVD, or other diseases.
The cause-speciﬁc mortality risk conditional on age and individual charac-
teristics is formalized as follows
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where Fj(.) is the logistic cumulative distribution function that corresponds to
mortality cause j (j 2 f1,2,3g). Mj,a+1(i) is equal to 1 if individual i became a
years old and died at age (a+1) from cause j, and 0 otherwise. xa(i) is a (1k)
vector of an individual’s observed characteristics at age a with a corresponding
(k 1) parameter vector 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The time-invariant unobserved individual characteristic (a random effect)
is denoted by (i) and is assumed to be normally distributed and independent
of individual’s observed characteristics at age 65. The j parameters allow the
unobserved individual speciﬁc characteristic to have different impacts on the
cause-speciﬁc mortality risks. As mentioned in the introduction, by modeling
unobserved individual characteristics the model takes into account that with
age the sample becomes more selective in terms of not only observed but also
unobserved characteristics (e.g., Van den Berg, 2001).
The age dependency of cause-speciﬁc mortality risk is modeled using a
linear age function (in the index).9 We include the years in each labor market
state from age 59 until age 64 to measure the extent to which pathways to
retirement other than employment are associated with cause-speciﬁc mortality
risk during retirement.
We estimate the model with two empirical speciﬁcations. The ﬁrst spec-
iﬁcation only controls for gender, birth cohort, pathways and labor market
status at age 58 and does not control for socioeconomic status. It also does
not control for the time-invariant unobserved individual characteristics. The
inclusion of labor market status at age 58 ensures that the associations between
the pathways and cause-speciﬁc mortality risk are identiﬁed solely from labor
market transitions after age 58. The estimated associations provide, under the
assumptions that we discussed in the introduction, insights into, for example,
whether individuals who leave employment between the ages of 58 and 65 to
early retirement or unemployment, may have health conditions that prevent
them from remaining employed.
The second speciﬁcation controls for gender, birth cohort, pathways to
retirement, labor market status at age 58 and socioeconomic status using the
characteristics marital status, homeownership and the logarithm of standard-
ized household income. In addition, it controls for time-invariant unobserved
individual characteristics. Socioeconomic status is known to be strongly associ-
ated with mortality risk and this second speciﬁcation provides further empirical
evidence on these associations for the Netherlands.10 Also, conditioning on
9Kalwij et al. (2009) present empirical evidence in favor of using a linear age function.
10We refer, for instance, to Duleep (1986), Huisman et al. (2004, 2005), Lindahl (2005),
Marmot et al. (1991), Menchik (1993), Smith (1999) and Van Kippersluis et al. (2010) for
empirical evidence and discussions on the socioeconomic variation in health- (and cause-)
speciﬁc mortality risk(s). Grundy and Holt (2001) argue that homeownership is a good proxy50 Pathways to Retirement and Cause-Speci￿c Mortality Risks Chapter 3
(observed) socioeconomic status provides insights into the extent to which
workers with different pathways to retirement differ with respect to socioe-
conomic status and corresponding health status. Should the selection into a
speciﬁc pathway be health related then we expect the associations between the
pathways and mortality risk to be affected by the inclusion of socioeconomic
status variables that are, in turn, known to be strongly related to mortality
risk. If, for instance, we ﬁnd that by controlling for socioeconomic status the
(possible) positive association between a pathway (relative to continuing em-
ployment) and mortality risk diminishes, this would provide empirical evidence
that workers with relatively lower socioeconomic status (and corresponding
lower health status) are more likely to take this pathway. In addition, by includ-
ing socioeconomic status variables measured at age 65 we take into account
the possible impact on mortality risk of changes in these variables that may
result from leaving employment before age 65.11
3.3.1 Model estimation
We observe an individual from age 65 until death or until the last sample
year. With A(i) denoting the age of the individual when last observed in the
sample, the variable mj(i) is equal to 1 if j is the cause of death at age A(i)+1
(j 2 f1,2,3g), and 0 otherwise. We summarize all information observed for
individual i in the vector z(i) = fxa(i)g
A(i)
a=65. The probability of individual i
surviving from age 65 to age A(i) and either surviving to or being deceased at






















for older people’s socioeconomic status.
11There are, however, few changes in socioeconomic status variables between the ages 58
and 65. Also (or instead) including, for instance, marital status and homeownership at age 58








where  = (1,2,3) and  = (1,2,3). The ﬁrst term in the right-hand
side of equation (3.2), in between the square brackets, is the survival probability
up to A(i), the second term is the probability of surviving one more year, and
the third term is the probability of being deceased from cause j at age A(i)+1.
As previously explained, (i)’s are unobserved random effects, meaning
there is no empirical counterpart to equation (3.2). We therefore assume that
the random effects are normally distributed with a zero mean and a variance


















where (.) is the cumulative normal distribution function. The maximum
likelihood estimates of the model parameters are given by
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where n is the number of individuals. We evaluate the integral of equation
(3.4) using a Gaussian quadrature (see, e.g., Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).12
Model identi￿cation 3.3.2
A well-known feature of a competing risks model is that one has to make an
assumption concerning the dependency across the different risks in order to
identify the parameters (see, e.g., Van den Berg, 2005). Frequently, such risks
are assumed to be independent conditional on the observed covariates (see, e.g,
Yashin et al., 1986). Yet in an analysis of cause-speciﬁc mortality risk, this latter
assumption may be unrealistic (for a discussion on this, see, e.g., Mackenbach
et al., 1995 and Vaupel and Yashin, 1999). We therefore allow for depen-
dency between cause-speciﬁc mortality risks by including an individual speciﬁc
12For estimation, we use the MATA module of the STATA software (www.stata.com).52 Pathways to Retirement and Cause-Speci￿c Mortality Risks Chapter 3
random effect as formulated in equation (3.1). A more general speciﬁcation,
such as different random effects for each risk, is impossible because of data
limitations: it would require, among other things, at least three continuous
covariates. However, one important aspect of the model given in equation
(3.1) is that, in the second empirical speciﬁcation, it contains one continuous
covariate (standardized household income) which, together with the propor-
tionality between age pattern, covariates, and the random effect imposed on
mortality risk, ensures identiﬁcation of the random effect distribution. A formal
discussion of the identiﬁability of mixed proportional hazards in competing
risks models can be found in, for instance, Heckman and Honoré (1989) and
Abbring and van den Berg (2003).
Our model also allows the (time-invariant) unobserved individual speciﬁc
characteristic to have different impacts on the cause-speciﬁc mortality risks
through the  parameters. Only their relative sizes are identiﬁed and we
normalize 1 = 3   2   3.13 The identiﬁcation of the  parameters in
equation (3.1) is guaranteed by the fact that medical examiners report more
than one cause of death for about one-third of deaths (see table 3.2.2). As
regards the likelihood function in equation (3.2), this information on multiple
causes of death means that mj(i) can be equal to 1 for more than one j for
individual i. Among others, Israel et al. (1986) and Mackenbach et al. (1999)
suggest to use multiple causes of death statistics to obtain information about
associations between different cause-speciﬁc mortality risks. Multiple causes of
death statistics have, as far as we know, not previously been used in the context
of a dependent competing risk model that includes unobserved individual
speciﬁc characteristics (random effects). Instead, for instance, Mackenbach
et al. (1999) use a logistic regression model to estimate the prevalence of a
speciﬁc secondary competing cause of death, given the primary cause of death.
Finally, as discussed above, the model includes a separate control for labor
market status at age 58 to ensure that the associations between the pathways
to retirement (measured by the years in the different labor market statuses
from age 59 onward) and cause-speciﬁc mortality risk are identiﬁed solely from
labor market transitions after age 58.
13This speciﬁcation allows one or two of the j parameters to be equal to zero.Section 3.4 Estimation results 53
Estimation results 3.4
The estimation results from the model outlined above are given in tables 3.4.1
and 3.4.2. In the following discussion we use a 5% level of signiﬁcance. Ta-
ble 3.4.1 shows the results using the ﬁrst empirical speciﬁcation, i.e. without
controlling for socioeconomic status and unobserved individual speciﬁc charac-
teristics. The table shows that women have a lower mortality risk than men
for all three causes of death, and that individuals in the more recent birth
cohorts have a lower mortality risk from CVD.14 Being on disability is the only
pathway to retirement that is signiﬁcantly associated with mortality risk during
retirement for all three causes of death.
Table 3.4.2 shows the results of the second empirical speciﬁcation which
controls for observed socioeconomic status and unobserved individual speciﬁc
characteristics. For all three causes of death, mortality risk is higher among
singles than married individuals. Homeowners have lower mortality risks,
especially from other diseases, and household income is more strongly and
negatively associated with the mortality risks from CVD and other diseases than
with that from cancer. This latter ﬁnding is in line with results for the U.S. (e.g.,
Cutler et al., 2006, and Smith, 1999) and the U.K. (e.g., Marmot et al., 1991).
Finally, being on disability is the only pathway that is signiﬁcantly associated
with mortality risk during retirement and for all three causes of death. This
latter ﬁnding is qualitatively similar to that in table 3.4.1. The signiﬁcant
and relatively large estimated standard deviation of the random effect (at the
bottom of the table) suggests an important role for unobserved individual-
speciﬁc characteristics.15 The hypothesis that  is equal to zero is rejected for
each of the three risks (based on t-statistics) and, more importantly, we reject
the hypothesis of the same (relative) impacts of unobserved individual speciﬁc
characteristics on all three mortality risks.16 These results on the standard
deviation of the random effect and the  parameters imply dependence between
the three competing risks, conditional on observed individual characteristics.
14In line with this ﬁnding, Janssen et al. (2004) show that old-age mortality from cardiovas-
cular diseases has declined after the 1960s.
15The parameter estimates are affected by excluding random effects. For instance, and in
line with the results in tables 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, it yields an underestimated age effect. This may
reﬂect that with age, the population at risk consists of relatively fewer frail individuals.
16The p-value corresponding to H0 : 2 = 3 = 1 is equal to 0.034 (note that 1 =
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Nevertheless, although the parameter estimates in table 3.4.2 provide
insights into the direction and relative size of the associations between the
covariates and the cause-speciﬁc mortality risks, they offer no clear quantitative
insights. We therefore use these estimates to predict the cause-speciﬁc and all-
causes mortality probabilities of a reference individual, conditional on surviving
up to age 65, with speciﬁc values assigned to the covariates.17 Here, we take
as a reference a male born in 1931, who is married at age 65, has a median
standardized household income, lives in a rented accommodation, and who
stayed employed up to the statutory retirement age of 65.18 First, we predict
the cause-speciﬁc and all-causes probabilities of the reference individual having
died by ages 70, 75, and 80 (see table 3.4.3); next, we change his characteristics
one at a time and report the resulting changes in these probabilities of his
having died by age 75 (see table 3.4.4).
As table 3.4.3 shows, with age there is a strong increase in the probability of
the man having died and a decrease in the relative importance of cancer as the
cause of death. Speciﬁcally, cancer accounts for about half of deaths by age 70
but only about one-third by age 80. The relative importance of CVD, however,
remains fairly constant with age, and the relative importance of other diseases
rises. As the ﬁrst line of table 3.4.4 (like that of table 3.4.3) shows, by age 75,
the reference male has a 13% probability of having died and this can be disen-
tangled in a 5% probability of having died from cancer, a 4% probability of hav-
ing died from CVD, and a 4% probability of having died from another disease.
In contrast, a woman with the same characteristics as the reference man
has about a 9 percentage point lower probability of having died by age
75 (table 3.4.4). The reduction in mortality is of similar size for all three
causes of death. Moreover, compared to the reference individual, who is
married at age 65, a single individual has a two times higher probability
of having died by age 75, an increase related primarily to CVD and other
diseases. Individuals that are widowed at age 65 have about a 9 percent-
age point higher probability of having died by age 75, primarily related to
other diseases. The younger birth cohorts, however, have a lower probability
17These calculations are based on Monte Carlo simulations. In a competing risk setting in
discrete time, two events can occur at the same time; however, by using random assignment in
the simulation, we allow for only one cause of death (cancer, CVD, or another disease).
18The choice of the reference individual only affects the baseline predictions and does not
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Table 3.4.3: Cause-speciﬁc mortality by age, conditional on being alive at
age 65 for a reference individuala (based on table 3.4.2 results)
All causes Cancer CVD Other diseases
Probability of
having died % S.e. % S.e. % S.e. % S.e.
by age 70 2.90 (0.63) 1.43 (0.43) 0.94 (0.43) 0.53 (0.29)
by age 75 13.25 (2.67) 5.15 (1.36) 4.17 (1.38) 3.93 (1.46)
by age 80b 51.04 (7.68) 16.31 (3.84) 14.51 (4.39) 20.22 (5.40)
a The reference individual is a male, born in 1931, married at age 65, with a median stan-
dardized household income, living in a rented accommodation at age 65, and who remained
employed up to the statutory retirement age of 65.
b This is an out-of-sample prediction (the oldest individual in our sample is 76 years of age).
of having died by age 75, due mainly to a lower mortality risk from CVD.19
The probability of having died by age 75 is almost twice as high among indi-
viduals in the ﬁrst quartile of the income distribution than among individuals in
the fourth quartile.20 In line with previous studies, this difference is strongest
for the mortality risk from CVD but insigniﬁcant for that from cancer. Further-
more, homeowners have a 3.6 percentage point lower probability of having
died by age 75, primarily due to a lower mortality risk from other diseases.
To assess the impact of pathways to statutory retirement on cause-speciﬁc
mortality risk, we examine in the second last panel at the bottom of table 3.4.4
the difference in the probability of having died by age 75 between individuals
who are and who are not employed in the three years preceding statutory
retirement (i.e., at ages 62–64).21 We ﬁnd, for example, that individuals in
early retirement during the three years preceding statutory retirement have no
increased probability of having died by age 75, no matter the cause of death.
The only pathway that is signiﬁcantly associated with the probability of having
died by age 75 is being on disability during the three years preceding statutory
retirement. Compared to those who remain employed, these individuals have
an almost twofold increase in the probability of having died by age 75 from any
of the three causes of death. Although the level of signiﬁcance of the estimated
increased CVD mortality risk is somewhat lower, we still reject a one-sided
hypothesis of no positive association.
19This interpretation only holds if we assume no time effects.
20Calculation: 13.25%+4.66% versus 13.25% 3.86%.
21Three years is an arbitrary choice; we could equally choose, for instance, two or four years.58 Pathways to Retirement and Cause-Speci￿c Mortality Risks Chapter 3
Finally, the last panel (at the bottom of table 3.4.4) shows that without
controlling for socioeconomic status and time-invariant unobserved individual
characteristics, the main ﬁndings are largely unchanged (and also considering
the standard errors). There is only one exception. In the last panel the pathway
nonparticipation is negatively associated with mortality risk, while there is no
signiﬁcant association in the second last panel. Together with the negative
association between socioeconomic status and mortality risk as shown in the
upper part of table 3.4.4, this could be explained by individuals with a higher
observed socioeconomic status being more likely to exit the labor force to
nonparticipation.Section 3.4 Estimation results 59
Table 3.4.4: Cause-speciﬁc mortality probabilities by socioeconomic status
and pathway to retirement
Cause-speciﬁc probability of having died by age 75
(conditional on being alive at age 65)
All causes Cancer CVDa Other diseases
% S.e. % S.e. % S.e. % S.e.
Reference indiv. 13.25 (2.67) 5.15 (1.36) 4.17 (1.38) 3.93 (1.46)
Differences from the reference individual
% point S.e. % point S.e. % point S.e. % point S.e.
Gender
Manb 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Woman -9.24 (1.92) -3.23 (0.86) -2.98 (0.97) -3.03 (1.11)
Marital status
Marriedb 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Single 13.95 (3.38) 2.25 (1.25) 4.68 (1.99) 7.02 (2.19)
Widowed 9.03 (3.22) 2.65 (1.31) 1.79 (1.43) 4.59 (2.19)
Birth cohort
1931b 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1936 -2.81 (1.27) -0.21 (0.55) -1.56 (0.68) -1.04 (0.62)
1941 -4.63 (2.09) -0.38 (1.03) -2.49 (1.02) -1.76 (0.99)
Household income
1st quartile 4.66 (1.23) 0.65 (0.37) 2.14 (0.74) 1.87 (0.74)
Medianb 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4th quartile -3.86 (1.04) -0.72 (0.38) -1.63 (0.55) -1.51 (0.62)
Accommodation
Renterb 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Homeowner -3.55 (1.26) -1.00 (0.61) -0.89 (0.57) -1.66 (0.67)
Labor market status at ages 62-64, conditional on being employed until age 62
Employedb 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Self-employed 0.03 (3.71) 0.66 (1.89) -0.97 (1.60) 0.34 (2.12)
Unemployed -2.07 (2.32) 0.05 (1.17) -0.97 (1.00) -1.15 (1.04)
On disability 12.67 (3.77) 4.53 (2.16) 3.21 (1.82) 4.93 (1.55)
Nonparticipating -3.26 (2.41) -0.32 (1.10) -1.49 (1.01) -1.45 (1.07)
Early retired -2.14 (1.82) -0.01 (0.81) -1.18 (0.82) -0.95 (0.90)
Labor market status at ages 62-64, conditional on being employed until age 62
(based on the model excluding random effects and socioeconomic status variables, table 3.4.1)
Employedc 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Self-employed 0.48 (4.75) 1.33 (2.60) -1.96 (4.68) 1.13 (5.10)
Unemployed 0.18 (2.68) 1.40 (2.08) -0.95 (2.96) -0.24 (2.63)
On disability 17.10 (2.54) 5.09 (2.71) 4.93 (3.59) 7.68 (3.60)
Nonparticipating -5.29 (2.64) 0.76 (1.66) -3.50 (2.50) -2.65 (2.52)
Early retired -1.70 (1.80) 1.48 (1.19) -2.31 (2.19) -0.87 (1.96)
a CVD = cardiovascular diseases
b The reference individual is a male, born in 1931, married at age 65, with a median standardized
household income, living in a rented accommodation at age 65, and who remained employed up to the
statutory retirement age of 65.
c The reference individual is a male, born in 1931, who remained employed up to the statutory retirement
age of 65.60 Pathways to Retirement and Cause-Speci￿c Mortality Risks Chapter 3
3.5 Summary and conclusions
In this study we investigate whether older workers who leave employment have
health conditions that may prevent them from remaining employed. For this
purpose we analyze to what extent pathways to statutory retirement other than
employment are associated with adverse health conditions, as measured by
increased cause-speciﬁc mortality risk during retirement (i.e., from the statutory
retirement age of 65 onward). In addition, we provide empirical evidence for
the Netherlands on the associations between socioeconomic status variables,
such as marital status and income, and cause-speciﬁc mortality risk. Hereby we
distinguish between cancer, cardiovascular and other diseases mortality risks.
The analysis involves the estimation of a dependent competing mortality
risks model using administrative data from the 1996–2007 waves of the In-
come Panel Study of the Netherlands supplemented with the Causes of Death
registry. Hereby we condition on both observed and unobserved individual
characteristics. A methodological contribution is the use of multiple causes of
death statistics in the context of a competing risk model to allow the impact
of the unobserved individual characteristic to differ across the cause-speciﬁc
mortality risks. We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant role of unobserved individual speciﬁc
characteristics for all three cause-speciﬁc mortality risks and conclude that
there is dependence between the three competing risks (after controlling for
observed characteristics).
Our primary empirical ﬁndings can be summarized as follows. Compared
to older workers who remain employed up to the statutory retirement age of
65, we ﬁnd no increased mortality risk among workers who leave employment
between the ages of 58 and 65 to early retirement and unemployment. Mortal-
ity risk is signiﬁcantly higher among workers who leave employment between
the ages of 58 and 65 and start drawing disability insurance beneﬁts. These
latter individuals have, by deﬁnition, health conditions that limit their work
capacity.22 These primary ﬁndings are not affected by allowing for random
effects or the inclusion of socioeconomic status variables that are, in turn,
shown to be strongly associated with mortality risk.
As discussed in the introduction, the results from previous studies support
22For a critical discussion on the functioning of the Dutch disability insurance scheme we
refer to De Vos et al. (2010).Section 3.5 Summary and conclusions 61
our assumptions of a positive association between health conditions that limit a
person’s work capacity and later life mortality risk, and that leaving employment
to early retirement or unemployment has no health-preserving effect. Under
these assumptions, our primary empirical ﬁndings imply that workers who
leave employment before the statutory retirement age of 65 to early retirement
or unemployment have, on average, no worse health conditions that may limit
their work capacity than workers who remain employed up to age 65.
The recent reforms in the Netherlands of the early retirement and unem-
ployment insurance schemes are aimed at keeping older workers employed
(see, e.g., De Vos et al. 2010). The success of such policies depends, among
other things, on the health conditions of these workers. If, for instance, workers
for health reasons have chosen to retire early, the effectiveness of a policy that
limits early retirement opportunities will be lower than if workers who have
chosen early retirement have no health conditions that prevented them from
remaining employed. Our ﬁndings imply that the effectiveness of reforms of
the early retirement and unemployment insurance schemes for older workers,
may, on average, not be adversely affected by the health conditions of older
workers, other than those who qualify for disability insurance beneﬁts.4
The E￿ects of Cooperation;
A Structural Model of Siblings’
Caregiving Interactions
This chapter is based on Knoef and Kooreman (2011).
Introduction 4.1
When parents age, their adult children usually face deteriorating parental
health and an increased need for care. For the children, the question arises of
how to balance the goal of appropriately caring for parents with other goals
in life, such as work and their own family. Governments, on the other hand,
face the challenge of how to reconcile the conﬂicting goals of encouraging
the provision of care for the elderly by families, and encouraging (female)
participation in the labor market.
A prerequisite for designing effective policies in this area is to understand
the complex decision making process at the level of individual families. The
outcome of the decision making process depends on a large number of factors,
including the labor market potential of each adult child in the family, their
own family situation, the availability of formal care, the distances between the
parental home and each child’s home and the health status of the parents. An
additional important factor that has received only scant attention in the litera-
ture is the nature of the interactions between siblings, in particular whether
these can be characterized as cooperative or non-cooperative.
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze this complex process by developing
a structural model in which adult children allocate their time to work, leisure,
and care simultaneously. Our ﬁrst contribution to the literature is that we64 A Structural Model of Siblings’ Caregiving Interactions Chapter 4
estimate a structural model for children without siblings (only children), to
learn about the preferences of adult children for informal care, without having
to make assumptions about the nature of interactions between siblings. Thus
our maintained assumption is that differences in behavior between children
with and without siblings are due to dissimilar constraints only. In the model,
preferences are characterized by a utility function deﬁned over consumption,
leisure, and the amount of care that parents receive from their children. Chil-
dren face a time constraint and a budget constraint, which depend on the
(potential) wage in the labor market, and the time and monetary costs of
traveling to the parental home. As far as we know, this is the ﬁrst study that
extracts preferences with regard to informal care using only children, such that
the results are not affected by interactions between siblings. Only Kotlikoff
and Morris (1990) explicitly consider only children, but they analyze the living
arrangements of an only child and a single parent. This study, instead, focuses
on care arrangements, taking living arrangements as given.1
Our second contribution to the literature is a ﬁrst attempt to assess the
nature of the interactions between siblings and investigate the potential welfare
gains of cooperation between siblings. In the literature, siblings are often
ignored in the decision making process, or included only as an explanatory
variable. However, as noted, among others, by Checkovich and Stern (2002),
caregiving decisions among siblings are not independent and allowing for
simultaneous decision making among siblings improves our understanding
of caregiving decisions. The next question that arises is how these family
decisions take place. Some studies that consider siblings assume that decisions
are made non-cooperatively (Byrne et al., 2009, Callegaro and Pasini, 2008,
Fontaine et al., 2009, Hiedemann and Stern, 1999), while others assume a
two-stage decision process in which siblings (1) decide whether to participate
in caregiving or not, and (2) those who participate in caregiving make a
cooperative care decision (Engers and Stern, 2002). This study computes
cooperative as well as non-cooperative equilibria between siblings using the
estimated preference parameters from the structural model, and compares these
equilibria to the observed outcomes found in the data. To do this, we have to
make some assumptions. First, as mentioned before, siblings are assumed to
1There are some studies that model both care and living arrangements, e.g. Hoerger et al.
(1996) and Pezzin and Schone (1999).Section 4.2 Literature review 65
have the same preferences as only children with regard to leisure, consumption,
and the amount of informal care received by the parent. Secondly, we assume
that informal care provided by oneself or by a sibling are perfect substitutes.
Finally, we assume that siblings have their own time and budget constraints
and that there are no ﬁnancial transfers between siblings.
We bring the model to the data using the ﬁrst two waves of the Survey
of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). SHARE includes in-
formation on the distances between the parental and adult children’s homes,
labor market participation, the household situation of adult children and their
parents, and the amount of time spent on caring for parents. Sources of iden-
tiﬁcation of the econometric model include shocks in the health condition of
parents between the two SHARE waves, and variation in characteristics and
outcomes between waves and between adult children. SHARE does not contain
wage and income data of the adult children. Therefore, we use the European
Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) as additional data
to impute wage rates and other household income for the adult children.
The results show that 71% of the siblings have a higher probability to
behave non-cooperatively than cooperatively. If it is possible to push these
families into their cooperative equilibrium, the amount of informal care can be
increased, but this is at the expense of labor supply.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 discusses relevant literature
on informal care giving. In section 4.3 we specify the structural model and
explain the estimation strategy. Section 4.4 discusses the data, after which sec-
tion 4.5 presents the estimation results. Section 4.6 considers the nature of the
interactions between siblings (cooperative and non-cooperative equilibria) and
investigates the potential welfare gains of cooperation. Section 4.7 concludes.
Literature review 4.2
In the economic, demographic, sociological, and psychological literature on the
elderly, considerable attention has been paid to the degree to which children
support their (elderly) parents. Support itself is usually distinguished into
instrumental support on the one hand, and social and emotional support on
the other (Hogan and Eggebeen, 1995, Silverstein and Bengtson, 1997). This66 A Structural Model of Siblings’ Caregiving Interactions Chapter 4
study focuses on instrumental support, which includes practical help to parents
(e.g., running errands, doing household work), help with personal care (e.g.,
washing, bathing, care when sick) and help with paperwork. Research shows
that children often provide practical help to their parents. Even in later life,
however, parents in Europe more often help children than children help parents
(Kohli, 1999). Hence, there is little reversal of the ﬂow of practical support
exchange as parents age.
Another category of instrumental support is ﬁnancial support. Financial
support to parents is rarely given by children in western societies, except
among immigrants. Bonsang (2007) found that only 2.6% of adult children in
European countries provide ﬁnancial assistance to their parents. In non-western
societies, it is more common and often more obligatory that adult children
ﬁnancially support their parents (Frankenberg et al., 2002, Lee et al., 1994).
Financial support from parents to children is more common. However, these
ﬁnancial transfers are mainly to children following further education or less
well off children, such as those who are unemployed. As these motivations are
not directly related to informal care giving, this study does not take ﬁnancial
transfers explicitly into account.
In the empirical economic literature we ﬁnd reduced form models and
structural models investigating (1) the extent to which informal care and
formal care are complements or substitutes, (2) the factors that determine the
provision of informal care, and (3) the dependence between informal care
giving and labor supply.
If informal and formal care are substitutes, informal care can reduce home
health care use and delay nursing home entry. Only then, governmental long
term care expenditures can be reduced and labor shortages in the (long term)
health care sector can be reduced, by increasing informal care. Bolin et al.
(2008a) and Bonsang (2009) investigated this issue in European countries and
found that informal care is a substitute for long term care, at least as long as
the needs of the elderly are low and require unskilled types of care. For the
U.S. Van Houtven and Norton (2004) also conclude that informal care and
formal care are substitutes. On the other hand, the introduction of free formal
personal care in Scotland in 2002 does not seem to have reduced informal care
(Bell et al., 2006).
The models in the literature focus on a large number of potential deter-Section 4.2 Literature review 67
minants. Theoretically, these determinants can be distinguished into demand
and supply variables. Demand variables are characteristics of parents which
indicate the degree to which parents ‘need’ support from their children, such
as a parent’s health status, and whether the parent is living with a partner
(Grundy, 2005, Klein Ikkink et al., 1999, Silverstein, 1995, Spitze and Logan,
1989). Living with a partner is related to less need for support by children,
because the partner is the prime source of giving support to an elderly person
(Dykstra, 1993).
Supply variables have to do with the child’s costs and beneﬁts of giving
support. Research shows that there is variation among societies in the degree to
which children respond to the need of their parents, with children in individual-
istic countries like Sweden and the Netherlands being less responsive (Kalmijn
and Saraceno, 2008). We will therefore include country speciﬁc dummy vari-
ables to allow the preferences for informal care to differ across countries.
An important supply variable is time costs. Giving support and paying a visit
are time intensive, especially if support also requires traveling, which is usually
the case. There are also ﬁnancial costs involved, but there is little evidence
that the child’s income situation affects contact or support (Klein Ikkink et al.,
1999, Waite and Harrison, 1992). There are social status gradients in contact
and support, but these have more to do with education and less with ﬁnancial
aspects of social status (Kalmijn and Dykstra, 2006).
The time budget of an adult child depends on whether the child has children.
Several authors have hypothesized that caring for one’s own children competes
with the support children give to their elderly parents. This phenomenon has
been referred to as the ‘sandwich generation’. There is indeed some evidence
that the support daughters give to parents is negatively affected by having
children (Klein Ikkink et al., 1999), but there is also evidence for a null effect
(Eggebeen and Hogan, 1990). A complication is that having one’s own children
may also increase contact levels with the parent due to the grandparenting role
(Kalmijn and Dykstra, 2006). This may be a reason why there are no consistent
effects of having children on support.
Employment also affects children’s time budget, and the opportunity costs
of labor may inﬂuence the informal care decision. Several studies have inves-
tigated the relation between employment and informal care using different
datasets and methods to correct for the potential endogeneity bias (caregivers68 A Structural Model of Siblings’ Caregiving Interactions Chapter 4
may have different (unobserved) characteristics than non-caregivers, which
inﬂuence both informal care and labor market decisions). The results are
mixed. Wolf and Soldo (1994) ﬁnd no evidence of reduced propensities to
be employed, or of reduced conditional hours of work, due to the provision
of informal care. Others ﬁnd that informal care reduces employment signiﬁ-
cantly among European men and women (Bolin et al., 2008b), and among U.S.
women (Ettner, 1996). Ettner (1995) and Heitmueller and Michaud (2006)
ﬁnd that caregiving for coresidential parents reduces employment. As in Pezzin
and Schone (1997, 1999), Byrne et al. (2009), and Callegaro and Pasini (2008)
we will model the labor force decision and informal care decision jointly in
a structural model. The results are important for understanding the conﬂict
between women’s increasing economic role in society on the one hand, and the
increasing need for informal support to the elderly on the other (Kohli, 1999).
A ﬁnal determinant of informal care has to do with family size and family
interactions. The number of siblings in a family may have different effects. First,
parents will need less help from each individual child when they have more
children. In addition, children may shirk their responsibilities if there are many
siblings who can do the work, such that the amount of informal care given by
one sibling may depend negatively on the care provided by another. On the
other hand, in the case of a strategic bequest motive (described by Bernheim
et al., 1985), the amount of care given by a sibling depends positively on the
care given by the other siblings. However, more recent studies do not support
the bequest motive (Callegaro and Pasini, 2008, Perozek, 1998, Sloan et al.,
1997). It has been found that siblings are each other’s substitutes. The more
siblings a child has, the less often the child visits the parent and the less often he
or she gives support to the parent (Kalmijn, 2007, Kalmijn and Saraceno, 2008,
Spitze and Logan, 1991). In addition to the number of siblings, the nature
of the interactions between siblings plays a role in informal care decisions.
In the literature we do not ﬁnd evidence regarding whether siblings behave
cooperatively or non-cooperatively. This study tries to identify the behavior of
siblings using the preference parameters of only children which are obtained in
a structural model.Section 4.3 Structural model 69
Structural model 4.3
This section describes the structural model we use to estimate the amount of
time only children spend on providing informal care to their parents, taking
into account the key supply and demand factors discussed in the previous
section. Section 4.3.1 deals with the speciﬁcation of the model and describes
the estimation strategy. Section 4.3.2 explains how we impute wage rates and
other household income in the model, because SHARE contains no information
about the wage rates and other household income of the adult children. We
use a wage equation to impute wage rates and an income equation to impute
remaining household income for the adult children in SHARE.
Model speci￿cation 4.3.1
We specify a structural model to explain the amount of time an adult child
spends on paid work, care for parents, and other activities. In this study all
activities other than paid work and care for parents are called leisure. As
in Van Soest (1995), we formulate the model as a discrete choice problem.
In this discrete choice problem adult children can choose between different
combinations of labor, informal care, and leisure, which also lead to different
levels of consumption. With regard to labor we distinguish full-time employ-
ment, part-time employment, and no employment.2 In the model, full-time
employment is set to 36 hours of labor per week and part-time employment to
18 hours of labor per week. Concerning informal care, we consider the choice
to give no substantial amount of informal care, giving between 1 and 4 hours a
week (50% of the informal care givers), between 4 and 8 hours a week (20%)
and giving more than 8 hours of informal care a week (30% of the informal
care givers). Where no substantial amount of informal care is given, the hours
of informal care in the model is set to zero.3 For the second informal care
category (1–4 hours) we set the number of hours of informal care in the model
to be 2 (the average) and the number of visits to one per week, for the second
category (4–8 hours) the number of hours is six (the average) and visits are on
2These are the three categories available in the data.
3In the data there are 134 observations giving between 0 and 1 hour of informal care per
week. Most of them give less than 0.25 hours of informal care per week. These people fall into
the category ‘no substantial informal care’.70 A Structural Model of Siblings’ Caregiving Interactions Chapter 4
a daily basis.4 In the last category (> 8 hours per week) we set the number of
hours of informal care to be 185 and we assume that the parents are visited
on a daily basis, which is also the median number of visits in this category. In
total we thus have a choice set of 12 alternatives (3 labor market categories 
4 informal care categories).
The child derives utility from leisure (tl), consumption (c), and the amount





where t = (tl,c,ts)0 , A is a symmetric 33 matrix with entries ij(i, j = 1,2,3)
and b = (bl, bc, bs)0. For the model to be economically rational, the marginal
utility of consumption must be positive; see e.g. Van Soest and Stancanelli
(2010). We will check whether this condition is satisﬁed in its estimated
version. The marginal utility of informal care may be negative.6 We maximize
the utility function subject to a time and budget constraint. The time and
budget constraints are speciﬁed as
tl + th + ts +(d)K = T
c + Kpdd = wth + (4.2)
where
th = labor time (hours),
K = number of visits (per week),
d = distance to parent (return trip, km),
 = travel time per kilometer (hours),
T = total time (# hours in one week),
4The median number of visits in the 4–8 category is also seven per week.
5This is the median number of hours of informal care in the ‘> 8’ category. The average
number of hours of informal care in this category is 29, but this is due to some individuals
giving a very high number of hours of informal care.
6Estimates of Byrne et al. (2009) show that adult children care about their parents’ health
quality, suggesting that altruism may play an important role in the provision of informal care.
However, they also show that informal care provision tends to be burdensome, which may
explain why few family members provide care for elderly individuals.Section 4.3 Structural model 71
pd = travel costs (per kilometer),
w = wage (per hour),
 = remaining household income.
The time endowment T is 168 hours per week. Remaining household
income () includes all income that is not earned by the adult child under
consideration. It includes capital income, social transfers, and labor income of
the partner (if present). We abstract from the fact that labor market choices of
the adult children under consideration and their partners may be determined
simultaneously. Furthermore, we assume wage rates7 and the geographical
distance between adult children and their parents to be exogenous.8
To take into account preference variation across adult children, the vectors
in b are functions of observed and unobserved characteristics of the adult
children and their parents
bl = Xll +ul
bc = Xcc +uc
bs = Xss +us.
(4.3)
Xl and Xc contain characteristics which are likely to inﬂuence the amount of
leisure time and consumption the adult child prefers, such as the age, gender,
education, number of children, and marital status of the adult child. Xs includes
variables inﬂuencing the preference for giving informal care to parents, namely
the health position of the parents, whether both parents are alive and the
gender of the parent when the parent is single, the (average) age of the
parents, the gender of the child, country speciﬁc dummy variables, and the
number of children of the adult child. Also education is included in the matrix
Xs, because higher educated children may have different value orientations
(Kalmijn, 2006). Random preferences due to unobserved characteristics are
incorporated through the terms ul, uc, and us. They capture time invariant
unobserved heterogeneity. For example, us may capture the three motives
7Bolin et al. (2008b) found no statistically signiﬁcant wage-rate effects of informal care
provision in Europe.
8Charles and Sevak (2005) tested whether children’s location endogenously responds to
parent’s health but found no evidence of this.72 A Structural Model of Siblings’ Caregiving Interactions Chapter 4
that are, in addition to observed characteristics, important in explaining social
support: reciprocity, altruism, and norms of responsibility.9 We assume u =













































In addition, we introduce random disturbances to the utilities of the twelve
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(4.5)
leading to the familiar logit choice probabilities
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and tl j and cj are deﬁned by
tl j = T   thj   tsj  (d)Kj
cj = wthj +  Kjpdd. (4.8)
9These three motives are investigated in the sociological literature (e.g. Kohli and Küne-
mund, 2003, and Kalmijn, 2010). Kalmijn (2010) found that altruism is relatively important
for parents to support their children, however, for adult children, reciprocity and norms of
responsibility appear to be relatively more important.Section 4.3 Structural model 73




is chosen, given observed and unobserved characteristics. The dis-





that is close to optimal, rather than always fully
optimal. This may be due to errors in the perception of the utilities of the set of




are known by the adult
child (but unobserved to the researcher). We estimate the model parameters
using maximum likelihood. The likelihood contribution of an individual i who


















where p(u) is the density of vector u. The three dimensional integral can be
approximated using simulations (simulated maximum likelihood). Using R
















where the draws ur,r = 1...R are from a trivariate normal distribution with
mean zero and variance u. Most of the adult children are observed twice
(wave 1 and wave 2). The likelihood contribution of an adult child who is
observed in both waves, and chooses alternative j in wave 1 and alternative h
















Uh2 > Uk2 for all k 6= h j X2,d2,w2,2,u
r
, (4.11)
so that the unobserved characteristics are the same in both waves.
A draw ur can be obtained by taking 3 (pseudo-random) draws from a74 A Structural Model of Siblings’ Caregiving Interactions Chapter 4











= L. Here, L is the Choleski factor of u (the unique
lower triangular matrix such that LL0 = u).10
Integrals can be approximated with fewer draws (R) when using Halton
draws instead of pseudo-random draws. This is because Halton sequences
provide more coverage of the density which has to be integrated. For more
information about the derivation of Halton sequences see for example Train
(2003), or Drukker and Gates (2006), who discuss the advantages of Halton
sequences when using simulations to approximate integrals numerically.
4.3.2 Modeling wage rates and remaining household income
Wage rates (w) and remaining household income () of the adult children in
SHARE are unknown. Therefore, we use predictions from a wage equation11
and an equation for remaining household income. Both equations are estimated
using the ‘European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions’ (EU-
SILC).
In EU-SILC we can only observe wages for workers. However, the working
population is probably not a random subsample from the population as people
with comparatively high wages (conditional on, for example, their education
level) are more likely to work. There may be unobservables that inﬂuence the
decision to participate, as well as the wage rate. A commonly used method to
deal with this sample selection is the method presented by Heckman (1979).
Heckman takes selection bias into account by adding an equation which models
the participation decision, and allowing for nonzero correlation between the
wage and the participation equation. We estimate the following Heckman
model, for each country separately
ln(w

i) = Xwiw + vwi (4.12a)
p

i = Xpip + vpi (4.12b)
10u is normally distributed because the sum of normals is normal. Furthermore, the covari-
ance of u is u because Var(u)=E(uu0) = E(L(L)0) = LE(0)L0 = LVar()L0 = LIL0 =
LL0 = u (Train, 2003).
11We assume wage rates to be independent of the provision of informal care. This is
consistent with the results of Bolin et al. (2008b), who did not ﬁnd any statistically signiﬁcant





i > 0 (4.12c)
wi = 0 if p

i  0 (4.12d)
where (4.12a) is the wage equation and (4.12b) is the (probit type) participa-
tion equation. Xwi and Xpi contain personal characteristics such as age, gender,
and education level. Generally an exclusion restriction is required to generate
credible estimates from the Heckman selection model. Therefore, we include
dummy variables for having children in the participation equation, but exclude




















and we estimate the parameters using FIML. As for a probit model, the nor-
malization 2
p = 1 is used since only the sign of p
i is observed. For remaining
household income (), we also estimate an equation using a standard OLS
regression, for each country and for men and women separately
ln(i) = Xi + vi, (4.14)
where Xi contains personal characteristics such as age, marital status, and
education level.
In the structural model, introduced in section 4.3.1, we take into account
that wage rates and remaining household income are predicted with error.
Using the estimated variances of the errors in the wage equations and the re-
maining household income equations (2
w and 2
), we integrate the prediction
errors out. Van Soest (1995) also uses estimated standard deviations of the
errors in the wage equation to account for prediction errors.
When we take into account prediction errors, the likelihood contribution in











Uj > Uk for all k 6= j j X,d,w,,u

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and vr is a draw from the normal distribution with variance 2













 is a draw from the normal distribution with variance 2
.
For most countries the estimates of wp in the EU-SILC data are not signiﬁ-
cant, which indicates that selection with regard to unobservables is not very
important. We therefore do not take into account correlations between vw, v
and the unobserved characteristics (ul,uc,us).
4.4 Data
This section describes the data we use to estimate the parameters of the model.
Section 4.4.1 describes the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe
(SHARE) and section 4.4.2 the ‘European Union Statistics on Income and Living
Conditions’ (EU-SILC).
4.4.1 SHARE
SHARE is a multidisciplinary database of microdata on health, socio-economic
status and social and family networks of individuals aged 50 and older in
Europe. Data were collected in 2004/2005 (wave 1) and 2006/2007 (wave
2) by face-to-face computer-aided personal interviews (CAPI), plus a self-Section 4.4 Data 77
completion drop-off part with questions that require more privacy. This study
uses 12 countries that have contributed data to SHARE. They represent various
regions in Europe, ranging from Scandinavia (Denmark and Sweden) through
Central Europe (Austria, France, Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands) to
the Mediterranean (Spain, Italy and Greece). In the second wave two ‘new’ EU
member states have contributed data to SHARE (Czech Republic and Poland).
Other countries available in SHARE that we do not use in this study are Israel
and Ireland. We do not use these countries because they are not represented in
the EU-SILC data, which we describe in the next section.
Several papers use SHARE to study informal care giving. Most of these
studies use the respondents as providers of informal care (e.g. Bonsang, 2007,
2009, and Bolin et al., 2008a,b). This study considers the respondents in
their role as (the potential) receiver of informal care. Crespo and Mira (2010)
call this the ‘parents-sample’ as the respondents are the elderly parents. The
reason for using the ‘parents-sample’ is that we need information on all siblings
within a family. The respondents (in our case ‘the parents’) give information
about all their children that are still alive (sex, year of birth, geographical
distance between the children and their parents, education, marital status,
number of children, the employment status of the children, and the amount
of informal care they receive from their children). If we were to consider the
respondents as the providers of informal care, there would be no information
on the amount of care the siblings of the respondents give to their parents.
The health situation of the parents provides a measure for the amount of
care parents need. SHARE provides a lot of health related variables, such as
self-reported health, limitations in activities of daily living (ADL and IADL),
mental health, diagnosed chronic conditions, whether people are suffering
from several symptoms and limitations in functioning (e.g. measures by grip
strength and walking speed). In this study we use self-reported health which
has the lowest number of missing data. The parents are asked to rate their
health on a ﬁve-point scale, ranging from very good to very poor (wave 1) or
from excellent to poor (wave 2).
We select all respondents with one or two adult children. Furthermore,
our interest is in children who are 40 years or older, as these children are
most likely to be involved in personal care for their elderly parents. Following
McGarry (1999), Bonsang (2007), and Norton and Van Houtven (2006) we78 A Structural Model of Siblings’ Caregiving Interactions Chapter 4
omit households where children are living in the same household as the respon-
dent, because there is no detailed information on informal care giving within
households. For the same reason we exclude respondents where grand-children,
siblings, and non-relatives are living in the same household as the respondent.
Families with one or two self-employed adult children are excluded, because
we have no information about the number of hours that self-employed people
work. Also families where one or both children have the daily activity given
as ‘sick’ are excluded, as they may not be able to give informal care. After
excluding respondents for whom key information is missing, we end up with
2253 respondents with one adult child and 2891 respondents with two adult
children.
Table 4.4.1 shows the amount of informal care and the number of adult
children per country. Informal care includes practical household help (e.g.
household chores, shopping and home repairs), personal care (e.g. dressing,
bathing, eating) and help with paperwork. Adults report whether their children
help them on an almost daily basis, weekly, monthly or less often. Furthermore,
they were asked to give an estimate of the number of hours of informal care
received on a typical day, week, month or year. We transform these answers to
a variable measuring the average amount of informal care that adults receive
from their children per week. We deﬁne people as involved in informal care
when they give one hour or more of informal care per week.
In Germany, Greece, the Czech Republic and Poland, many people are
involved in informal care giving (more than 15% of the only children and
siblings). Conditional on being involved in informal care, children in Mediter-
ranean countries give relatively many hours of informal care, whereas the
children in Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden give a relatively small num-
ber of hours of informal care. When we compare only children and siblings,
we ﬁnd that in general only children are more often involved in informal care
giving than siblings and that they also provide more hours of informal care.
This suggests that the hours of care provided by a sibling are a substitute for
someone’s own informal care.
Table 4.4.2 presents information about informal care giving and the geo-
graphical distances between children and their parents. The higher the distance
between children and their parents, the higher the traveling time and costs,
and the lower the fraction of people involved in informal care. It appears thatSection 4.4 Data 79
Table 4.4.1: Informal care per countrya
Country only child % informal # hrs 1 sibling % informal # hrs
care care
Austria 218 14.7 15.9 438 12.3 6.9
Germany 294 19.0 17.3 572 15.0 6.3
Sweden 217 10.6 7.1 674 7.6 5.9
Netherlands 115 7.8 3.0 442 4.3 4.8
Spain 99 13.1 17.2 308 9.7 19.5
Italy 167 12.0 18.4 338 8.6 12.8
France 263 14.1 10.0 508 9.6 6.2
Denmark 134 11.2 4.5 512 6.3 6.8
Greece 213 19.7 17.1 804 19.5 12.5
Belgium 318 20.1 5.8 528 8.1 10.8
Czech Republic 165 24.2 11.8 450 29.6 10.7
Poland 50 16.0 16.5 208 16.8 5.1
Total 2253 15.9 12.2 5782 12.4 9.5
a Percentage of children involved in informal care and the number of hours of informal care,
conditional on giving any informal care, per country.
the distribution of only children and siblings among the categories is about the
same (so that only children do not in general live closer or further away from
their parents than siblings).
As expected, the provision of informal care is higher for children with
parents in bad health than for children with parents in good health (table 4.4.3).
In the analysis we distinguish single parents and parents living with a partner,
Table 4.4.2: Distance and informal carea
Distance only child % inf. # hrs 1 sibling % inf. # hrs
care care
same building 9.8 29.0 15.7 7.1 31.0 12.4
 1 kilometer 17.2 20.7 11.0 15.3 19.1 12.3
1–5 kilometers 18.8 19.9 8.1 21.0 15.9 8.3
5–25 kilometers 25.6 15.9 13.1 23.2 10.5 6.3
25–100 kilometers 12.6 9.9 13.3 15.3 6.8 5.7
100–500 kilometers 10.0 4.4 24.3 11.1 3.6 6.5
 500 kilometers 3.0 0.0 - 3.3 1.1 86.0
 500 kilometers 3.0 1.5 1.9 3.7 1.4 1.4
and another country
Total 100 15.9 12.2 100 12.4 9.5
a Percentage of children involved in informal care and the number of hours of informal
care, conditional on giving any informal care, per distance category.80 A Structural Model of Siblings’ Caregiving Interactions Chapter 4
Table 4.4.3: Health and informal carea
Health only child % inf. # hrs 1 sibling % inf. # hrs
care care
Father, good / very good 8.7 6.1 4.5 7.7 6.3 13.5
Father, fair 4.9 19.8 9.6 5.9 12.4 5.0
Father, poor 2.4 34.0 15.9 2.3 23.5 8.4
Mother, good / very good 21.3 16.4 7.6 22.8 12.2 7.1
Mother, fair 17.8 24.2 9.8 15.0 19.5 10.1
Mother, poor 8.5 33.3 22.0 7.1 26.5 12.1
Both poor, or poor and fair 5.0 20.5 23.3 5.3 21.8 14.6
Both fair, or fair and good 15.6 6.5 7.2 17.5 5.9 7.9
Both good / very good 12.4 2.5 7.1 13.0 3.1 3.8
Father poor, mother good 1.7 12.8 2.9 1.7 10.4 5.6
Father good, mother poor 1.6 25.0 11.8 1.8 18.3 11.1
Total 100 15.9 12.2 100 12.4 9.5
a Percentage of children involved in informal care and the number of hours of informal care,
conditional on giving any informal care, per health status of the elderly parent. In the ﬁrst
three categories the adult child only has a father, in the fourth to the sixth category the adult
child only has a mother, and in the last ﬁve categories the adult child has a father and a
mother.
Table 4.4.4: Daily activity and informal carea
Daily activity only child % informal # hrs 1 sibling % informal # hrs
care care
full-time work 67.2 13.4 8.3 73.6 11.0 7.8
part-time work 8.2 15.2 7.6 8.8 11.2 5.9
unemployed 5.5 17.1 11.0 3.0 16.8 13.2
in education 0.6 7.1 14.0 0.3 0.0 -
parental leave 0.3 0.0 - 0.1 0.0 -
(early) retirement 8.1 31.1 20.4 5.4 26.4 10.9
homemaker 9.2 21.7 21.8 8.1 17.3 18.8
other 0.9 20.0 25.1 0.8 0.0 -
Total 100 15.9 12.2 100 12.4 9.5
a Percentage of children involved in informal care and the number of hours of informal care,
conditional on giving any informal care, per daily activity of the adult child.
as parents may give informal care to each other when they are both alive. It
appears that when the mother of a child is in poor health and the father is in
good health there is more informal care from adult children than when the
father is in poor health and the mother is in good health. The reason may be
that men in the observed generations have less household management skills
than women.Section 4.4 Data 81
Table 4.4.4 shows the amount of informal care by the daily activity of
the child. It is interesting to see that the amount of informal care does not
differ much between children in full-time employment and those in part-time
employment. Children who are (early) retired or are looking after the home
are most often involved in informal care. However, note that retired persons
have relatively older parents, who are more often in bad health. Finally, women
are more often involved in informal care than men and often provide more
hours of informal care (table 4.4.5).
Table 4.4.5: Gendera
Gender only child % informal # hrs 1 sibling % informal # hrs
care care
Female 53.8 17.7 14.1 51.9 14.8 9.9
Male 46.2 13.8 9.4 48.1 9.8 8.8
Total 100 15.9 12.2 100 12.4 9.5
a Percentage of children involved in informal care and the number of hours of
informal care, conditional on giving any informal care, per gender of the adult
child.
EU-SILC 4.4.2
The wage equation and the equation for remaining household income, de-
scribed in section 4.3.2, are estimated using EU-SILC data. EU-SILC contains
microdata on income, poverty, social exclusion and living conditions in Europe.
It comprises information from surveys and registers from the EU member states.
We select people up to age 76 and omit households who receive income from
self-employment or who are permanently sick or disabled (just as in SHARE).
Furthermore, we exclude observations which have missing data for one or more
of the variables in the model. We end up with 55,100 observations, which are
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Estimation results 4.5
This section presents the estimation results of the wage equation, the equation
for remaining household income, and the parameters of the structural model.
We start with the estimation results of the wage equation and the equation for
remaining household income, since these are needed as input to estimate the
parameters of the structural model.
Wage equation and remaining household income 4.5.1
Wage equations are estimated for each country separately. Table 4.5.1 describes
the wage equation for Sweden. The wage equations for all other countries are
estimated in a similar way and are presented in Appendix 4.A. Table 4.5.1 shows
that wage rates increase with age and are signiﬁcantly higher for people with
a high education level. wp is not signiﬁcantly different from zero, indicating
that sample selection is not a signiﬁcant issue. This also holds for most of the
other countries. Due to measurement errors in the wage rates, the standard
deviation of the errors in the wage equation may be overestimated.12
Table 4.5.2 shows the estimation results of remaining household income for
Sweden. The equations for the other countries are estimated in a similar way
and are available on request. Remaining household income increases with age.
Furthermore, in Sweden remaining household income is not signiﬁcantly dif-
ferent for different education categories. Next, we will use the wage equations
and the equations for remaining household income from EU-SILC to estimate
the parameters of the structural model.
Estimation results of the structural model 4.5.2
Table 4.5.3 presents the estimation results of the structural model.13 This
section ﬁrst describes the parameter estimates related to the preferences for
12A sensitivity analysis, in which we for example multiply w by 0.8 for all countries,
indicates that this does not inﬂuence the structural estimation results very much.
13Our estimation procedure uses 25 drawings. The estimation is computer intensive. Other
studies with these kind of models have used for example 5 or 10 drawings which produce
qualitatively similar results (Van Soest, 1995) or 10 drawings (Van Soest and Stancanelli,
2010).84 A Structural Model of Siblings’ Caregiving Interactions Chapter 4
Table 4.5.1: Estimation results wage equation Sweden, sam-
ple selection modela




Primary education -0.070 0.109
Lower secondary education -0.057 0.083
(Upper) secondary education 0.000 -
Post secondary non-tertiary education 0.051 0.089
Tertiary education 0.109 0.046
Man with partner 0.073 0.088
Woman with partner -0.092 0.082
Intercept 1.458 0.368
Equation 2: participation decision
Man -0.069 0.196
Age 15–29 0.000 -
Age 30–39 1.045 0.157
Age 40–49 1.010 0.143
Age 50–59 1.147 0.166
Age  60 -1.193 0.155
Primary education -0.351 0.163
Lower secondary education -0.962 0.130
(Upper) secondary education 0.000 -
Post secondary non-tertiary education -0.355 0.194
Tertiary education 0.090 0.117
Man with partner 0.612 0.152
Woman with partner 0.574 0.145
Man with child -0.022 0.144









a The reference individual is a woman with (upper) secondary educa-
tion in the age category 15-29. She has no partner and no children.Section 4.5 Estimation results 85
Table 4.5.2: Estimation results remaining household income, Swedena
ln(remaining household income) Men Women
Coefﬁcient St. error Coefﬁcient St. error
Age -0.097 0.023 -0.040 0.023
Age2 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000
Primary education -0.115 0.227 0.051 0.232
Lower secondary education 0.326 0.186 0.185 0.189
(Upper) secondary education 0.000 - 0.000 -
Post sec. non-tertiary education 0.109 0.248 -0.156 0.300
Tertiary education 0.203 0.149 0.028 0.136
Married 0.440 0.163 0.421 0.167
Widowed 0.054 0.453 -0.442 0.341
Divorced -0.658 0.292 -0.676 0.231
Never married 0.000 - 0.000 -
Having a child 0.724 0.138 0.845 0.141
Intercept 10.524 0.454 9.766 0.468
N 655 638
R-squared 0.115 0.116
Adj R-squared 0.101 0.102
 1.466 1.434
a The reference individual is a man (left) or woman (right) who has never been married,
with (upper) secondary education and no children.
informal care (ts). With regard to informal care the results show signiﬁcant
decreasing returns to scale (ss is signiﬁcantly negative). Furthermore, the
interaction term ls is signiﬁcantly positive, meaning that when the amount of
informal care is already high, the utility of an extra hour of leisure increases.
When parents are in bad health they need more attention and the estimates
show that this increases the preference for informal care. The preference for
informal care is highest when a single living father or mother has poor health,
when both parents are in poor health, or when the mother has poor health
and the father is in good health. On the other hand, when the father is in
poor health and the mother is in good health, the preference for informal care
giving is lower. Presumably, mothers are better able to give informal care to
their spouses than fathers are able to give informal care to the mothers of the
adult children. Several studies ﬁnd that mothers receive more care than fathers
(Attias-Donfut et al. 2005, Bonsang 2007, Klein Ikkink et al. 1999). Our results
suggest that this depends on the health of the parent. Mothers in good health
receive more informal care than fathers in good health, but fathers in bad86 A Structural Model of Siblings’ Caregiving Interactions Chapter 4
Table 4.5.3: Estimation results structural modela
Coef. Std. err. p-value
ll (t2
l ) -0.00018 0.00019 0.358
cc (c2) 1.44e-07 2.38e-07 0.546
ss (t2
s ) -0.01226 0.00445 0.006
lc (tl  c) 0.00002 0.00001 0.003
ls (ts  tl) 0.00230 0.00102 0.023
cs (ts  c) -1.43e-06 0.00002 0.945
l0 (tl) -0.25464 0.05971 0.000
l1 (tl child is man) -0.10354 0.02051 0.000
l2 (tl number children) 0.02203 0.00907 0.015
l3 (tl mannumber children) -0.03900 0.01133 0.001
l4 (tl age child) 0.00564 0.00084 0.000
l5 (tl child is married) 0.00757 0.01535 0.622
l6 (tl child is divorced) -0.01272 0.02226 0.568
l7 (tl child is widowed) 0.04751 0.04445 0.285
l8 (tl child has low education level) 0.13144 0.03673 0.000
l9 (tl child has high education level) -0.03662 0.01288 0.004
c0 (c) 0.02788 0.00410 0.000
c1 (tc child is man) 0.00292 0.00161 0.070
c2 (tc number children) -0.00096 0.00087 0.271
c3 (tc mannumber children) 0.00106 0.00092 0.249
c4 (tc age child) -0.00050 0.00007 0.000
c5 (tc child is married) 0.00348 0.00133 0.009
c6 (tc child is divorced) 0.00355 0.00203 0.080
c7 (tc child is widowed) 0.00235 0.00572 0.682
c8 (tc child has low education level) 0.00288 0.00483 0.552
c9 (tc child has high education level) 0.00320 0.00097 0.001
s0 (ts) -3.03510 0.31385 0.000
s1 (ts child is man) -0.23573 0.11326 0.037
s2 (ts number children) 0.03988 0.04162 0.338
s3 (ts mannumber children) -0.11870 0.05818 0.041
s4 (ts father good / very good health) -0.10545 0.18083 0.560
s5 (ts father fair health) 0.88709 0.17274 0.000
s6 (ts father poor health) 1.11773 0.20649 0.000
s7 (ts mother good / very good health) 0.57372 0.15491 0.000
s8 (ts mother fair health) 0.72741 0.14136 0.000
s9 (ts mother poor health) 1.06507 0.16237 0.000
s10 (ts both poor, or poor and fair health) 1.01035 0.16383 0.000
s11 (ts both fair, or fair and good health) 0.43515 0.13891 0.002
s12 (ts father poor, mother good health) 0.67826 0.24108 0.005
s13 (ts father good, mother poor health) 1.36701 0.22906 0.000
a Table continues on the next page.Section 4.5 Estimation results 87
Table 4.5.3: Estimation results structural model, continueda
Coef. Std. err. p-value
s14 (ts Germany) 0.34698 0.12951 0.007
s15 (ts Italy) -0.05540 0.14384 0.700
s16 (ts Greece) 0.41713 0.12893 0.001
s17 (ts Spain) 0.21706 0.14050 0.122
s18 (ts France) 0.22165 0.12188 0.069
s19 (ts Netherlands) -0.38264 0.18871 0.043
s20 (ts Denmark) 0.18658 0.15070 0.216
s21 (ts Belgium) 0.34925 0.12576 0.005
s22 (ts Austria) 0.27338 0.13071 0.036
s23 (ts Poland) -0.30224 0.18413 0.101
s24 (ts Czech Republic) 0.59367 0.15322 0.000
s25 (ts (average) age parent - 55) 0.03911 0.00492 0.000
s26 (ts child has low education level) 0.36887 0.11600 0.001
s27 (ts child has high education level) -0.25675 0.07192 0.000
2
l 0.02078 0.00442 0.000
2
c 0.00007 0.00001 0.000
2
s 1.02037 0.21353 0.000
lc -0.00121 0.00022 0.000
ls 0.02571 0.00853 0.003
cs -0.00148 0.00042 0.000
Log likelihood -2814.912
N 2253
a The reference individual is a female adult child who has never been married, of whom both
parents are alive, have a good / very good health position, and are living in Sweden.
health receive more informal care than mothers in good health (which is also
as expected, if fathers in the observed generation indeed have lower household
management skills). In addition to poor health, the preference for informal care
increases with the age of the parent(s). This is in accordance with the literature,
indicating that even after extensively controlling for disability, age remains an
important driver of long term care use (De Meijer et al., 2009). The country
speciﬁc dummy variables comprise institutional as well as cultural differences
between countries. Institutional differences constitute for example publicly
ﬁnanced long term care programmes,14 and the availability of formal care.
Cultural differences include differences in social norms with regard to informal
care and the degree to which family ties are considered to be important. It has
been found that southern European countries have stronger family ties than
14An overview of publicly ﬁnanced long term care programmes can be found in Bolin et al.
(2008b).88 A Structural Model of Siblings’ Caregiving Interactions Chapter 4
northern European countries (Reher, 1998). The estimation results show that
preferences with regard to informal care are relatively high in Greece, Germany,
Belgium, Austria, and the Czech Republic.15 Higher educated children have
signiﬁcantly lower preferences for informal care than lower educated children.
One argument in the literature is that higher educated children live farther
away from their parents due to geographical labor market restrictions. However,
also after taking into account distance we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant effect of education
on the preference for informal care, which may be explained by different value
orientations of the higher educated (Kalmijn, 2006) and/or competing interests
(Waite and Harrison, 1992).16 Finally, we ﬁnd that women have signiﬁcantly
higher preferences for providing informal care than men.
Secondly, we describe the parameter estimates related to leisure (tl). The
preference for leisure increases with age and is somewhat lower for men than
for women. Children increase women’s preferences for leisure signiﬁcantly,
probably because more children often mean more responsibilities for adult
daughters inside their own households (the care for a child also belongs to
‘leisure time’ in this model). Marital status does not affect adult children’s
preferences for leisure. Married persons spend leisure time with each other, but
on the other hand household production is more efﬁcient for couples than for
singles, which saves time.17 Finally, lower educated children have signiﬁcantly
higher preferences for leisure, and higher educated children have signiﬁcantly
lower preferences for leisure. It is possible that less favorable labor conditions
among the lower educated bring about higher preferences for leisure time
rather than labor time.
The parameter estimates related to consumption (c) show that older chil-
dren have signiﬁcantly lower preferences for consumption. In addition, married
persons and higher educated individuals have a relatively high preference for
consumption. As mentioned before, for the model to be economically rational,
the marginal utility of consumption must be positive. We ﬁnd that for all but
15It is notable that southern European countries like Italy and Spain do not have signiﬁcantly
positive results here. Probably this has to do with living arrangements. In Italy and Spain many
adult care givers co-reside with their parents and these households are not included in this
analysis.
16Kalmijn (2006) found that face-to-face contact between higher educated children and their
parents is relatively low, even after controlling for distance.
17Waite and Harrison (1992) found that the presence of a husband decreases the number of
visits a woman has with friends, but does not reduce a woman’s social contacts with kin.Section 4.5 Estimation results 89
18 observations (0.8%) this condition holds. These 18 adult children have a
high age, which leads to a relatively low preference for consumption in the
model (as can be seen from the coefﬁcient c4).
The ﬁnal part of table 4.5.3 shows the estimates of the covariance matrix
of the unobserved heterogeneity terms (equation 4.4), which are in line with
our expectations. All coefﬁcients are signiﬁcant, indicating that unobserved
heterogeneity is important. The negative sign of lc indicates that unobserved
characteristics which increase the preference for leisure tend to have a negative
effect on the preference for consumption. In the same way, the negative value
for cs indicates that unobserved characteristics which increase the preference
for informal care, have in general a negative effect on the preference for
consumption. Finally, ls shows that if individuals have a relatively high
preference for leisure (conditional on the observed characteristics in the model),
they also have on average a somewhat higher preference for informal care.
The relations between wage rates, distances, and informal care follow from
the estimated preference parameters and the time and budget constraints. To
facilitate interpretation of the results, ﬁgure 4.1 shows the relation between
geographical distance and the amount of informal care given by a reference
individual in the model. As a reference individual we consider a married
German woman of age 55, with an 80 year old father in poor health, no mother,
and 2 children of her own. She has a medium education level, a wage rate
of 10 euros per hour and her remaining household income is 15,000 euros
per year. Unobserved heterogeneity is important regarding the preferences for
informal care. Figure 4.1 therefore shows seven lines. Each line represents
the reference individual with a different random effect us. These reﬂect, for
example, different levels of family ties, degree of altruism, or feelings of
obligation to provide informal care. The line ‘p50’ shows the relationship
between distance and informal care when all random effects ul,uc and us are
equal to zero. This means that the unobserved preferences with regard to
leisure, consumption, and informal care are at the median level. For example,
with regard to informal care we can interpret this reference individual to
have ‘median responsibility norms’. The line ‘p90’ represents the reference
individual with high unobserved preferences for informal care. Only 10% of
the individuals have a higher random effect us. The same explanation holds for
the other lines, p10, p25, p60, p70, and p80. For example, for line p25, only90 A Structural Model of Siblings’ Caregiving Interactions Chapter 4
25% of the people have smaller unobserved preferences for informal care. ul
and uc are zero for all lines, such that the only difference between the lines is
the random effect us, the unobserved heterogeneity with regard to informal
care.
Figure 4.1: Estimated relationship between distance and the ex-
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Figure 4.1 shows that the reference person with ‘median’ unobserved pref-
erences for informal care provides almost no informal care. This is as expected,
since we found in table 4.4.3 that only 34% of the only children with a father in
poor health provide informal care. The higher the preference of the reference
individual to provide care, the longer it takes before informal care decreases
with distance (distance elasticity is low for those with high preferences for
informal care).
The distance between adult children and their parents may also inﬂuence
the labor force participation of the adult children. Unsurprisingly, ﬁgure 4.2
shows that for the majority of adult children, who give almost no informal
care, distance does not inﬂuence labor force participation. Focussing on p70,
we see that labor supply increases with distance. Apparently, at least part of
the reduction in informal care is replaced by labor. For those with relatively
high preferences for informal care, labor force participation ﬁrst declines when
distance increases, as more travel time is needed for the provision of informalSection 4.5 Estimation results 91
care. However, after a certain distance (e.g. 50 kilometers for the 80th
percentile), informal care decreases and labor force participation increases.
Figure 4.2: Estimated relationship between distance and the ex-
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Figure 4.3 and 4.4 show the relation between the wage rate of the reference
individual, the expected number of hours of participation in the labor market,
and the hours of informal care the reference individual provides to her father.
In these ﬁgures the distance between the reference individual and her father
is 7.5 kilometers. The seven lines represent different levels of the unobserved
heterogeneity term with regard to informal care, just as explained for ﬁgure 4.1.
In line with the literature (e.g. Evers et al., 2008), ﬁgure 4.3 shows a positive
wage elasticity of labor supply. Reference individuals with higher preferences
for informal care are less active in the labor market. For example, at the wage
rate of 10 euros per hour, the reference individual with a high preference for
informal care (p90) participates about 9 hours less in the labor market than the
reference individual with a low unobserved preference for informal care (p10).
According to Figure 4.4 the wage elasticity of informal care supply is small.
The wage elasticity for a reference individual with large norms of responsibility
(or other reasons that lead to a high unobserved preference for informal care)
is almost zero.92 A Structural Model of Siblings’ Caregiving Interactions Chapter 4
Figure 4.3: Relationship between wages and the expected hours of
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Figure 4.4: Relationship between wages and the expected supply
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Two adult children 4.6
In families with two siblings, informal care provision to parents is determined
by the characteristics of both siblings, and the nature of the interaction between
siblings. In this section we use the estimates of the structural model, estimated
for only children, to families with two adult children. When applying the
estimates of only children to siblings, some assumptions are required. First of
all, we assume that siblings have the same preferences for leisure, consumption
and informal care as only children.18 The only difference is that there is now a
sibling available who can also provide informal care (the hours of informal care
ts in the utility function becomes the sum of own informal care and informal
care provided by the sibling). We assume that informal care provided by oneself
and by the sibling are perfect substitutes. This means that children receive
the same direct utility from an hour of informal care provided by themselves
or by their sibling (this utility is s, from equation 4.3). Also, an hour of
informal care provided by one of the siblings decreases the marginal utility
of an extra hour of informal care by ss (as in the model for only children), it
increases the utility obtained from leisure by ls, and it changes the marginal
utility of consumption by cs (not signiﬁcant). Only, for those siblings with
a negative direct utility from informal care (s < 0), we assume that they do
not receive any direct utility from an extra hour of informal care provided by
their sibling (these are, for example, individuals with healthy parents and/or
low unobserved preferences for informal care). Finally, we assume that both
siblings have their own time and budget constraints and that there are no
ﬁnancial transfers between siblings. The amount of informal care provided may
be the outcome of a non-cooperative or cooperative game between two siblings.
Section 4.6.1 describes how we derive non-cooperative and cooperative
equilibria. Next, we show some simulations of cooperative and non-cooperative
behavior between reference siblings (4.6.2). Finally, we apply the model
estimated in this chapter to the families with two siblings in SHARE, to gain an
indication of whether siblings behave cooperatively or non-cooperatively, and
to estimate the expected gains from cooperation between siblings (4.6.3).
18We see no reason why preferences for leisure, consumption, and informal care would be
different for only children, compared to children with brothers and sisters. Regarding informal
care, this is in line with Spitze and Logan (1991), who ﬁnd that the number of siblings is
unrelated to adult children’s closeness to parents or attitudes toward ﬁlial responsibility.94 A Structural Model of Siblings’ Caregiving Interactions Chapter 4
4.6.1 Cooperative and non-cooperative equilibria
Non-cooperative equilibrium
In the non-cooperative equilibrium, we assume that both siblings maximize
their utility, given the choice of their sibling and their own time and budget
constraints. We use a generalization of the Nash equilibrium, based on the
assumption that a player’s rationality is bounded. Bounded rationality is
incorporated by adding random disturbance to the payoffs of the players, just
as we did for only children in (4.5). Just as for only children, we assume that
siblings are more likely to choose better strategies than worse strategies, but do
not play the best strategy with probability one (children are ‘better responders’
rather than ‘best responders’). This concept, in a game-theoretic framework,
has been explained by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995, 1998) and is called the
Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE). As we add random errors distributed
according to the type I extreme value distribution, we have a special version
of the Quantal Response Equilibrium, namely the logit equilibrium (LQRE).
The LQRE extends the model we estimated for only children to the situation
with two or more siblings. In the logit equilibrium the sibling’s alternatives are
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is the expected utility to player i of choosing alternative m when sibling j
has probability distribution pj for the 12 alternatives. The time and budget
constraints are substituted in the utility function. The nonnegative parameter
 is inversely related to the level of error and can be interpreted to reﬂect
the degree of bounded rationality. When  ! 1, players become ‘perfectly
rational’ and the logit equilibrium converges to the Nash equilibrium. In the
other extreme case, when  = 0, the probabilities of the twelve alternatives
converge to 1=12, for both siblings (i.e., siblings make extremely noisy choices).
Standard multinomial logit models assume  = 1. Consistent with the model
for only children, we also assume  = 1.19
19The parameter  can not be identiﬁed. For future research it may be interesting to allow 
to vary with the education levels of the adult children.Section 4.6 Two adult children 95
The logit response functions pi and pj are functions of each other. For
example, the probability of sibling 1 choosing alternative m depends on the
probabilities of sibling 2 choosing alternatives 1 to 12. On the other hand, the
probability of sibling 2 choosing alternative m depends on the probabilities of
sibling 1 choosing alternatives 1 to 12. We ﬁnd the logit equilibrium by solving
the logit response functions, which form a system of 24 nonlinear equations
that are listed in Appendix 4.6.2.
Cooperative equilibrium

















 2 [0,1] (4.20)
subject to their own time and budget constraints. We choose 
 = 0.5, which is
one choice out of the large set of Pareto solutions.20
For each of the 1212 = 144 possible alternatives for the two siblings we
compute U(t1,t2), and we use these utilities to compute the probability of each
alternative in the same way as we did for only children (equation 4.6). The
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Simulations 4.6.2
In this section we simulate some non-cooperative and cooperative equilibria.
For these simulations we stick to our reference person, speciﬁed in section 4.5.2
(a woman of age 55, who is married and living in Germany, who has an 80
year old father in poor health, no mother, two children, a medium education
level, a remaining household income of 15,000 euros per year, and a wage
20In section 4.6.3 we do a sensitivity analysis, which shows that the conclusions are not very
sensitive to the choice of the weights.96 A Structural Model of Siblings’ Caregiving Interactions Chapter 4
rate of 10 euros per hour). However, in this section our reference person
is no longer an only child. First, we assume that she has a sister, who has
exactly the same characteristics as herself. This sister lives 7.5 kilometers from
the parent. Figure 4.5 presents the amount of care that these two sisters are
providing to their parent, for different geographical distances of our reference
individual.21 At the distance of 7.5 kilometers, both siblings have exactly the
same characteristics, and we see that they indeed give the same amount of
care. When the distance of our reference individual to the parent increases, the
amount of care provided by our reference sibling decreases, but the amount
of care provided by her sister increases (she compensates for part of the loss
of informal care). The total amount of informal care provided is higher in the
cooperative equilibria than in the non-cooperative equilibria. Compared to the
situation where our reference person was an only child (p70 in ﬁgure 4.1), in
the non-cooperative equilibria our reference person provides substantially less
informal care.
Figure 4.5: Cooperative and non-cooperative outcomes for two
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In ﬁgure 4.6 the sister of our reference person, explained above, has a
high education level instead of a medium education level (the two sisters still
21In section 4.5.2 we found that only those who have a relatively high unobserved random
effect for informal care provide informal care. In ﬁgure 4.5 we therefore assume the sisters to
have unobserved preferences for informal care at the 70th percentile, corresponding to the line
‘p70’ in section 4.5.2 (30% of the of the adult children have a higher random effect us).Section 4.6 Two adult children 97
have the same wage rate). In the presence of the higher educated sister, our
reference person provides more informal care in the non-cooperative equilibria
than in the cooperative equilibria (until about 40 kilometers), because she
has a higher preference for informal care than her sister. When the reference
Figure 4.6: Cooperative and non-cooperative outcomes for two
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Figure 4.7: Cooperative and noncooperative outcomes for two sib-
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individual lives farther from their father, her higher educated sister increases
her provision of informal care slightly.
When we switch the education levels for our reference person and her sister
(such that the reference person has a high education level and her sister has
a medium education level), we ﬁnd the equilibria shown in ﬁgure 4.7. In
the non-cooperative equilibria the medium educated sister provides most of
the informal care, whereas in the cooperative equilibria informal care is more
shared between the reference individual and her sisters.
4.6.3 Interactions between siblings in SHARE
The simulations in the previous section showed us that the nature of the
interactions between children can have a large effect on the division of informal
care between siblings and the total amount of informal care provided to parents.
In this section we apply the estimated structural model to families with two
adult children in SHARE (described in section 4.4). First, we examine the
ﬁt of cooperative and non-cooperative equilibria. Second, we investigate
which siblings behave cooperatively and non-cooperatively (using observed
characteristics). Finally, we study the gains that can be achieved by cooperation.
To examine the ﬁt of cooperative and non-cooperative equilibria, we predict
the cooperative and non-cooperative outcomes for the siblings in SHARE (using
their observed characteristics and the structural parameter estimates from the
only child empirical results), and compare them with their realized outcomes.
Cooperative and non-cooperative equilibria are described by probabilities for
each of the twelve alternatives described in section 4.3, for both siblings.
We examine the ﬁt of the cooperative and non-cooperative equilibria by the
sum (over siblings) of the probabilities for the realized options, divided by
the number of siblings. This can be interpreted as the percentage of correct
predictions of the model. The non-cooperative model has a higher ﬁt than
the cooperative model (26.8% versus 17.3%). In the non-cooperative model
siblings provide on average 1.13 hours of informal care per week, whereas in the
cooperative model this is 1.63 hours. The realized average hours of informal
care is also closer to the non-cooperative outcome than to the cooperative
outcome, namely 1.18 hours per week.Section 4.6 Two adult children 99
The next question we want to answer is which people tend to behave coop-
eratively and which people tend to behave non-cooperatively. We measure the
degree of non-cooperativeness by the difference between the non-cooperative
and the cooperative predicted probabilities for the realized outcome. Figure 4.8
shows the histogram of this measure of non-cooperativeness and can be inter-
preted as follows: when the degree of non-cooperativeness is 0.1, the realized
outcome has a 10%-points higher probability to be a non-cooperative than a
cooperative outcome. The histogram shows that most of the families (71%)
have a higher probability to behave non-cooperatively than cooperatively. Even,
for 47% of the families the probability that they behave non-cooperatively
is 10%-points higher than the probability that they behave cooperatively.22
The spike around zero includes families for whom the cooperative and the
non-cooperative outcomes are about the same.
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Degree of noncooperativeness
We regress the degree of non-cooperativeness on several background char-
acteristics of the siblings. The results in table 4.6.1 show that, relative to two
22A sensitivity analysis shows that the conclusions are not very sensitive to the weights chosen
in equation (4.20). For example, when we choose the weights to be 0.3 and 0.7 (instead of
0.5 and 0.5) the ﬁt of the cooperative model is 14.6% instead of 17.3%, the number of hours
of informal care is 1.81 instead of 1.63, 75% of the families have a higher probability for the
non-cooperative equilibrium (instead of 71%), and 50% of the families have a 10%-points
higher probability to behave non-cooperatively instead of cooperatively (instead of 47% when
the weights are 0.5 and 0.5).100 A Structural Model of Siblings’ Caregiving Interactions Chapter 4
sisters, two brothers have on average a 10.5%-points higher probability to
behave non-cooperatively than cooperatively. Also, a brother-sister relationship
appears to be more cooperative than a brother-brother relationship. This may
be explained by the fact that traditionally women are kin keepers. It has been
found that sister-to-sister relationships and sister-to-brother relationships show
on average greater emotional closeness and more frequency of contact than
brother-brother relationships (Connidis and Campbell, 1995). Furthermore,
when both of the siblings have a high education level, or when one of them
has a high education level and the other a medium education level, they are
signiﬁcantly less cooperative than two medium or low educated siblings. On
average, two high educated siblings have a 3.2%-points higher probability to
behave non-cooperatively rather than cooperatively. Finally, older siblings and
siblings with a larger age difference have a signiﬁcantly higher probability to
behave cooperatively, and the differences in cooperativeness between countries
is small. Siblings in Austria and the Netherlands behave slightly more coop-
eratively than siblings in Sweden, while siblings in Spain, Italy and Denmark
behave somewhat less cooperatively.
To obtain insights into the gains that can be achieved from cooperation, we
compute the increase in the hours of informal care that would occur if those
who seem to be non-cooperative were to change to cooperative behavior. If
those who tend to be non-cooperative (who have a higher probability to be
non-cooperative than to be cooperative) were pushed into cooperative behavior,
their average provision of informal care would increase from 1.04 hours per
week to 1.52 hours per week. So, their parents would on average receive
0.96 hours of informal care per week more from their children, which is a
growth of 46.2%. While informal care increases when families are pushed into
their cooperative outcome, the number of individuals working full-time in the
labor market decreases by 5.7%-points and the number of individuals working
part-time increases by 6.7%-points.Section 4.6 Two adult children 101
Table 4.6.1: Degree of non-cooperativeness
Coef. Std. err. p-value
Gender
2 sisters 0.000 - -
brother and sister 0.020 0.004 0.00
2 brothers 0.105 0.005 0.00
Age
Age youngest sibling -0.004 0.000 0.00
Age difference between the siblings -0.002 0.001 0.00
Education
Both low education level -0.014 0.010 0.17
Both high education level 0.032 0.004 0.00
Low and medium education level -0.018 0.008 0.02
Low and high education level -0.006 0.015 0.67
Medium and high education level 0.021 0.004 0.00
Number of children
Minimum number of children of both siblings -0.004 0.002 0.07
Difference in number of children between siblings 0.000 0.002 0.91
Partners
No partners 0.000 - -
One sibling has a partner -0.004 0.009 0.63
Both siblings have a partner -0.006 0.009 0.53
Country of the parents
Sweden 0.000 - -
Austria -0.016 0.007 0.04
Belgium 0.001 0.007 0.85
Germany -0.012 0.007 0.08
Denmark 0.019 0.007 0.01
Spain 0.031 0.008 0.00
France 0.004 0.007 0.54
Italy 0.030 0.008 0.00
The Netherlands -0.019 0.007 0.01
Czech Republic -0.011 0.007 0.12
Greece -0.005 0.006 0.45
Poland 0.013 0.010 0.16
Constant 0.238 0.017 0.00
N 2891
R2 0.251102 A Structural Model of Siblings’ Caregiving Interactions Chapter 4
4.7 Conclusions
This chapter presents a structural model to analyze families’ complex decisions
regarding informal care provision for aging parents. In the model adult children
maximize their utility, deﬁned over consumption, leisure, and the amount of
care that parents receive from their children, subject to a time and budget
constraint.
In the ﬁrst part of this study, the preference parameters of the model are
estimated using only children, such that interactions between siblings do not
play a role. The results show that the preference for informal care is inﬂuenced
by the health of the parents, the gender and education level of the adult
children, and cultural and institutional differences between countries. Also
unobserved individual speciﬁc preferences such as altruism, reciprocity and
responsibility norms play a large role in the preferences of adult children to
give informal care. The (negative) wage elasticity of informal care supply
appears to be small.
The second part of the chapter focuses on the strategic interactions between
siblings. In the literature it has been emphasized that modeling family decisions
as a bargaining process is important to increase our understanding of these
decisions. An important follow-up question is whether this bargaining process
is cooperative or non-cooperative. In a structural model with two siblings
one has to make assumptions about the nature of the interactions between
siblings. When some families are cooperative and other non-cooperative,
this cannot be identiﬁed in general together with the other coefﬁcients in a
game-theoretic model. In some way, one needs information about the (non-
)cooperativeness of siblings, which is often not available. Most often, empirical
game-theoretic models assume that siblings make non-cooperative decisions.
This study presents a ﬁrst attempt to identify the nature of the interactions
between siblings using the structural parameter estimates of only children. We
show that the nature of the interactions between siblings can have a large
effect on the division of informal care between siblings and the total amount
of informal care provided to parents. Furthermore, it appears that 71% of
the siblings have a higher probability to be non-cooperative than cooperative
(which means that the assumption of non-cooperative siblings used by current
game-theoretic models holds for the majority of the siblings). The degree ofSection 4.7 Conclusions 103
cooperativeness varies most with the gender of the siblings. On average, two
brothers have a 10.5% higher probability to be non-cooperative than two sisters.
Furthermore, two higher educated siblings or a higher and medium educated
sibling appear to be less cooperative on average than two medium or lower
educated siblings, and older siblings have a signiﬁcantly higher probability to
behave cooperatively.
For future research it may be interesting to estimate this model using U.S.
data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). The HRS has the advantage
that it also contains information about family income of the adult children.
For policy design, we can conclude that a reduction in the geographical
distance between adult children and their parents would be an effective mea-
sure to increase informal care as well as the labor force participation of those
children with a relatively high preference for informal care. For example, the
social rent sector could weigh informal care in their assignment of houses, or
senior houses could be built in residential areas. For ﬁscal policies it may be
of interest that net wages have negligible effects on the provision of informal
care, while they do inﬂuence labor supply. Pushing non-cooperative families
into their cooperative equilibria would increase the provision of informal care,
but this would be at the expense of the labor supply of adult children.104 A Structural Model of Siblings’ Caregiving Interactions Chapter 4
4.A Wage equations per country
Table 4.A.1: Wage equations per country
Equation 1: ln(wage rate) AT BE DE
Man 0.095 -0.016 0.062**
Age 0.066*** 0.044*** 0.098***
Age2=100 -0.067*** -0.042*** -0.100***
Primary education -1.511*** -0.095 -0.590***
Secondary education -0.261*** -0.140*** -0.287***
(Upper) secondary education 0.000 0.000 0.000
Post secondary non-tertiary edu. 0.155** -0.006 0.125***
Tertiary education 0.388*** 0.178*** 0.270***
Man with partner 0.045 0.064 0.193***
Woman with partner -0.042 -0.052 -0.056**
Intercept 0.574** 1.243*** -0.217*
Equation 2: participation decision
Man 0.023 0.453** -0.283***
Age 15–29 0.690*** 1.197*** 0.694***
Age 30–39 0.793*** 1.160*** 0.860***
Age 40–49 -0.393*** 0.260* 0.343***
Age  60 -2.997*** -2.376*** -1.988***
Primary education -1.132** -0.740*** -1.036***
Secondary education -0.288*** -0.474*** -0.330***
(Upper) secondary education 0.000 0.000 0.000
Post secondary non-tertiary edu. 0.015 0.459 0.120
Tertiary education 0.382*** 0.634*** 0.269***
Man with partner 0.738*** 0.971*** 0.704***
Woman with partner -0.078 0.363*** -0.130**
Man with child -0.195 -0.494*** -0.021
Woman with child -0.827*** -0.417*** -0.695***
Intercept 0.510*** -0.627*** 0.114
 0.083 -0.116 0.196***
w 0.490*** 0.323*** 0.409***
wp = w 0.041 -0.037 0.080***
Observations 1488 1346 6028
Censored observations 658 676 3240
Uncensored observations 830 670 2788
Log likelihood -1165.866 -704.823 -4038.892
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1Section 4.A Wage equations per country 105
Table 4.A.1: Wage equations per country (continued)
Equation 1: ln(wage rate) DK ES FR
Man -0.114 0.147*** 0.080*
Age 0.086*** 0.031*** 0.070***
Age2=100 -0.090*** -0.025*** -0.066***
Primary education -0.262*** -0.204***
Secondary education -0.136*** -0.163*** -0.042
(Upper) secondary education 0.000 0.000 0.000
Post secondary non-tertiary edu. -0.081 0.378***
Tertiary education 0.158*** 0.294*** 0.407***
Man with partner 0.297*** 0.137*** 0.062
Woman with partner 0.006 0.088*** -0.035
Intercept 0.474 0.932*** 0.423**
Equation 2: participation decision
Man 0.231 0.190*** -0.117
Age 15–29 1.335*** 0.748*** 1.115***
Age 30–39 1.556*** 0.650*** 1.224***
Age 40–49 1.321*** -0.053 0.397***
Age  60 -1.339*** -1.942*** -2.587***
Primary education -0.259*** -0.317***
Secondary education -0.550*** -0.029 -0.405***
(Upper) secondary education 0.000 0.000 0.000
Post secondary non-tertiary edu. 0.495*** 0.575**
Tertiary education 0.198* 0.623*** 0.475***
Man with partner 0.628*** 0.923*** 1.138***
Woman with partner 0.520*** -0.154*** 0.399***
Man with child -0.057 -0.287*** -0.349***
Woman with child -0.222 -0.547*** -0.697***
Intercept -0.410*** 0.031 -0.039
 0.040 -0.028 0.035
w 0.515*** 0.452*** 0.466***
wp = w 0.021 -0.013 0.016
Observations 1422 7171 3221
Censored observations 509 3328 1321
Uncensored observations 913 3843 1900
Log likelihood -1160.870 -5647.577 -2396.299
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1106 A Structural Model of Siblings’ Caregiving Interactions Chapter 4
Table 4.A.1: Wage equations per country (continued)
Equation 1: ln(wage rate) CZ GR PL
Man 0.141** 0.135** 0.006
Age 0.026** 0.070*** 0.037***
Age2=100 -0.032** -0.065*** -0.030**
Primary education -0.226*** -0.299***
Secondary education -0.207*** -0.051 -0.810***
(Upper) secondary education 0.000 0.000 0.000
Post secondary non-tertiary edu. 0.279* 0.233*** 0.208***
Tertiary education 0.398*** 0.353*** 0.608***
Man with partner 0.195*** 0.148*** 0.154***
Woman with partner 0.039 0.144*** 0.025
Intercept -0.055 -0.095 -0.698***
Equation 2: participation decision
Man -0.278 0.334** -0.053
Age 15–29 0.834*** 1.070*** 0.729***
Age 30–39 1.447*** 0.717*** 0.688***
Age 40–49 -0.080 -0.207 -0.244***
Age  60 -3.139*** -2.553*** -2.027***
Primary education -0.345*** -0.632***
Secondary education -1.248*** -0.444*** -1.734***
(Upper) secondary education 0.000 0.000 0.000
Post secondary non-tertiary edu. 0.941 0.784*** 0.443***
Tertiary education 0.501** 0.591*** 0.797***
Man with partner 0.990*** 1.364*** 0.935***
Woman with partner -0.109 -0.010 0.259***
Man with child -0.978*** -0.547*** -0.050
Woman with child -1.320*** -0.263** -0.290***
Intercept 1.124*** -0.411*** -0.324***
 0.241* -0.075 -0.110
w 0.375*** 0.388*** 0.543***
wp = w 0.091* -0.029 -0.060
Observations 1095 1345 10464
Censored observations 485 729 5883
Uncensored observations 610 616 4581
Log likelihood -584.078 -832.007 -8276.916
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1Section 4.A Wage equations per country 107
Table 4.A.1: Wage equations per country (continued)




Primary education -0.310*** -0.170***
Secondary education -0.169*** -0.147***
(Upper) secondary education 0.000 0.000
Post secondary non-tertiary edu. 0.040** 0.046*
Tertiary education 0.301*** 0.237***
Man with partner 0.090*** 0.222***
Woman with partner 0.067*** -0.048**
Intercept 0.939*** 0.876***
Equation 2: participation decision
Man 0.223*** 0.018
Age 15–29 0.914*** 0.702***
Age 30–39 1.085*** 0.662***
Age 40–49 0.078* -0.261***
Age  60 -1.945*** -2.883***
Primary education -0.798*** -0.508***
Secondary education -0.395*** -0.489***
(Upper) secondary education 0.000 0.000
Post secondary non-tertiary edu. 0.380*** 0.044
Tertiary education 0.400*** 0.356***
Man with partner 0.712*** 1.144***
Woman with partner -0.078* 0.176***
Man with child -0.305*** -0.338***




wp = w 0.022 0.042**
Observations 14155 6007
Censored observations 7740 2195
Uncensored observations 6415 3812
Log likelihood -8780.796 -3100.034
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1108 A Structural Model of Siblings’ Caregiving Interactions Chapter 4
4.B Logit equilibrium
Section 4.6.1 explains the non-cooperative logit equilibrium, which is a gen-
eralization of the Nash equilibrium and deals with ‘noisy decisions’ made by
bounded-rational siblings. This equilibrium concept extends the model for only
children described in section 4.3, to a game theoretic framework with two
players.
In section 4.6 we have two siblings, i and j who can choose between 12
alternatives. Therefore, to obtain the logit equilibrium we have to solve a
system of 24 nonlinear equations, the logit response functions. The logit
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These 24 equilibrium conditions have to be solved numerically since there is
no closed-form solution.5
Changes in the Income Distribution of
the Dutch Elderly between 1989
and 2020: A Dynamic
Microsimulation
This chapter is based on Knoef, Alessie, and Kalwij (2009).
Introduction 5.1
In 2011, the ﬁrst generation of the babyboom will reach the statutory retirement
age of 65. From then onwards, there will be a doubling in the proportion of
retirees over the working population from 26% in 2011 to 47% in 2038. This
places an increasing ﬁnancial burden on society through pay-as-you-go ﬁnanced
social security, pension, health, and long-term care systems.
Policies aimed at alleviating the costs related to the aging society can be
based on the notion that the ﬁnancial burden is shared between generations
(see Bovenberg and Ter Rele, 2000, Van Ewijk et al., 2006). Alternatively or
at the same time, one could call upon intragenerational solidarity, such as
solidarity within the elderly generations. An example of a proposed policy is
lowering the indexation ambition of the public pensions (Den Butter, 2010).
Another example is ‘ﬁscalization’ of the public pension contributions. In this
case, a larger part of the pay-as-you-go public pension scheme will be ﬁnanced
by general tax revenues. Consequently, also the 65+ population pays for the
state pensions and due to the progressive Dutch tax system, this policy option
redistributes income within the elderly generation.
In order to assess the viability of proposed reforms, policymakers require
insights into the income distribution of current and future generations of pen-
sioners in a situation of no policy changes. It is important to note that also110 Income distribution of the Dutch Elderly Chapter 5
without pension reforms, the future income distribution of pensioners will
differ from the current distribution due to developments in longevity and in
demographic and socio-economic compositions. For instance, the number of di-
vorces is increasing and female labor force participation has increased strongly
during the last decades, so that many more women will receive an occupational
pension income in the future. Also, there are productivity differences between
cohorts that lead to income differences.
The contribution of this study to the literature is threefold. First, we describe
developments in the income distribution for the age groups 50–64 and 65–90
between 1989–2007 for the Netherlands. We also present developments in the
income composition for different parts of the distribution. The data show that
occupational pensions have become more important over the whole income
distribution, not just at the upper part.
Second, we predict the income distribution of the elderly until 2020 using
a microsimulation model. Previous research making predictions about the
income distribution in the Netherlands was performed by Dessens and Jansen
(1997) and SZW (2006). Dessens and Jansen examined the consequences
of the increased proportion of working female partners on trends in income
inequality. They extrapolated the Gini coefﬁcient until 2011, using predictions
of female participation rates and the average ratio of their incomes to those
of their partners. Our empirical results indicate that a single inequality index
such as the Gini coefﬁcient is not always sufﬁciently informative to describe
trends in income inequality, as trends in the lower and upper segments of the
distribution may be contradictory.
With a microsimulation model detailed estimates on the whole income
distribution are possible.1 SZW (2006) uses a microsimulation model to predict
the future income distribution of pensioners in the Netherlands. Our model
deviates from this model by using longitudinal instead of cross sectional data,
such that we can disentangle age, period, and cohort effects. Furthermore,
we use administrative instead of survey data. A related microsimulation study
of Van Sonsbeek (2009) predicts the costs and the redistributive effect of public
pensions in the Netherlands.
Third, new in this microsimulation study on income is that we investigate
1Merz (1991), O’Donoghue (2001) and Zaidi and Rake (2001) explain, review, and classify
microsimulation models around the world.Section 5.1 Introduction 111
the income process by explicitly paying attention to the modeling of the error
terms. Households may experience income shocks, the distribution of which
may be different for different types of households. In addition, income shocks
may have persistent effects, and the degree of persistency probably increases
with age. Therefore, we take into account autocorrelation and allow for the
fact that the degree of autocorrelation differs over the lifecycle. We are not
aware of a previous microsimulation study on income that takes into account
heteroskedasticity and persistency of income shocks.
For the income predictions we estimate a ﬁxed effects income equation
with three speciﬁcations. The ﬁrst speciﬁcation only contains age and period
effects. It models no other underlying processes that inﬂuence income (for
example labor market positions) and thus relies heavily on the modeling of
the income process. In the second speciﬁcation household demographics are
added, and the third speciﬁcation also incorporates the labor market status of
household members. In these speciﬁcations changes in demographic variables
or labor market status lead to income shocks. The main results of the three
speciﬁcations are rather similar. From this founding we cautiously conclude
that adding other background characteristics will not affect the simulation
results dramatically.
The advantage of using ﬁxed effects and modeling the error terms is that
they make the explicit modeling of underlying processes inﬂuencing household
income less necessary. Yet, more complex simulation models give more under-
lying information. For example, only after explicitly modeling labor market
status (which we do in speciﬁcation three), we can say more about the income
positions of elderly with and without occupational pension income.
The results show that next generations of pensioners have higher equiv-
alized household incomes than current generations of pensioners, especially
among households with median income. Between 2008 and 2020, equivalized
household income of the elderly in the age group 65–90 increases on average
by 0.5% per year for the 10th percentile, 1.2% for the median, and 1.0% for
the 90th percentile. Inequality among pensioners increases at the lower end
of the income distribution, but decreases at the upper end. The increased
inequality in the lower segment is not the result of a higher inequality between
households with and without occupational pension income. Instead, inequality
between households with and without occupational pension income in the112 Income distribution of the Dutch Elderly Chapter 5
lower segment of the distribution decreases until 2020.
If one aims to quantify the effects of different pension policies, then it is
important to model labor supply responses explicitly (Creedy and Duncan,
2002). This is beyond the scope of this study, however. This study offers
insights into the development of the future income distribution, induced by
increased longevity and ongoing demographic and socio-economic changes.
If labor market outcomes of a certain policy measure are known, they can be
incorporated into the model.
This chapter is structured as follows: the next section reviews the empirical
literature on developments in the Dutch income distribution in the past. Sec-
tions 5.3 and 5.4 describe the data and the microsimulation model, after which
section 5.5 summarizes the estimation results. Section 5.6 presents the results
of the simulation, and the chapter concludes with section 5.7.
5.2 Developments in the Dutch income distribution
This section shortly reviews the empirical literature on the Dutch income
distribution during the past ﬁfty years. From the 1960s onward, inequality
decreased rapidly. The main reason for this was the relative increase of the
income of inactive households, due to the establishment of the social security
system (Caminada and Goudswaard, 2003, Trimp, 2000). Later, between
1979–1994 inequality increased rapidly. Compared to other countries the
Netherlands started from a relatively low inequality, but experienced a relatively
high inequality growth (Gottschalk and Smeeding, 2000). Caminada and
Goudswaard (2001) found that the two main forces behind this phenomenon
are a more unequal distribution of market incomes and changes in social
transfers. In 1990 a revision of the tax system led to more inequality. In
addition, the growth in the number of two-earner couples increased inequality
between 1985 en 1994 (SCP, 2003). Using a decomposition analysis, SCP
found that the growth of two-earner couples, in combination with the relatively
decreasing incomes of people without employment income, explains about one
third of the total increase in inequality. In the second half of the 1990s, income
inequality between households decreased slightly (De Vos, 2007), whereas it
was quite stable during 2000 to 2007 (Statistics Netherlands).Section 5.3 Data 113
In the future, the trend of more two-earner households will result in more
households receiving two occupational pension incomes. This will increase the
average retirement income. With regard to inequality, more two-earner couples
can lead to a pooling effect: the inequality within the group of households with
two earners is lower than that of households with one earner. This means that
an increase in the proportion of two-earner households will, at a certain point,
reduce household income inequality.
Data 5.3
The data used in this study are from the 1989–2007 Income Panel Study of
the Netherlands (IPO, Inkomens Panel Onderzoek, CBS 2009a) and from the
population register (GBA, Gemeentelijke Basis Administratie, CBS 2010). These
data were compiled by Statistics Netherlands. Section 5.3.1 provides basic
information about IPO and lists descriptives on income and labor market status.
Section 5.3.2 describes the information used from the GBA.
Dutch income panel (IPO) 5.3.1
IPO contains information about households and their income, based on adminis-
trative data. Most of these data are from the Dutch National Tax Administration.
Additional data are derived from the registration of rent subsidies and study
grants. In the IPO, so called ‘key persons’ are randomly drawn from the Dutch
population and are followed over time. Data on all household members of
the key persons are also available. Major advantages of having administrative
data are a very low attrition rate and a high level of representativeness. It is
a well-known fact that the rich and the poor are often underrepresented in
surveys, institutional households are in general not included, and the elderly
population and single person households have relatively low participation rates
in surveys (Alessie et al., 1990, Knoef and de Vos, 2009b). Another advantage
of administrative data is that the observed variables are measured with a high
degree of accuracy. A drawback of the IPO is that it lacks some crucial back-
ground variables, such as education levels. Variables that are included in the
data are individual characteristics (such as gender, date of birth and marital114 Income distribution of the Dutch Elderly Chapter 5
status), household characteristics (such as family composition) and ﬁnancial
variables related to income.
We have waves from 1989 to 2007 at our disposal, which means that we
have data covering 19 years. A revision of IPO in 2000 changed several data
sources, deﬁnitions and methods. For the year 2000 two datasets are available:
one with the data sources, deﬁnitions and methods from before the revision,
and one with the data sources, deﬁnitions and methods after the revision. We
have equalized the deﬁnitions as much as possible. Appendix A describes the
most important changes.
To compare incomes of households with different compositions and size a
wide range of equivalence scales is available. Buhmann et al. (2005) review
available equivalence scales and ﬁnd that the choice of the equivalence scale
can affect inequality rankings. We chose the equivalence scale proposed by
Statistics Netherlands because it is based on the Dutch situation (see Siermann
et al., 2004, table 15, for more details). It takes into account the number of
adults and the number of children in a household. Kalmijn and Alessie (2008)
found that the modiﬁed OECD scale and the CBS scale yield very similar results
with regard to the distribution of equivalized household income. Appendix B
Table 5.3.1: Data selectiona
Raw sample 1,835,819
Observations left over after removal (sequentially)
Household income missing 1,819,048
Age of a household member missing 1,819,007
Negative or zero household income 1,807,963
Households with 9 or more household members 1,802,405
Key persons member of multiple couple household 1,793,807
Key person is a child or a student 1,290,226
Select key persons of age 36–90 958,188
Select key person born between 1917–1970 911,079
Bottom or top 0.1% of income distribution (by year) 909,257
Minus the year 2000 after revisionb 861,336
a The number of key persons and reason of removal from the sample. Key
persons are randomly drawn from the Dutch population and are followed over
time. We have information about all household members of the key persons.
b In the estimations we use the year 2000 before revision, instead of the year
2000 after revision.Section 5.3 Data 115
explains the deﬁnition of income. Income is always deﬂated/inﬂated to the
prices of 2005 (real income) using the CPI.
Table 5.3.1 reports on the selection of the data. At ﬁrst, we exclude house-
holds with missing or non-positive household income.2 Furthermore, we ex-
clude households with nine or more household members and households where
the key person is a member of a multiple couple household, a child or a student.
We select all households where the key person is born between 1917–19703
Table 5.3.2: Descriptives equivalized household income, age key person
50–64a







1989 20114 11310 18346 30705 2.71 1.67 1.62 0.228
1990 21187 11599 19096 32811 2.83 1.72 1.65 0.241
1991 21220 11464 19139 32566 2.84 1.70 1.67 0.243
1992 21183 11473 19242 32495 2.83 1.69 1.68 0.241
1993 21329 11530 19360 32931 2.86 1.70 1.68 0.241
1994 21241 11200 19210 33107 2.96 1.72 1.72 0.247
1995 21718 11320 19490 34049 3.01 1.75 1.72 0.250
1996 21971 11477 19727 34343 2.99 1.74 1.72 0.251
1997 22073 11530 19943 34418 2.99 1.73 1.73 0.248
1998 22747 12025 20534 35206 2.93 1.71 1.71 0.246
1999 23034 11985 20747 35923 3.00 1.73 1.73 0.253
2000 23596 12297 21190 36589 2.98 1.73 1.72 0.253
2000 23506 12428 21128 35947 2.89 1.70 1.70 0.248
2001 24203 12838 21786 37468 2.92 1.72 1.70 0.247
2002 24407 13024 22077 37580 2.89 1.70 1.70 0.244
2003 24128 12930 21911 37330 2.89 1.70 1.69 0.243
2004 24463 13124 22035 37641 2.87 1.71 1.68 0.245
2005 24589 13102 21994 38118 2.91 1.73 1.68 0.247
2006 23629 12598 20859 36872 2.93 1.77 1.66 0.254
2007 24351 12814 21528 38257 2.99 1.78 1.68 0.258
a Source: IPO, own computations. In this study income is always inﬂated/deﬂated to
2005 euro’s. The year 2000 is presented two times, ﬁrst for the data before revision
and secondly for the data after revision.
2In 64% of the households with negative income, there are one or more self-employed
household members. However, of all households with self-employment, only 3.3% have a
negative income, so that we do not overlook a large part of the self-employed households.
3In this way we can make predictions until 2020 for the population of age 50–90, because
the cohort born in 1970 reaches the age of 50 in 2020 and the cohort born in 1917 is of age 90
in the last wave of the data (2007). In this study we ignore new immigrant families. For the
elderly we expect the effect of this choice to be small.116 Income distribution of the Dutch Elderly Chapter 5
and is of age 36–90. Finally, households in the bottom or top 0.1% of the
income distribution are excluded.
Descriptives household income
Tables 5.3.2 and 5.3.3 describe the distribution of equivalized household income
for key persons in the age groups 50–64 and 65–90, respectively. Henceforth,
any reference to ‘income’ should be read as ‘equivalized household income’.
During the years 1989–2007, income increased. In the age group 50–64,
mean income increased by 21%, from 20,114 euro in 1989 to 24,351 euro
in 2007. In the age group 65–90, income was fairly constant during the
1990s. It increased by only 1% between 1990–1999, compared to 9% between
2000–2007.4
The Gini coefﬁcient and the decile ratios show that inequality in the age
group 50–64 increased between 1989 and 1995 and remained fairly constant
thereafter.5 For the age group 65–90, inequality is lower and shows a different
pattern. It grew between 1989–1991, but declined in the years after 1991.
Since 1998, inequality in the age group 65–90 has been quite stable. These
developments add to the results of Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000), who found
that overall income inequality increased between 1979 and the mid-1990s.
Several factors may have induced these trends, such as the increased female
labor force participation, changes in early retirement schemes, the development
of the pension system, and the business cycle.
Labor and occupational pensions
Changes in participation rates inﬂuence the income structure of the next gen-
eration of pensioners, since more labor income today generally leads to more
occupational pension income in the future. Figure 5.1 shows the percentage of
females receiving labor income across several generations. For example, ‘1938’
4This is probably related to the fact that no indexation of public pension beneﬁts occurred
in the 1990s.
5In 1990 a major revision of the tax system took place with distributional consequences
(‘operatie Oort’). This explains (part) of the difference between inequality measures from 1989
to 1990.Section 5.3 Data 117
Table 5.3.3: Descriptives equivalized household income, age key person
65–90a







1989 17031 10355 14699 26732 2.58 1.82 1.42 0.225
1990 17725 10416 14850 28459 2.73 1.92 1.43 0.242
1991 17738 10388 14890 28641 2.76 1.92 1.43 0.244
1992 17626 10542 14935 28176 2.67 1.89 1.42 0.236
1993 17489 10557 14867 27746 2.63 1.87 1.41 0.231
1994 17252 10481 14639 27183 2.59 1.86 1.40 0.231
1995 17278 10605 14659 27246 2.57 1.86 1.38 0.228
1996 17375 10665 14799 27300 2.56 1.84 1.39 0.228
1997 17461 10835 14795 27343 2.52 1.85 1.37 0.225
1998 17916 11275 15192 27758 2.46 1.83 1.35 0.221
1999 17936 11222 15196 27696 2.47 1.82 1.35 0.224
2000 18337 11393 15515 28406 2.49 1.83 1.36 0.228
2000 18541 11504 15708 28337 2.46 1.80 1.37 0.227
2001 18562 11702 15737 28252 2.41 1.80 1.34 0.224
2002 19044 11932 16125 29300 2.46 1.82 1.35 0.225
2003 19065 11956 16180 29193 2.44 1.80 1.35 0.225
2004 19189 12073 16366 29316 2.43 1.79 1.36 0.222
2005 19367 12014 16439 29717 2.47 1.81 1.37 0.228
2006 19575 12247 16771 29788 2.43 1.78 1.37 0.224
2007 20048 12406 17196 30592 2.47 1.78 1.39 0.227
a Source: IPO, own computations. In this study income is always inﬂated/deﬂated to
2005 euro’s. The year 2000 is presented two times, ﬁrst for the data before revision
and secondly for the data after revision.
refers to persons born in 1938. The vertical differences between lines measure
the ‘cohort-time’ effects. We use this terminology to emphasize that it is not
possible to disentangle age from cohort and time effects in this ﬁgure. Female
participation rates have increased considerably and it can be seen that there
are important cohort-period effects. This has also been found by Euwals et al.
(2011), who claim that changed attitudes towards the combination of paid
work and children have played a major role. This trend will have considerable
consequences for the income structure of next generations of pensioners, as
more two-earner couples today will lead to more couples receiving double
pension incomes in the future.
Figure 5.2 shows the percentage of males receiving labor income across sev-
eral generations. From age 50 to 65 there is a steep decrease in the proportion118 Income distribution of the Dutch Elderly Chapter 5
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of males receiving labor income. However, as from the generation born in 1943,
more men of age 50–65 continue to participate in the labor market. At age
60, about 46% of the men born in 1938 received labor income, while about
61% of the men born in 1943 received labor income. This means there is a
cohort-period effect of 15%-points, probably due to policy reforms that have
been implemented since the late 1990s to discourage early retirement. The
results are in line with Kapteyn et al. (2010), who found that the labor force
participation for men of age 55–64 decreased until 1993 and has increased
afterwards. Furthermore, they agree with SCP (2006), who report that between
1994 and 2003 the importance of earnings for the age group 55–64 increased,
at the expense of income from early retirement.
Retirement decisions of married men and women are interrelated. We ﬁnd
that the participation rates of married women, younger than 65, who have
a husband aged 65 or over have increased considerably, from 12% in 1989
to 23% in 2007. Meanwhile, the age difference between men and women
has been quite stable over time. This is an interesting trend, which leads to
elderly households receiving more labor income and more occupational pension
income in the future.
Coherent with the growth in the female labor force participation, table 5.3.4
shows that especially the percentage of women receiving an occupational
pension has increased. In 1989, 29% of the women aged 65 received an
occupational pension; in 2007 this was almost 63%. Also with age an increasing
percentage of women receive an occupational pension income. For example,
in 1989 29% of the 65-year-old women received an occupational pension
income. In 1999 these women were 75 year old and the percentage receiving
an occupational pension income has increased to 40%. This increase can be
attributed to widow pensions, which women start to receive later in life, when
their partners die. New generations of retired men also receive occupational
pension income more often. The percentage of men receiving an occupational
pension at age 65 has increased from 85% in 1989 to 96% in 2007.
Income composition 1989￿2007
This study addresses the distribution of household income, which is the sum of
several income components. This section investigates the composition of these120 Income distribution of the Dutch Elderly Chapter 5
Table 5.3.4: Percentage of men and women receiving
occupational pension incomea
Age Men Women
1989 1999 2007 1989 1999 2007
50 2.00 5.18 3.52 5.89 6.88 5.13
55 8.16 8.20 9.20 10.28 8.19 10.11
60 34.47 33.92 31.45 19.92 18.45 28.68
65 84.76 88.75 96.21 28.94 36.00 62.71
70 84.21 89.69 91.94 41.13 40.83 46.53
75 86.70 90.22 40.48 51.47
80 85.91 87.19 57.03 61.96
85 83.70 69.19
90 88.89 67.47
a Source: IPO, own computations. The percentage of men and
women with occupational pension income in the years 1989,
1999 and 2007. Because we focus on the birth years 1917–
1970, there are no descriptives for age 75+ in 1989, and age
85+ in 1999. Widow pensions are included.
income components. Figures 5.3 and 5.4 show the income composition in 1989
and 2007 for the age groups 65–90 and 50–64, respectively. The horizontal axes
give the percentiles of the income distribution, the vertical axes the proportions
of the various income components.
In ﬁgure 5.3 (age 65–90) the income of a median income household consists
of 58% public pension beneﬁts, 32% occupational pension income, and 10%
remaining income sources. Between 1989 and 2007, occupational pensions
became more important for almost all percentiles. In 1989, as from about
the 85th percentile occupational pensions were more important than state
pensions. In 2007, already as from the 70th percentile occupational pensions
are more important than state pensions. This ﬁnding might be explained in
part by spending cuts of the government during the early 1990s, as a result of
which public pension beneﬁts have not been adjusted for inﬂation.6 Another
explanation for the increase of the income share of occupational pensions is the
development of the pension system in the 1950s and the 1960s (Deelen, 1995).
6In principle, public pensions follow the gross minimum wages, which are linked to the
development of the contractual wages. If no indexation takes place, public pensions will lag
behind the growing prosperity; all the more because contractual wages in turn lag behind
earned incomes, because of occasional increments and promotions. (De Kam and Nijpels,
1995)Section 5.3 Data 121
Figure 5.3: Income composition for the age group 65–90 in 1989
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Note: for each percentile in the income distribution these ﬁgures show the average proportion
of several income components. Transfer income includes welfare, disability beneﬁts, and
unemployment beneﬁts.
Above age 65, labor income is most important for households in the high
percentiles. It is likely that households with the ‘better’ jobs remain active on
the labor market and obtain a relatively high share of their income from work.
Capital income only plays a substantial role for the top 5% of the households.
For age 50–64 we see that the proportion of labor income increases over
the income distribution: the more income households receive, the more labor
is an important component (ﬁgure 5.4). As expected, for the lower percentiles
transfer income is important. Interestingly, less households depended on
transfer income in 2007 than in 1989. While in 1989, as from the 25th
percentile labor income becomes more important than transfer income, in 2007
this intersection already takes place at the 13th percentile.122 Income distribution of the Dutch Elderly Chapter 5
Figure 5.4: Income composition for the age group 50–64 in 1989
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Note: for each percentile in the income distribution these ﬁgures show the average proportion
of several income components. Transfer income includes welfare, disability beneﬁts, and
unemployment beneﬁts. Occupational pensions also contain early retirement income.
5.3.2 Population register (GBA)
Trends in marital status inﬂuence the income distribution. Divorces, for exam-
ple, lead to changes in income as well as household formation (and thus the
equivalence scale). The GBA contains information on the marital status of all
people registered in Dutch municipalities.7 Because the GBA contains much
more observations than IPO, we use the GBA to estimate transition models
of marital status from one year to another. Data is available from January 1
1995 to January 1 2008. Just as in IPO, we select all persons born between
1917–1970 with age 36–90. Furthermore, to be able to estimate transitions
between t and t +1, the marital status in t +1 has to be known. Therefore,
7Individuals not registered as residents are, for instance, NATO personnel, diplomats and
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2006 is the last year we can use and persons who, for example, emigrate or
decease in t +1 are excluded at time t.
We end up with 6,812,340 individuals in 1995, increasing to 8,673,138
individuals in 2006. The percentage of married people who divorce between t
and t +1 raised from 0.7% in 1995 to 0.8% in 2006. Furthermore, per year on
average 2.5% of the divorced persons make a transition into marriage. Most
widows and widowers are relatively old and do not remarry again. On average,
0.4% of the widows and widowers make a transition into marriage from one
year to the other.
Microsimulation model 5.4
Microsimulation models are used for income predictions and pension issues
internationally.8 These models are in general very demanding multi-year
projects which require a lot of data (Harding, 2007). One often needs to
combine various data sources with different samples, so that one needs to rely
on matching of ‘statistical twins’ (e.g. Geyer and Steiner, 2010) and on surveys
that often suffer from representability problems, especially when focusing on
the elderly population.9
In a microsimulation model the quality of the input data is of prime im-
portance: if the baseline data are not representative, the predictions of the
population will not be representative either (Martini and Trivellato, 1997).
This study uses a long and representative administrative panel. Although ad-
ministrative data contain less detailed information on the characteristics of
persons and households, the panel aspect of the data allows us to take into
account unmeasured variables such as education, ability, and cohort effects.
To simulate the income distribution of the elderly until the year 2020, we
use an open dynamic population model with cross-sectional aging. In our model
each characteristic for each person is updated each year (dynamic aging). By
8Examples are the MIDAS (Microsimulation for the Development of Adequacy and Sustain-
ability) model for Belgium, Italy and Germany (Dekkers et al., 2008). The MINT (Modeling
retirement Income in the Near Term) model for the US (Butricia et al., 2001, Panis and Lillard,
1999, Smith et al., 2007, Toder et al., 1999), Pensim2 for the UK (Emmerson et al., 2004), and
SESIM which is used to study the income of the Swedish babyboomers (Flood et al., 2008).
9Nursing homes are often excluded in surveys and the elderly population living in private
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contrast, in microsimulation models with static aging individual characteristics
are constant over time. Then, the weights attached to each individual change
over time and mimic the process of demographic aging.
Static aging is well suited for short to medium term forecasts (3–5 year),
where it can be expected that large changes have not occurred in the underlying
population (O’Donoghue, 2001). An example of a model with static aging can
be found in Soede et al. (2004), who analyze future incomes in six European
countries.
Cross-sectional aging means that we ﬁrst simulate all individuals for one
year, then for the second year, and so fort. Longitudinal simulation models, on
the other hand, simulate individual one for all years, the same for individual
two, and so forth. Cross-sectional aging allows us to have interactions between
household members. For example, husbands and wives make joint labor supply
decisions, and the death of a household member can inﬂuence the labor market
positions of the remaining household members. The model is open, as marriage
and birth lead to new synthetic household members. In closed microsimulation
models the matching of spouses is restricted to persons within the sample.
Figure 5.5: Design of the microsimulation model
Figure 5.5 describes the design of the model. The representative households
in the Dutch Income Panel of the year 2007 are the starting point of the
simulation. They form the base population of the model. We dynamically ageSection 5.4 Microsimulation model 125
all members of these households until 2020 in the aging module. In the aging
module, people age, they may decease, divorces may take place, children may
leave their parental home, new partners or children may enter the household
and labor market positions may change. Transition models, estimated with IPO
and GBA data, are used to predict the transitions in household demographics
and labor market positions. Furthermore, we take into account differential
mortality with regard to income.
After the aging module, households move into the income module, where
household incomes are predicted. To this end, we estimate a ﬁxed effects
income equation, taking into account age and period effects, household de-
mographics and labor market status. The ﬁxed effects take into account unob-
served heterogeneity and we consider the persistency and heteroskedasticity of
income shocks.
In the remainder of this section we explain the income equation (5.4.1),
the implementation of differential mortality in the aging module (5.4.2), the
transition models with regard to household demographics (5.4.3) and the
transition models with regard to labor market status (5.4.4).
Income equation 5.4.1
To predict income trends for future generations of pensioners we model house-
hold income using a ﬁxed effects model. We include age effects, period effects,
and socio-economic variables in our regression model. Socio-economic vari-
ables enable us to take into account developments in the income distribution
due to different socio-economic characteristics of future pensioners. The ﬁxed
effects allow us to control for time-invariant omitted variables that inﬂuence the
income of a household. They include education, ability, and income differences
between cohorts caused by productivity differences.10 Fixed effects are in line
with Haveman et al. (2007), who found that preretirement economic advan-
tages continue into retirement. We have found only one other microsimulation
model using ﬁxed effects. That is the MINT model that uses ﬁxed effects to
take into account unmeasured heterogeneity in lifetime preretirement earnings
proﬁles (Butricia et al., 2001, Toder et al., 1999).
10Kapteyn et al. (2005) found that productivity growth can explain all generation effects
with regard to income.126 Income distribution of the Dutch Elderly Chapter 5
We prefer a ﬁxed effects model to a random effects model as household
speciﬁc effects (i) may be correlated with the included covariates. For example,
‘ability’ is likely to be correlated with labor market status. The disadvantage of
a ﬁxed effects estimator in microsimulation models is that it rules out out-of-
sample simulations (Wolf, 2001). However, in this analysis we can use a ﬁxed
effects model because our target population are future pensioners, who are
already born and available in the data.
Income proﬁles are estimated with the same data as the base population is
derived from. The ﬁxed effects income equation is
yit = +
0xit +i + vit, (5.1)
where yit is the ‘log’ of equivalized household income11 of household i in time
period t,  is a scalar, xit is the it-th observation on K explanatory variables,
 is a parameter vector of size K, i is the unobserved individual effect and vit
is the error term. We assume strict exogeneity
E(vit j i, xi1,...,, xit,..., xiT) = 0 (5.2)
and identify  using the normalization
PN
i=1i = 0. The estimation of , 
and i is explained in Appendix 5.C. We estimate three speciﬁcations of the
income equation. In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation, the vector xit only contains age and
period effects. This is the pure speciﬁcation where income mobility only results
from income shocks. In the second speciﬁcation, demographic variables such
as household size and marital status are added, and in the third speciﬁcation
also the labor market positions of household members are taken into account.
By adding extra variables to the vector xit, more individual heterogeneity
is introduced in the income path. Adding household size as an explanatory
variable, in addition to the use of the equivalence scale in the dependent
variable, leads to information about the income effect of an extra men, women
or child in the household. For example, if the coefﬁcient for the number of
adult men in the household is positive, we can conclude that on average, the
income of an extra men exceeds his marginal costs of living (determined by
11If one wants to simulate income components separately, one should take into account the
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the equivalence scale).
Age and period effects are implemented as dummy variables, so that their
relationship with income is very ﬂexible. However, age, period, and cohort
effects (cohort effects are captured in the individual effect) cannot be identiﬁed
empirically, since calendar time is equal to the year of birth plus age. We follow
the identiﬁcation restriction proposed by Deaton and Paxson (1994), which
means that we assume that all time dummy coefﬁcients add up to zero and are
orthogonal to a linear time trend. We assume that all period effects are due to
unanticipated business cycle shocks.
Households experience income shocks, the size of which may depend on
characteristics of the household (heteroskedasticity). For example, income
shocks may be larger during working life than during retirement, and may be
higher for singles than for couples. Furthermore, the question arises how long
income shocks persist (autocorrelation), and whether the persistency of a shock
depends on the position in the lifecycle.
When a household experiences an income shock in period t, this may have
an effect on the income in the periods following t. The error term vit therefore
might follow an autoregressive scheme. To model this we ﬁt the following
auxiliary regression model of order two12
vit = 1,itvi,t 1 +2vi,t 2 +"it, (5.3)
where we assume "it to be serially uncorrelated. The persistency of a shock
may depend on the position in the lifecycle.13 Therefore, we allow 1,it to be a
function of age.14








As explained above, the variance of an income shock may depend on the
characteristics of a household. We take this heteroskedasticity into account
by investigating the distribution of "it for several mutually exclusive groups
12We ﬁnd that higher orders are of no importance.
13Kalmijn and Alessie (2008) found that the two-year autocorrelation of equivalized income
is quite stable during midlife, but moves to a higher level after age 65.
14We have tried several speciﬁcations and have also investigated whether it is relevant to
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of households. For example, the group of households where the key person is
younger than 65 and the group of households where the key person is older
than 65. For each group we draw income shocks from the empirical distribution
of residuals in 2001–2007 for that group (b "i,2001,..., b "i,2007).15
In the predictions we assume period effects to be zero, such that the pre-
dicted incomes are free from the effects of the business cycle. Finally, we take
into account that as from 2015, the partner bonus for the younger partners
of state pension beneﬁciaries with no or low income will be abolished. We
subtract the partner bonus for all households who are not eligible for a partner
bonus anymore, and of whom the younger member of the couple has no labor
income. SZW (2009) found that remaining household income for most of these
households will not reach the eligibility limit for social assistance.
5.4.2 Di￿erential mortality
In the aging module, where we age all household members in the microsimula-
tion model from 2007 to 2020, persons may decease. To determine whether
an individual in the sample deceases we apply Monte carlo simulations (see
e.g. Law and Kelton, 1982). For each individual j and each period t from 2008
to 2020 we draw a random value mjt from the uniform distribution. If mjt is
lower than the predicted mortality rate the individual deceases.
We use predicted mortality rates per age, cohort, and gender published
by Statistics Netherlands and adjust the mortality rates of the ﬁrst and fourth
income quartile using the degree of differential mortality found by Kalwij et al.
(2009) for the Netherlands. If we would not take into account differential
mortality we would underestimate the income level of the elderly, as low income
households would survive relatively too often and high income households
would survive not often enough.16 Kalwij et al. (2009) ﬁnd a quartile ratio
Q1/Q4 of 2.2 for men and 1.7 for women as from age 65, meaning that
mortality rates in the ﬁrst income quartile are 2.2 times higher for men and 1.7
times higher for women, relative to the fourth quartile.17 As from age 65 we
15By using the years as from 2001, possible effects caused by the revision of the data are
excluded.
16When we do not take into account differential mortality, the average yearly income growth
of pensioners between 2008 and 2020 is 0.15%-points lower.
17This is in line with ﬁndings in other European countries, e.g. Von Gaudecker and Scholz
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therefore adjust mortality rates such that mortality rates in the ﬁrst quartile
are 2.2 (or 1.7 for women) times higher than in the fourth quartile, keeping
the average mortality rate equal. Before age 65 mortality rates are small, such
that differential mortality will not make a relevant difference.
To determine which households belong to the ﬁrst and the fourth income
quartile, we use the ﬁxed effects estimation of the ﬁrst speciﬁcation (where
only age and period effects are taken into account). The ﬁxed effects of this
estimation give us a measure of the ‘lifetime income position’ of households,
as in this speciﬁcation a correction has been made only for the age proﬁle, the
business cycle, and for income shocks.
Transitions in marital status and household composition 5.4.3
Using GBA data, we model the following transitions in marital status from
year to year: married-divorced, unmarried-married, widow(er)-married, and
divorced-married. Logit models are employed to estimate the transition prob-
abilities between the various marital statuses. The transition models are es-
timated for men and women separately and use age and year of birth as
explanatory variables. We do not explicitly model transitions into widowhood.
Becoming a widow(er) depends on the death of a partner. This probability is
incorporated via mortality (described in section 5.4.2).
We assume people to make at most one transition in marital status per
year and apply Monte Carlo simulation to assess whether a change indeed
occurs. In case of a divorce, the partner of the key person is removed from the
household, and in case of marriage a new household member is added. These
new household members have the same age as their partners and the opposite
gender.
The probability of a child leaving the parental home from one year to the
other is estimated using a logit model, where age and gender of the child are
the explanatory variables. The probability of a newborn child is also modeled
with a logit model. The explanatory variables are the age and gender of the
key person in the household, whether there is a couple in the household, and
the number of children which are already present in the household. In reality,
also older children may enter the household. The simulation model ignores
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5.4.4 Transitions in labor market status
The third speciﬁcation of the income equation distinguishes three labor market
positions: (1) receiving labor income, (2) receiving occupational pension
income and (3) receiving none of these two (‘other’). In order to belong to
(1) or (2), labor income or occupational pension income has to be at least 500
euro per year. In case an individual receives both labor income and pension
income the highest income component counts.
We model the transitions between the three labor market positions. Here-
with, we assume ‘occupational pension’ to be an absorbing state. The labor mar-
ket positions of the two members of a couple are interrelated. We therefore es-
timate transition models for singles and couples separately. Concerning singles,
we estimate multinomial logit models for men and women one by one. For cou-
ples we treat the three labor market outcomes of a husband and a wife as 33 =
9 univariate outcomes. For instance, we model the transition probability from
the state where both husband and wife work to the state where only the wife
works and the husband receives an occupational pension income. Transitions
between the nine states are estimated with multinomial logit models. The ex-
planatory variables used in the estimations are age, cohort, marital status, and
the number of children. Using the parameters of the transition models, we esti-
mate the transition probabilities for all singles and couples, given their age, mar-
ital status, and labor market position in the previous period. Also here, random
draws from the uniform distribution determine whether a transition takes place.
To determine the labor market status at time t + 1 with the transition
models, we need the labor market status at time t. A problem arises for new
household members and children who enter adulthood. To determine an initial
state for them we estimate a multinomial logit model per gender, with age and
cohort as explanatory variables. The increased labor market participation of
women therefore enters the model in two ways: via the initial labor market
positions of women and via cohort effects in the labor market transition models.
5.5 Estimation results
This section discusses the estimation results of the income equation explained
in section 5.4.1. The estimation results of the transition models described inSection 5.5 Estimation results 131
section 5.4.3 and 5.4.4 are discussed in Appendix 5.D.
Table 5.5.1 shows the estimation results of the ﬁxed effects income equation.
The ﬁrst two columns show the estimation results of the ﬁrst speciﬁcation,
where only age and period effects are taken into account. In the second
speciﬁcation, household demographics are added and in the third speciﬁcation
also labor market positions are added. All coefﬁcients are based on within
variation.
Table 5.5.1: Estimation results ﬁxed effects income equationa
Coef. 1 S.e. Coef. 2 S.e. Coef. 3 S.e.
age dummiesb yes yes yes
year dummies yes yes yes
# adult men 0.131 0.0018 0.037 0.0028
# adult women 0.061 0.0018 -0.030 0.0023
# children -0.068 0.0015 -0.059 0.0015
widower 0.138 0.0072 0.084 0.0071
widow 0.044 0.0051 -0.044 0.0058
divorced (man) 0.033 0.0062 0.021 0.0060
divorced (woman) -0.123 0.0077 -0.140 0.0076
unmarried (man) 0.057 0.0091 0.050 0.0088
unmarried (woman) -0.071 0.0120 -0.080 0.0119
# labor (man) 0.120 0.0026
# labor (woman) 0.118 0.0018
# occ. pension (man) 0.058 0.0032
# occ. pension (woman) 0.099 0.0034
0,1 -0.160 0.0253 -0.217 0.0259 -0.227 0.0260
1,1 0.162 0.0091 0.163 0.0093 0.162 0.0093
2,1 -0.010 0.0008 -0.009 0.0008 -0.009 0.0008
2 0.066 0.0012 0.054 0.0012 0.055 0.0012
 9.909 9.746 9.805
 0.370 0.369 0.342
" 0.210 0.205 0.234
R2 0.061 0.134 0.165
N 861336 861336 861336
a Reference categories are ‘age 65’ and ‘married’. For the identiﬁcation of age, period, and
cohort effects the method of Deaton and Paxson (1994) is used. Clustered standard errors
are used to take into account the correlation of the error terms in the same household.
b The coefﬁcients of the age speciﬁc dummy variables can be found in Appendix 5.E
In all three speciﬁcations, age effects increase until about age 55 and
decrease afterwards. As from age 70 they increase again, even when we control
for selectivity by adding selection dummies. The shape of the age proﬁles of
speciﬁcation two and three are very similar, while the age proﬁle of the ﬁrst132 Income distribution of the Dutch Elderly Chapter 5
speciﬁcation is more pronounced. The ﬁrst speciﬁcation has relatively high
age effects around age 54, caused by children leaving their parental home.
Equivalized household income increases when children leave their parental
home, as the equivalence scale captures the fact that children cost money.18
Speciﬁcation two and three correct for the presence of children, hence they
have lower age effects around age 54. The estimated period effects follow the
development of the business cycle.
Speciﬁcation two shows that households with more adults have on average
a higher equivalized household income. On average adults thus yield more
income than ‘costs’ (in terms of the increase in the equivalence scale). House-
holds with more children, on the other hand, have a lower equivalized income.
Kalmijn and Alessie (2008) found that this is partly due to a decline in the
personal income of women after the birth of children, but mainly because of
the increase in expenditures compelled by having children.
Marital status is signiﬁcantly associated with income. Compared to divorced
men, divorced women are relatively worse off. A divorce often coincides with a
loss of an adult in the household, such that the total effect of a divorce for men
is a 2.8% loss of income (0.033-0.061) and for women a 25% loss of income
(-0.123-0.131). Widowers and widows are better off than unmarried men and
women, and the unmarried are on average better off than divorced men and
women. Compared to marriage, men have on average 8% more income in wid-
owhood, but women are married 9% ﬁnancially better off than in widowhood.
The ﬁnal speciﬁcation takes labor market positions into account, namely,
the number of men and women receiving labor income, and the number of
men and women receiving occupational pension income. These variables can
be considered endogenous explanatory variables, but although this implies
the model estimates cannot be given a causal interpretation, they can be
used for predicting income. As expected, the number of working men and
women increases household income. The number of men and women with an
occupational pension increases household income in a smaller degree.
The parameters 0,1 to 2 in table 5.5.1 show that income shocks are
persistent and that persistency increases with age. In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation 1
(the ﬁrst-order coefﬁcient deﬁned by equation (5.4)) increases from 0.29 at
18Money transfers between parents and children not living in the same household cannot be
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age 36 to 0.50 at age 80. In the second and third speciﬁcation 0,1 is smaller,
such that 1 is somewhat smaller until age 70. This can be explained by the
fact that the added demographic variables and labor market status capture
part of the persistency. Consider for instance a person faced with a negative
income shock from a transition to unemployment. Speciﬁcation three takes
labor market status into account, so as long as the person stays unemployed
the negative income effect persists. In the ﬁrst two speciﬁcations labor market
positions are not taken into account explicitly. However, a person can receive a
negative income shock, which may implicitly be caused by unemployment. The
parameters 0,1 to 2 determine the persistency of the shock. This persistency
increases with age, comparable to the duration of unemployment, which also
tends to increase with age. Finally,  and " show that the individual variation
is larger than the random component.
Future income shocks are drawn from the empirical distribution of the
idiosyncratic residuals in 2001–2007. As shown by Kalmijn and Alessie (2008),
the variance of equivalized income (logged) is relatively low after 65. We
therefore distinguish between households with key persons younger and older
than 65. The standard deviation of the residuals is 40% higher for households
where the key person is younger than 65. In the third speciﬁcation we also
distinguish households that do receive labor or occupational pension income
from those that do not receive any of these income components. For households
where the key person is younger than 65, the standard deviation of the residual
is 49% higher in households without labor or occupational pension income,
compared to households with labor or occupational pension income. In house-
holds where the key person is older than 65, the standard deviation of the
residual is 71% higher for households without occupational pension income,
compared to households with an occupational pension. In the simulation these
results lead to higher income shocks for young households and for households
without labor and/or occupational pension income.
Simulation results 5.6
Corresponding to the three speciﬁcations of the income equation, we have three
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predictions we describe the predictions of marital status and labor market
status from the aging module, as they are input for the income predictions in
the income module. Predictions of marital status are given in table 5.6.1 for
the age groups 50–64 and 65–90.
Table 5.6.1: Predictions of marital statusa
Men Women
Year Marr Unmarr Wid Div Marr Unmarr Wid Div
Age 50–64
2008 75.6 9.9 2.0 12.5 71.8 7.5 6.2 14.5
2009 74.7 10.5 2.0 12.8 70.9 7.9 6.1 15.1
2010 73.4 11.5 2.0 13.0 70.3 8.4 5.9 15.3
2011 72.2 12.1 2.0 13.7 69.5 9.0 5.7 15.7
2012 71.1 12.9 2.0 14.0 68.9 9.6 5.4 16.1
2013 70.1 13.6 1.9 14.4 68.0 10.1 5.5 16.4
2014 69.1 14.4 1.8 14.7 67.1 10.7 5.2 17.0
2015 67.7 15.4 1.8 15.1 66.3 11.3 5.0 17.4
2016 66.4 16.3 1.9 15.5 65.2 12.1 5.0 17.7
2017 65.4 17.0 1.9 15.8 64.4 12.7 4.9 18.0
2018 64.3 17.8 1.9 15.9 63.7 13.3 4.8 18.3
2019 63.1 18.8 1.7 16.4 62.8 14.2 4.6 18.4
2020 61.8 19.9 1.7 16.7 61.8 15.1 4.4 18.7
Age 65–90
2008 74.5 5.6 12.4 7.5 46.4 5.7 39.5 8.4
2009 73.8 5.7 12.6 7.9 46.9 5.5 39.0 8.6
2010 73.7 5.7 12.4 8.2 47.9 5.5 37.7 8.9
2011 73.4 5.8 12.2 8.7 48.2 5.5 36.9 9.4
2012 73.0 5.8 12.1 9.2 49.1 5.3 35.7 9.8
2013 72.4 5.9 12.1 9.6 49.8 5.4 34.7 10.2
2014 71.9 5.9 12.2 10.0 50.4 5.3 33.8 10.5
2015 71.7 6.0 12.0 10.2 50.4 5.3 33.3 11.0
2016 71.0 6.3 12.2 10.5 50.5 5.3 32.8 11.4
2017 70.9 6.4 12.1 10.6 50.6 5.5 32.2 11.7
2018 70.3 6.6 12.0 11.1 50.7 5.6 31.5 12.2
2019 69.1 7.1 12.4 11.4 50.5 5.8 31.1 12.7
2020 68.4 7.4 12.4 11.8 50.2 5.9 30.8 13.2
a Marital status for men and women. E.g. in 2020 about 61.8% of the men in
the age group 50–64 will be married.
In the age group 50–64, the most important ﬁnding is the growth in the
share of divorced people. The share of divorced men increases from 13 to 17%,
while that of women increases from 15 to 19%. In the age group 65–90 we ﬁnd
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life expectancies of men and women, which leads to younger cohorts of women
being widowed less often. Furthermore, the fall in widowhood can be attributed
to the babyboom generation reaching age 65. Therefore, the total age group
65–90 starts to contain relatively many ‘young’ elderly who are widowed less
often (composition effect).
Table 5.6.2: Predictions of labor market statusa
Men Women
Year Labor Occupational Other Labor Occupational Other
pension pension
Age 50–64
2008 62.6 19.6 17.8 46.3 15.0 38.6
2009 62.8 21.2 16.1 47.4 16.6 36.0
2010 62.3 23.0 14.7 48.4 17.9 33.7
2011 63.1 23.3 13.7 49.9 19.0 31.1
2012 63.3 23.6 13.1 51.9 19.8 28.2
2013 64.4 23.7 11.9 53.6 20.6 25.8
2014 64.5 24.2 11.3 55.1 21.4 23.5
2015 64.6 24.6 10.8 56.1 22.4 21.6
2016 65.0 25.0 10.1 56.7 23.5 19.8
2017 65.3 25.3 9.5 57.4 24.3 18.3
2018 65.8 25.0 9.2 58.1 25.1 16.7
2019 66.2 25.1 8.7 59.1 25.7 15.2
2020 66.3 25.4 8.4 59.5 26.7 13.9
Age 65–90
2008 3.6 87.0 9.4 2.1 54.0 43.8
2009 3.2 87.5 9.3 2.0 54.8 43.1
2010 3.1 88.0 8.9 2.2 55.3 42.5
2011 3.6 88.0 8.4 2.6 56.1 41.3
2012 4.3 87.6 8.1 3.0 56.9 40.2
2013 4.2 88.1 7.7 3.2 58.5 38.3
2014 4.1 88.8 7.1 3.1 60.1 36.8
2015 4.4 88.9 6.6 2.9 62.0 35.1
2016 4.3 89.5 6.2 2.9 63.9 33.2
2017 4.1 89.8 6.1 3.0 65.4 31.6
2018 4.3 90.0 5.6 3.0 67.3 29.7
2019 4.1 90.6 5.3 3.2 68.6 28.2
2020 4.0 90.9 5.1 3.1 70.4 26.5
a In case a person receives both labor income and occupational pension income
the labor market status is based on the highest income component. E.g. in
2020 labor is the most important income source for 66.3% of the men in the
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Table 5.6.2 presents predictions of labor market status. For both men and
women, and both age groups 50–64 and 65–90, the share of people receiving
occupational pension income increases. This especially holds for women, as a
result of their strong increase in the labor force participation.
Using the predictions of marital status and labor market status described
above, we predict equivalized household income for all households. Table 5.6.3
shows the results of the most extensive prediction, where household demo-
graphics and labor market positions are taken into account (model speciﬁcation
three). Incomes in these tables are free from period effects, such as the effects
of the business cycle.
According to the predictions, income will increase on average by about 0.6%
per year for the age group 50–64 and 1.0% per year for the age group 65–90
between 2008 and 2020. The Gini coefﬁcient and the decile ratio p90/p10
show that inequality in the age group 65–90 will increase until about 2012,
to stabilize thereafter. Focussing on the decile ratios p90/p50 and p50/p10,
two contradictory developments seem to occur: an increasing inequality in the
lower part of the income distribution and a decreasing inequality in the upper
part of the income distribution. This shows the importance of investigating the
entire income distribution by microsimulation, rather than just investigating the
development of an inequality measure such as the Gini coefﬁcient. Inequality
indices differ in their sensitivities to income differences in different parts of the
distribution, but one index cannot show the different developments occurring
throughout the entire income distribution. For the age group 50–64 the Gini
coefﬁcient and the decile ratio p90/p10 show that inequality decreases until
2012, but increases afterwards. After 2012 inequality rises in the upper part of
the distribution as well as in the lower part of the distribution.
Figure 5.6 shows realizations and predictions of log income per age and
cohort. For every cohort the ﬁgure presents the income of the 10th, the me-
dian, and the 90th percentile. Period effects are excluded for the predictions
(the dashed lines) as well as for the realizations (the solid lines). We use log
equivalized household income, as it is more interesting to compare relative
than absolute changes. The age proﬁle of the median incomes and the 90th
percentile is stronger than that of the 10th percentile. As expected, younger
cohorts have higher incomes than older cohorts. However, for the 10th per-
centile cohort-time effects decrease between 2008 and 2020, while they do notSection 5.6 Simulation results 137
Table 5.6.3: Predictions of equivalized household incomea








2008 24484 13282 22028 37983 2.86 1.72 1.66 0.242
2009 24665 13473 22285 38117 2.83 1.71 1.65 0.237
2010 24789 13573 22443 38283 2.82 1.71 1.65 0.237
2011 24877 13757 22594 38348 2.79 1.70 1.64 0.235
2012 25054 13787 22760 38469 2.79 1.69 1.65 0.235
2013 25309 13986 22839 38960 2.79 1.71 1.63 0.238
2014 25506 14015 22961 39209 2.80 1.71 1.64 0.239
2015 25592 14062 23047 39493 2.81 1.71 1.64 0.239
2016 25672 13936 23004 39560 2.84 1.72 1.65 0.243
2017 25719 13937 23000 39649 2.84 1.72 1.65 0.243
2018 25953 13880 23264 40443 2.91 1.74 1.68 0.247
2019 26059 13929 23400 40473 2.91 1.73 1.68 0.248
2020 26239 13946 23387 41488 2.97 1.77 1.68 0.251
Age 65–90
2008 20267 12214 17805 31156 2.55 1.75 1.46 0.225
2009 20611 12147 18122 31940 2.63 1.76 1.49 0.230
2010 20875 12280 18443 32162 2.62 1.74 1.50 0.229
2011 21252 12377 18862 32715 2.64 1.73 1.52 0.229
2012 21508 12437 19188 33144 2.66 1.73 1.54 0.229
2013 21754 12522 19396 33332 2.66 1.72 1.55 0.229
2014 21951 12734 19612 33716 2.65 1.72 1.54 0.227
2015 22212 12829 19890 34059 2.65 1.71 1.55 0.227
2016 22301 12860 19943 34105 2.65 1.71 1.55 0.228
2017 22436 12836 20111 34332 2.67 1.71 1.57 0.230
2018 22589 12944 20331 34457 2.66 1.69 1.57 0.229
2019 22672 12949 20434 34463 2.66 1.69 1.58 0.229
2020 22874 12976 20632 34925 2.69 1.69 1.59 0.230
a In this study income is always inﬂated/deﬂated to 2005 euro’s. This table shows
the results of the most extended model speciﬁcation, where demographic variables
and labor market positions are taken into account (model speciﬁcation three). The
results of the ﬁrst and second speciﬁcation can be found in Appendix 5.F.
decrease for the median income households. It becomes clear that the income
growth is not the same for everyone.
To show this more thoroughly, ﬁgure 5.7 presents the growth of the 10th,
median, and 90th percentile of the income distribution between 1989–2020 for
the elderly of age 65–90. Like in the other ﬁgures, period effects are excluded
for the predictions and the realizations.138 Income distribution of the Dutch Elderly Chapter 5
Figure 5.6: Log equivalized household income per age and cohort.
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Note: the 10th, median, and 90th percentile of log equivalized household income per age
and cohort. The solid lines are realizations corrected for period effects, the dashed lines are
predictions made with the most extended version of the microsimulation model (speciﬁcation
three).
Pensioners with median household income experience the highest income
growth. As a result, inequality (indeed) increases in the lower part of the
distribution and decreases in the upper part of the distribution. Relative
poverty thus increases. On average the income growth of pensioners will be
higher in the future than it was in the past. When we compare the realized
average income growth of pensioners between 1989–2007 with the predicted
average income growth between 2007–2020 in ﬁgure 5.7, we ﬁnd an increase
in the average income growth per year for median income households from
0.8% until 2007 to 1.4% after 2007. The average income growth of the 90th
percentile also increases, from 0.7% per year until 2007 to 1.0% after 2007.
The 10th percentile experiences a decrease in the average growth rate from
0.9% to 2007 to 0.3% after 2007. The results of speciﬁcation one and two are
presented in Appendix 5.G and lead to similar conclusions.19
19The ﬁrst and the second speciﬁcation lead to rather similar conclusions, indicating that the
use of ﬁxed effects and modeling the error terms make the explicit modeling of demographicSection 5.6 Simulation results 139
Figure 5.7: Indexed growth of equivalized household income for
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Note: income growth for the 10th percentile, the median and the 90th percentile. The solid
lines are realizations corrected for period effects, the dashed lines are predictions made with
the most extended version of the microsimulation model (the third speciﬁcation).
The lower part of the income distribution experiences a relatively low
income growth. In this part of the distribution there are many households
without occupational pension income. The question arises whether the growing
inequality in the lower part of the distribution is caused by an increase in
the inequality between households with and without occupational pension
income. To answer this question we do a Theil decomposition, concentrating
on the lower half of the income distribution. Appendix 5.H describes the Theil
decomposition method and table 5.6.4 shows the results.
In the lower half of the income distribution, 21% of the households receive
no occupational pension in 2010. In 2020 this proportion will shrink to about
15%. As expected, average income is higher for households with occupational
pension income, compared to the households without occupational pension
income. The Theil index is about two times higher for households without
occupational pension income, but the inequality growth between 2010 and
changes not very important for investigating the future income distribution.140 Income distribution of the Dutch Elderly Chapter 5
2020 is higher for the households with occupational pension income. The Theil
decomposition shows that in 2010, 11% of the inequality in the lower half of
the distribution is caused by the inequality between the group of households
with and without occupational pension income. By 2020 this is reduced to 5%.
The increased inequality in the lower part of the distribution is thus not caused
by a higher inequality between households with and without occupational pen-
sion income. Instead, the inequality between these two groups will decrease.
This means that inequality between households with occupational pension in-
come on the one hand and inactive/self-employed households without pension
arrangements on the other will not increase.
Table 5.6.4: Theil decomposition of equivalized household incomea
Year 2010 2015 2020
% Households without occupational pension 21 18 15
Average income, households without occ. pension 12608 13448 13859
Average income, households with occ. pension 14825 15776 16030
Theil index, households without occ. pension 0.033 0.039 0.039
Theil index, households with occ. pension 0.013 0.016 0.022
Within group inequality 0.0167 0.0197 0.0240
Between group inequality 0.0020 0.0017 0.0012
% Between group inequality 11 8 5
a This table concentrates on the lower half of the income distribution of pensioners (age
65–90). It shows the inequality within and between households with and without
occupational pension income.
5.7 Conclusions
This chapter examines the income distribution of the Dutch elderly between
1989–2007 and predicts the income distribution of the elderly between 2008–
2020. In the predictions we take into account developments in household
compositions, developments in labor market positions, productivity differences
between cohorts resulting in income differences, differential mortality, and
increased longevity.
Predictions are made using an open dynamic microsimulation model with
cross-sectional aging. Methodologically this microsimulation model deviates
from the more traditional dynamic microsimulation models, by using ﬁxedSection 5.7 Conclusions 141
effects to take into account unmeasured heterogeneity in total household in-
come and taking into account the persistency and heteroskedasticity of income
shocks. Using these techniques, one needs less information on all underlying
processes inﬂuencing income such that administrative data sources, instead
of more detailed surveys, can be used. Administrative data are often more
representative than surveys, which is important to make reliable predictions for
the whole population. We ﬁnd that income shocks are persistent and that per-
sistency increases over the lifecycle (even after the correction for ﬁxed effects).
The variance of income shocks is larger for working-age households than for
retirement-age households, and is relatively large for households without labor
and/or occupational pension income.
Exploration of the data reveals that between 1989–2007, equivalized house-
hold income of the elderly in the age group 50–64 increased on average by 1.1%
per year. Income inequality in this age group increased between 1989–1995
and was fairly stable afterwards. The income of the elderly in the age group 65–
90 remained fairly constant during the nineties and grew on average by 1.3%
per year between 2000–2007. Income inequality in this age group increased
between 1989–1991, but decreased thereafter. Occupational pensions became
more relevant for the whole income distribution between 1989 and 2007.
The results of the microsimulation model indicate that average income
increases for future generations of pensioners. More speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that
between 2008 and 2020 household income increases on average by about
0.6% per year in the age group 50–64 and 1.0% for pensioners of age 65–90.
Income growth is not the same for everyone. Among pensioners of age 65–90,
households with median income experience the highest income growth. During
the years 2008–2020 their income is predicted to grow on average by 1.2%
per year, while this is 1.0% for the 90th percentile and only 0.5% for the 10th
percentile.
Inequality indices such as the decile ratio p90/p10 and the Gini coefﬁcient
show that inequality among pensioners of age 65–90 increases up to 2012 and
stabilizes thereafter. However, a closer inspection of the whole distribution
reveals that inequality grows in the lower part of the distribution, while it
declines in the upper part of the distribution. The growing inequality in the
lower half of the income distribution is not caused by an increasing inequality
between households with and without occupational pension income. Instead,142 Income distribution of the Dutch Elderly Chapter 5
inequality between households with and without occupational pension income
will decrease. The contradictory movements in the lower and upper part of
the distribution underline the importance of investigating the whole income
distribution, here achieved by using microsimulation, instead of just analyzing
the development of one inequality index such as the Gini coefﬁcient. Income
mobility is an aspect for future research.
In the introduction we described two examples of proposed policy reforms
to keep the costs of the aging society affordable. The results suggest that
a policy such as ‘ﬁscalization’ can be effective, as a majority of the future
pensioners will be considerably wealthier than the current ones. Obviously,
this policy measure will not further increase the income inequality among the
elderly. Lowering the indexation ambition of the (ﬂat rate) public pensions
especially affects the households on the lower end of the distribution and
increases inequality further. However, when occupational pensions are also
lowering their indexation ambitions (plausible as a result of the ﬁnancial crisis),
inequality remains undisturbed.
5.A IPO before and after the revision in the year 2000
In this appendix we list important changes which took place during the revision
of IPO. In addition we mention several steps we have taken to make the data
before and after revision more comparable.
 As from 2000 also one-off income such as severance pays are included.
(All income that previously belonged to ‘bijzonder tarief’, it concerns
large amounts that do not occur frequently.)
 As from 2000 new data sources are in use. In particular with regard to
rents and dividends. Before 2000 we did not observe rents and dividend
for the people who were only obliged to pay tax on wages (rents and
dividends belonging to the tax free allowance). As from 2000 new data
sources are used such that rents and dividends are observed for everyone
(small amounts of income for a rather large group of observations). In
order to smooth the data before and after revision we have imputed the
rents of the year 2000 to the years before revision, taking inﬂation into
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 Computations of the rental value of real estate are revised.
 Income on the individual level has limitations, because certain com-
ponents (such as child beneﬁts and rent subsidies) are ascribed to a
different household member after revision (for example breadwinner
instead of the head of the household). As this study focusses on total
household income, this revision does not give us any problems.
 The method to determine whether persons on a certain address consti-
tute a household together is changed
 Employer contribution payments are included in the wages before re-
vision but are separated afterwards. To make the data comparable, we
subtract employer contributions before revision.
 Contributions to social insurance, paid by the authority who pays out
transfer incomes, were included before revision but were separated after
revision. Unfortunately, it is not possible to subtract these contributions
before revision, therefore we add them after revision to make the data
comparable.
 After revision dividends from stocks of a substantial holding20 also in-
cludes the selling of stocks from own business. Before revision these
were excluded. Following the advice of Statistics Netherlands we try to
exclude these dividends by dropping dividends which exceed 250,000
euro.
 Although we have tried to make deﬁnitions as consistent as possible,
differences are left. Therefore, we smooth several income components
on the individual level: labor income, occupational pensions, public
pension beneﬁts, and remaining transfer income (e.g. disability beneﬁts
and unemployment beneﬁts). We have used absolute differences and
take inﬂation into account.
 Sometimes the birth year of individuals in IPO are not consistent over
time. For these people we have imputed the birth year from the pop-
ulation register (GBA), which is available as of 1995. There are a few
observations that have inconsistent birth years and are not present in
GBA (for example because they died before 1995).
20A taxpayer is regarded as having a substantial holding in a corporation if he or she, either
alone or with his or her spouse, holds directly or indirectly 5% of the issued capital.144 Income distribution of the Dutch Elderly Chapter 5
5.B The construction of income
This appendix describes our deﬁnition of income. Income is the sum of net non
capital and net capital income. To construct net non capital income and net
capital income we distinguish between the data before 2001 and after 2001,
as in 2001 a new tax system was introduced. First we deﬁne net non capital
and net capital income between 1989 and 2000. Secondly, we deﬁne net non
capital and net capital income as from 2001. Net non capital income between
1989 and 2000 is deﬁned by
net non capital income = L + T  
L + T
L + T + H + C
i   P +allowances,
where L is the sum of all income obtained with labor, T is total transfer income,
C is total capital income, i is the total taxation on income (from labor, trans-
fers, interests, etc.), and P is the sum of the forced premia for social security
insurances and employees’ insurances. In the Dutch law mortgage interests
are tax-deductible. Furthermore, the law states that home owners earn a tax-
able income from an owner-occupied house (the so called ‘imputed rent’). The
imputed rent is a percentage of the value of the house determined by the munic-
ipal authority. In our calculations of the net capital and non capital income we
take this deductible mortgage interests and imputed rent into account. H is the
imputed rent minus the mortgage interests. Allowances consist of child beneﬁts,
rent subsidies etc. For the period 1989–2000 net capital income is deﬁned by















where w is the tax on wealth. Net capital income consists of two parts. The
ﬁrst part is capital income associated with the possession of an own house, the
second part is all remaining capital income. As from 2001 the tax system has
changed, as from then we deﬁne non capital income as
net non capital income = L + T  
L + T
L + T + H
i   P +allowances,
Compared to the period 1989–2000 C is no longer in the deﬁnition, because the
taxation on income does not include the income on capital (interests, dividendSection 5.C Estimation method 145
etc.) anymore. As from 2001 we deﬁne capital income as












also here the deﬁnition has changed because the taxation on income does not
include capital income anymore.
Estimation method 5.C
To estimate the parameter vector  of equation (5.1) we compute









where yi is the average household income of household i across time. xi and
vi are average values across time for each household i. Using (5.C.1), we can
consistently estimate  with OLS. Furthermore, we correct the standard errors
of  for the fact that the error terms vit   vi are correlated for observations of
the same household (see for example Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, p. 727). For
the computation of the variance-covariance matrix standard regression routines
use
PN
i=1(Ti)  K in the denominator of the multiplier, where Ti denotes the
number of periods household i is in the data and K the number of explanatory
variables. However,
PN
i=1(Ti   1)   K should be used here. Therefore, we








(see for example Baltagi, 1995, p.12).
Averaging (5.1) across all observations gives
y = +x + v, (5.C.2)
when we use the identifying assumption
PN
i=1i = 0. From (5.C.2), we obtain
b  by
b  = y   b x, (5.C.3)146 Income distribution of the Dutch Elderly Chapter 5
We also average the data of individual households across time
yi = +xi +i + vi, (5.C.4)
from (5.C.4) we compute b i = yi   b   b xi. Now b vit is computed by
b vit = yit   b   b xit   b i. (5.C.5)
which we use in the auxiliary regression for autocorrelation (5.3).
5.D Estimation results of the transition models
This appendix describes the estimation results of the transition models with
regard to marital status, children, and labor market positions explained in
section 5.4.3 and 5.4.4.
5.D.1 Marital status
Using GBA data we estimate transition models with regard to marital status.
The explanatory variables are age, age squared, cohort, and cohort squared. We
assume period effects to be negligible compared to the age and cohort effects.
The ﬁrst part of table 5.D.1 presents the results for the transition from being
married to divorced. The probability of a divorce decreases with age for both
men and women and as expected younger cohorts divorce more often than
older cohorts. The second part of the table is about remarriage after a divorce.
The probability to remarry after a divorce decreases with age and is smaller
for younger cohorts than for older cohorts. Only for women, the probability to
remarry increases up to the cohort born in 1946. The results for the transition
from being unmarried to married show that the probability of marriage mostly
decreases with age and that younger cohorts have a higher probability to marry
than older cohorts. This may look strange, as it is commonly known that
younger cohorts marry less often than older cohorts. However, this sign can
be explained by younger cohorts marrying later in life than the older cohorts.
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(36–90) is relatively high for young cohorts. The fourth part of table 5.D.1 is
about remarriage after the death of a spouse. For widow(er)s the probability to
remarry decreases with age and is higher for younger than for older cohorts.
Table 5.D.1: Logit transition models for marital status
Men Women
Coef. S.e. Coef. S.e.
Married ! Divorced
age/10 1.461 0.0414 1.611 0.0482
(age/10)2 -0.190 0.0043 -0.224 0.0052
(year of birth-1900)/10 0.179 0.0404 -0.097 0.0477
((year of birth-1900)/10)2 0.013 0.0037 0.038 0.0042
constant -8.556 0.0894 -7.888 0.1054
pseudo R2 0.050 0.056
Divorced ! Married
age/10 -0.388 0.0560 0.167 0.0704
(age/10)2 -0.032 0.0057 -0.098 0.0074
(year of birth-1900)/10 -0.068 0.0539 0.290 0.0708
((year of birth-1900)/10)2 -0.010 0.0050 -0.031 0.0064
constant -0.069 0.1197 -2.975 0.1533
pseudo R2 0.028 0.050
Unmarried ! Married
age/10 -2.732 0.0751 -1.954 0.1066
(age/10)2 0.203 0.0086 0.124 0.0123
(year of birth-1900)/10 1.654 0.0919 1.927 0.1305
((year of birth-1900)/10)2 -0.138 0.0077 -0.151 0.0108
constant -0.918 0.1987 -4.154 0.2755
pseudo R2 0.046 0.065
Widowed ! Married
age/10 1.254 0.1353 1.234 0.1467
(age/10)2 -0.175 0.0114 -0.188 0.0130
(year of birth-1900)/10 0.204 0.0919 0.419 0.1101
((year of birth-1900)/10)2 -0.026 0.0106 -0.018 0.0118
constant -5.406 0.3319 -7.481 0.3376
pseudo R2 0.092 0.143
Children 5.D.2
Using IPO data we estimate the probability of children leaving their parental
home from one year to the other. For this estimation we select all children
in IPO in 2006 and check whether they are still in the household in 2007.148 Income distribution of the Dutch Elderly Chapter 5
Thus, for the years 2008–2020 we assume children to have the same behavior
with regard to leaving their parental home as the children between 2006 and
2007.21
Table 5.D.2: Logit transition models for children
Coef. S.e.







New children being born
age/10 -5.983 0.1449
(age/10)2 0.459 0.0154
(year of birth-1900)/10 -0.432 0.1666
((year of birth-1900)/10)2 0.073 0.0144
man 0.679 0.0232
couple 1.514 0.0473
one child 0.753 0.0287




As expected, the probability to leave the parental home increases with age.
Furthermore, female children have a higher probability to leave their parental
home than males.
Table 5.D.2 also presents the estimation results with regard to new children
being born in a household. For this estimation we select all households in the
years 1989–2006 and we determine, given the characteristics in t  1, whether
a new child has entered the household during the next year. As from age 36 the
probability of a new child decreases with age, and is higher for younger cohorts
(who in general get children later in life). The probability of a new child is
higher in households with a couple and in households where already one child
is present. So, if there is already one child present, there is a relatively large
probability of a second child after age 36. On the other hand, when there are
21Here, children are deﬁned as all persons younger than 30 who are at least 18 years younger
than the key person of a household.Section 5.D Estimation results of the transition models 149
already two or more children in the household, the probability of an extra child
after age 36 is relatively low.
Labor market status 5.D.3
Transitions in labor market status are estimated for singles and couples sepa-
rately. Table 5.D.3 shows the estimation results for singles. The ﬁrst half of the
table is about the transitions from work to occupational pension or to ‘other’
(being no labor and no occupational pension, for example the receivers of just
unemployment beneﬁts, disability beneﬁts, or a state pension). The second half
of the table deals with the transitions from ‘other’ to work or to occupational
pension. The probability to keep on working in the labor market increases
for younger generations. Furthermore, divorced men and women experience
transitions from work to ‘other’ and from ‘other’ to work relatively often. For
women, the number of children is positively associated with transitions from
work to ‘other’ (e.g. out of the labor force).
The labor market outcomes of a couple are interrelated. We therefore treat
the three possible outcomes of the two persons of a couple as nine (3  3)
possible outcomes, and model the transitions between these nine states. The
nine outcomes are listed in table 5.D.4, together with their relative frequencies.
The table shows that the proportion of two-earner couples increased between
1989 and 2007, from 23% to 40%. On the other hand, the proportion of
couples where only the man receives labor income declined (column three).
Over the years, the percentage of couples involved in occupational pensions has
increased. Especially the percentage of couples where both men and women
receive labor income or occupational pension income has increased.
The explanatory variables used to explain transitions in the labor market
positions of couples are the age of the man and woman part of the couple
and the cohort to which the man belongs (in combination with the age of
both man and woman, the cohort of the woman is automatically known).
We add an interaction of age and cohort to allow for age patterns to be dif-
ferent for different cohorts.22 Finally, table 5.D.5 shows the gender-speciﬁc
22To save space, the detailed estimation results with regard to the transitions between these
nine states are available on request.150 Income distribution of the Dutch Elderly Chapter 5
Table 5.D.3: Logit transition models for the labor market status of singlesa
Men Labor ! Occup. pension Labor ! Other
Coef. S.e. Coef. S.e.
age/10 0.234 0.6802 -1.194 0.2637
(age/10)2 0.091 0.0457 0.114 0.0218
(year of birth-1900)/10 -0.139 0.2471 -0.314 0.0634
interaction age and cohortb -0.020 0.0457 -0.009 0.0206
divorced 0.240 0.0802 0.303 0.0538
widow(er) 0.345 0.1096 -0.077 0.1227
constant -6.315 2.3818 1.601 0.6178
pseudo R2 0.063
N 127759
Women Labor ! Occup. pension Labor ! Other
Coef. S.e. Coef. S.e.
age/10 0.121 0.7283 -1.001 0.2838
(age/10)2 0.020 0.0476 0.090 0.0227
(year of birth-1900)/10 -0.812 0.2743 -0.341 0.0733
interaction age and cohortb 0.116 0.0488 -0.041 0.0218
divorced -0.414 0.0800 0.454 0.0592
widow(er) 0.797 0.0805 0.048 0.1065
# children -0.099 0.0659 0.137 0.0202
constant -3.256 2.6181 1.954 0.7104
pseudo R2 0.104
N 83337
Men Other ! Labor Other ! Occup. pension
Coef. S.e. Coef. S.e.
age/10 -0.760 0.2741 2.067 0.8009
(age/10)2 0.017 0.0227 -0.133 0.0513
(year of birth-1900)/10 0.139 0.0644 0.205 0.3114
interaction age and cohortb -0.045 0.0219 -0.046 0.0524
divorced 0.502 0.0590 0.318 0.0907
widow(er) 0.219 0.1410 0.642 0.1074
constant 0.803 0.6192 -10.647 2.9932
pseudo R2 0.183
N 40821
Women Other ! Labor Other ! Occup. pension
Coef. S.e. Coef. S.e.
age/10 -0.486 0.2744 0.680 0.6978
(age/10)2 -0.017 0.0222 -0.090 0.0426
(year of birth-1900)/10 0.254 0.0684 -0.882 0.2963
interaction age and cohortb -0.065 0.0218 0.139 0.0456
divorced 0.582 0.0579 -0.222 0.0795
widow(er) 0.441 0.1036 0.960 0.0718
# children -0.014 0.0169 -0.113 0.0546
constant -0.164 0.6538 -3.676 2.7678
pseudo R2 0.245
N 49339
a Estimation results of the transition models for labor market status. We assume ‘occupa-
tional pension’ to be an absorbing state.
b The interaction between age and cohort: age/10*(year of birth-1900)/10.Section 5.D Estimation results of the transition models 151
Table 5.D.4: Relative frequencies of the labor market positions
of couplesa
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1989 22.8 1.1 36.0 1.6 1.5 14.7 4.1 0.8 17.4
1990 24.2 1.2 34.1 1.9 1.6 15.7 4.1 0.8 16.5
1991 25.6 1.2 32.2 1.8 1.9 16.2 4.2 0.8 16.1
1992 26.3 1.2 30.5 1.8 2.0 17.2 4.5 0.8 15.7
1993 27.7 1.2 29.4 2.0 2.2 17.3 4.6 0.8 15.0
1994 28.1 1.2 28.3 2.1 2.4 17.6 4.8 0.8 14.7
1995 29.3 1.3 27.6 2.1 2.6 17.5 4.9 0.8 13.9
1996 30.4 1.4 26.7 2.1 2.9 17.6 4.9 0.8 13.2
1997 31.6 1.4 25.9 2.3 3.2 17.8 4.9 0.7 12.3
1998 33.4 1.5 24.8 3.4 2.9 16.9 4.6 0.7 11.8
1999 35.6 1.4 23.8 3.5 2.7 17.0 4.5 0.7 10.8
2000 36.9 1.7 22.0 3.4 3.4 17.3 4.5 0.7 10.1
2001 36.0 1.5 21.7 2.6 3.9 19.4 4.3 0.6 9.9
2002 38.4 1.8 19.9 2.7 4.3 18.0 4.9 0.7 9.2
2003 38.5 1.9 18.9 3.0 4.7 18.0 5.3 0.8 9.0
2004 38.8 2.0 18.2 3.3 5.1 18.0 5.2 0.8 8.6
2005 38.8 2.0 17.5 3.5 5.4 18.1 5.5 0.8 8.4
2006 39.8 2.0 16.4 3.8 6.0 18.1 5.5 0.8 7.7
2007 40.3 1.9 15.5 4.1 6.5 18.2 5.4 0.8 7.2
a We distinguish three labor market positions: (1) labor, (2) occupational
pension, (3) other (none of these two). For couples we thus have 9
(= 33) combinations, corresponding to the nine columns in the table.
1: man works, woman works, 2: man works, woman occ. pension, 3:
man works, woman other, 4: man occ. pension, woman works, 5: man
occ. pension, woman occ. pension, 6: man occ. pension, woman other,
7: man other, woman works, 8: man other, woman occ. pension 9: man
other, woman other.
estimation results of the multinomial logit model to determine the initial labor
market status of new household members and children who enter adulthood.
All household members in the data are used. For men and women the prob-
ability of labor increases until about age 40 and decreases afterwards. The
probability of receiving an occupational pension, on the other hand, increases
with age. Younger cohorts have a higher probability for a labor or occupational
pensions status than older generations.152 Income distribution of the Dutch Elderly Chapter 5
Table 5.D.5: Multinomial logit model for the initial labor market sta-
tus of new household members and children entering
adulthood
Men Women
Coef. S.e. Coef. S.e.
Labora
age/10 8.778 0.0404 6.150 0.0371
(age/10)2 -1.768 0.0105 -1.134 0.0095
(age/10)3 0.107 0.0008 0.063 0.0008
(year of birth-1900)/10 0.207 0.0700 -1.925 0.0657
(year of birth-1900/10)2 0.074 0.0127 0.560 0.0115
(year of birth-1900/10)3 -0.007 0.0007 -0.036 0.0006
constant -13.502 0.1349 -10.038 0.1377
Occupational pension
age/10 -4.883 0.1267 0.545 0.1512
(age/10)2 1.548 0.0221 0.248 0.0251
(age/10)3 -0.104 0.0013 -0.020 0.0014
(year of birth-1900)/10 0.834 0.0690 0.064 0.0623
(year of birth-1900/10)2 -0.062 0.0157 0.076 0.0158
(year of birth-1900/10)3 -0.001 0.0012 -0.005 0.0013
constant -5.856 0.2926 -10.375 0.3422
pseudo R2 0.489 0.296
N 1019127 998296
a We distinguish three labor market positions: labor, occupational pension, and
‘other’ (no labor and no occupational pension income). ‘Other’ is the reference
category in this estimation.Section 5.E Extended estimation results 153
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Table 5.E.1: Extended estimation results for Table 5.5.1, the
age dummy coefﬁcientsa
Coef 1 S.e. Coef. 2 S.e. Coef. 3 S.e.
age 36 -0.259 0.0050 -0.201 0.0051 -0.217 0.0055
age 37 -0.249 0.0049 -0.187 0.0050 -0.204 0.0054
age 38 -0.240 0.0048 -0.177 0.0050 -0.195 0.0054
age 39 -0.227 0.0047 -0.165 0.0049 -0.184 0.0053
age 40 -0.211 0.0047 -0.151 0.0049 -0.173 0.0053
age 41 -0.191 0.0046 -0.138 0.0048 -0.161 0.0052
age 42 -0.170 0.0045 -0.128 0.0047 -0.153 0.0051
age 43 -0.150 0.0045 -0.122 0.0046 -0.147 0.0051
age 44 -0.123 0.0044 -0.109 0.0046 -0.136 0.0050
age 45 -0.099 0.0043 -0.101 0.0045 -0.129 0.0049
age 46 -0.072 0.0043 -0.089 0.0044 -0.118 0.0048
age 47 -0.046 0.0042 -0.078 0.0043 -0.107 0.0048
age 48 -0.019 0.0042 -0.062 0.0042 -0.092 0.0047
age 49 0.006 0.0041 -0.045 0.0041 -0.075 0.0046
age 50 0.020 0.0041 -0.034 0.0040 -0.064 0.0045
age 51 0.031 0.0040 -0.025 0.0039 -0.053 0.0044
age 52 0.043 0.0039 -0.011 0.0039 -0.038 0.0043
age 53 0.046 0.0039 -0.005 0.0038 -0.031 0.0042
age 54 0.051 0.0038 0.005 0.0037 -0.018 0.0041
age 55 0.051 0.0037 0.010 0.0036 -0.011 0.0040
age 56 0.047 0.0036 0.011 0.0035 -0.005 0.0039
age 57 0.038 0.0036 0.008 0.0035 -0.005 0.0038
age 58 0.033 0.0035 0.007 0.0034 -0.002 0.0037
age 59 0.024 0.0034 0.003 0.0033 -0.002 0.0035
age 60 0.017 0.0033 -0.001 0.0032 -0.001 0.0033
age 61 0.008 0.0032 -0.006 0.0031 -0.001 0.0031
age 62 -0.003 0.0030 -0.013 0.0029 -0.005 0.0029
age 63 -0.007 0.0028 -0.013 0.0028 -0.004 0.0028
age 64 -0.008 0.0026 -0.012 0.0025 -0.002 0.0026
age 65b 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 -
age 66 -0.015 0.0024 -0.013 0.0023 -0.011 0.0023
age 67 -0.017 0.0026 -0.012 0.0025 -0.010 0.0025
age 68 -0.019 0.0028 -0.012 0.0027 -0.010 0.0026
age 69 -0.021 0.0029 -0.012 0.0028 -0.010 0.0028
age 70 -0.022 0.0030 -0.010 0.0029 -0.009 0.0029
a Estimation results continue on the next page.
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Table 5.E.1 continued
Coef. 1 S.e. Coef. 2 S.e. Coef. 3 S.e.
age 71 -0.026 0.0032 -0.012 0.0031 -0.011 0.0030
age 72 -0.025 0.0033 -0.009 0.0032 -0.009 0.0031
age 73 -0.023 0.0033 -0.005 0.0032 -0.004 0.0032
age 74 -0.019 0.0034 0.000 0.0033 0.000 0.0033
age 75 -0.019 0.0036 0.002 0.0035 0.001 0.0034
age 76 -0.018 0.0037 0.005 0.0036 0.003 0.0036
age 77 -0.016 0.0039 0.008 0.0039 0.007 0.0038
age 78 -0.010 0.0041 0.016 0.0040 0.014 0.0040
age 79 -0.007 0.0043 0.020 0.0043 0.018 0.0042
age 80 -0.001 0.0045 0.028 0.0044 0.024 0.0043
age 81 0.002 0.0047 0.032 0.0047 0.028 0.0046
age 82 0.006 0.0051 0.038 0.0051 0.033 0.0050
age 83 0.004 0.0057 0.039 0.0056 0.033 0.0055
age 84 0.011 0.0062 0.048 0.0061 0.041 0.0060
age 85 0.018 0.0071 0.057 0.0069 0.048 0.0068
age 86 0.035 0.0079 0.075 0.0077 0.066 0.0076
age 87 0.031 0.0098 0.074 0.0096 0.063 0.0095
age 88 0.032 0.0131 0.074 0.0124 0.061 0.0122
age 89 0.050 0.0155 0.092 0.0146 0.081 0.0144
age 90 0.060 0.0222 0.099 0.0207 0.091 0.0211Section 5.F Simulation results model speci￿cation 1 and 2 155
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Table 5.F.1: Predictions of equivalized household income, age 50-64a








2008 24340 13167 21905 37813 2.87 1.73 1.66 0.244
2009 24418 13205 21996 37792 2.86 1.72 1.67 0.240
2010 24456 13261 22066 37849 2.85 1.72 1.66 0.240
2011 24471 13318 22110 37783 2.84 1.71 1.66 0.237
2012 24609 13437 22288 37814 2.81 1.70 1.66 0.238
2013 24815 13544 22400 38242 2.82 1.71 1.65 0.239
2014 24877 13511 22547 38347 2.84 1.70 1.67 0.240
2015 25146 13562 22600 38960 2.87 1.72 1.67 0.244
2016 25215 13619 22666 39207 2.88 1.73 1.66 0.242
2017 25362 13692 22787 39536 2.89 1.74 1.66 0.243
2018 25627 13760 22999 40067 2.91 1.74 1.67 0.245
2019 25940 13869 23163 40706 2.94 1.76 1.67 0.248
2020 26047 13893 23180 40909 2.94 1.76 1.67 0.251
Model speciﬁcation 2
2008 24659 13199 22205 38418 2.91 1.73 1.68 0.245
2009 24752 13276 22332 38160 2.87 1.71 1.68 0.242
2010 24950 13394 22558 38531 2.88 1.71 1.68 0.241
2011 25083 13601 22643 38561 2.84 1.70 1.66 0.240
2012 25153 13721 22857 38765 2.83 1.70 1.67 0.237
2013 25426 13688 22902 39381 2.88 1.72 1.67 0.241
2014 25564 13711 23081 39328 2.87 1.70 1.68 0.241
2015 25793 13828 23283 40008 2.89 1.72 1.68 0.242
2016 25890 13891 23238 40142 2.89 1.73 1.67 0.244
2017 26039 14051 23483 40459 2.88 1.72 1.67 0.242
2018 26125 13939 23528 40733 2.92 1.73 1.69 0.245
2019 26414 14026 23618 41364 2.95 1.75 1.68 0.248
2020 26516 14068 23688 41657 2.96 1.76 1.68 0.249
a In this study income is always inﬂated/deﬂated to 2005 euro’s.156 Income distribution of the Dutch Elderly Chapter 5
Table 5.F.2: Predictions of equivalized household income, age 65-90a








2008 20327 12178 17842 31186 2.56 1.75 1.47 0.227
2009 20634 12025 18162 32018 2.66 1.76 1.51 0.230
2010 20821 11985 18491 32459 2.71 1.76 1.54 0.231
2011 21159 12096 18866 32871 2.72 1.74 1.56 0.233
2012 21398 12140 19108 33252 2.74 1.74 1.57 0.232
2013 21646 12276 19435 33462 2.73 1.72 1.58 0.233
2014 21803 12272 19615 33734 2.75 1.72 1.60 0.231
2015 21975 12271 19822 33814 2.76 1.71 1.62 0.231
2016 22184 12419 19964 34220 2.76 1.71 1.61 0.230
2017 22365 12561 20116 34307 2.73 1.71 1.60 0.230
2018 22491 12660 20361 34504 2.73 1.69 1.61 0.228
2019 22635 12770 20554 34385 2.69 1.67 1.61 0.226
2020 22808 12826 20714 34901 2.72 1.68 1.62 0.228
Model speciﬁcation 2
2008 20315 12230 17843 31198 2.55 1.75 1.46 0.227
2009 20687 12140 18211 32134 2.65 1.76 1.50 0.231
2010 20925 12108 18501 32606 2.69 1.76 1.53 0.233
2011 21389 12191 18875 33440 2.74 1.77 1.55 0.236
2012 21707 12260 19203 33790 2.76 1.76 1.57 0.236
2013 21909 12287 19475 34233 2.79 1.76 1.59 0.236
2014 22188 12478 19702 34338 2.75 1.74 1.58 0.235
2015 22408 12604 19996 34609 2.75 1.73 1.59 0.234
2016 22644 12723 20373 35022 2.75 1.72 1.60 0.233
2017 22788 12819 20503 35225 2.75 1.72 1.60 0.231
2018 22954 12909 20728 35391 2.74 1.71 1.61 0.229
2019 23255 13035 20937 35665 2.74 1.70 1.61 0.231
2020 23425 13121 21156 35859 2.73 1.69 1.61 0.229
a In this study income is always inﬂated/deﬂated to 2005 euro’s.Section 5.G Indexed growth in speci￿cation 1 and 2 157
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Figure 5.G.1: Indexed growth of equivalized household income in

































1990 2000 2010 2020
Year

































1990 2000 2010 2020
Year
10th percentile median 90th percentile
Note: the ﬁrst ﬁgure is based on model speciﬁcation one, the second ﬁgure on
model speciﬁcation two. The dashed lines are predictions and the solid lines
are realizations corrected for period effects.158 Income distribution of the Dutch Elderly Chapter 5
5.H Theil decomposition
Overall income inequality can be related to mutually exclusive population
subgroups using a Theil decomposition. We use the Theil decomposition
method to explore whether the rising inequality in the lower part of the
distribution is caused by an increase in the inequality between households with
and without occupational pension income. Theil decompositions are developed
by Shorrocks (1980), Bourguignon (1979), and Cowell (1980). The Theil
index is a weighted average of inequality within subgroups, plus inequality
among those subgroups. More speciﬁc, inequality within a year is the average
inequality within each subgroup, weighted by the income of the subgroups,
plus the inequality among subgroups. The subgroups in this study are (1)
households with occupational pension income and (2) households without














where N is the number of observations, yi the income of household i, and ¯ y


















where the ﬁrst term presents within group inequality and the second term
presents between group inequality. T1 is the Theil index for households with
occupational pension income, T2 is the Theil index for households without
occupational pension income. s1 is the share of total income received by the
households with occupational pension income, s2 is the share of total income
received by the households without occupational pension income. ¯ y1 is the
average income of households with occupational pension income and ¯ y2 is the
average income of households without occupational pension income.6
The Association between
Individual Income and Remaining
Life Expectancy at the Age of 65 in
the Netherlands
This chapter is based on Kalwij, Alessie, and Knoef (2009).
Introduction 6.1
Signiﬁcant socioeconomic inequalities in mortality risk over many populations
and time periods have been identiﬁed in the literature.1 These socioeconomic
inequalities in mortality, commonly termed differential mortality, give strong
evidence for an inverse relationship between income and mortality risk. Esti-
mates of this relationship for different populations with respect to country and
age range indicate that the ratio of mortality risk for individuals in the lowest
quartile of the income distribution to that of individuals in the highest quartile
ranges from around two in Europe to three in the U.S.2
At the same time there is ongoing debate from various disciplines on the
causal interpretation of this relationship and the possible pathways through
which socioeconomic position affects health and mortality risk (e.g., Lindahl,
2005, Macintyre, 1997, Marmot et al., 1991, Smith, 1999, and Snyder and
Evans, 2006). The explanation that differential mortality is a result of low-
income individuals having access to less or lower quality health services appears
1See e.g., Attanasio and Hoynes (2000), Huisman et al. (2004), Hupfeld (2009), Hurd
et al. (2001), Kunst et al. (2004), Marmot et al. (1991), Menchik (1993), Palme and Sandgren
(2008), and Sullivan and Von Wachter (2009)
2See Duleep (1986) for the U.S., Martikainen et al. (2001) for Finland, Osler et al. (2002)
for Denmark, Attanasio and Emmerson (2003) for the U.K., Blakely et al. (2004) for New
Zealand, and Von Gaudecker and Scholz (2007) for Germany.160 Association between Income and Remaining Life Expectancy Chapter 6
to be dismissed by the literature (see, e.g., Attanasio and Emmerson, 2003,
and Smith, 1999). A cultural or behavioral explanation is that low-income
individuals have an unhealthy lifestyle, e.g. are more often smokers, consume
more alcohol and have diets that are linked to obesity (see, e.g., Macintyre,
1997, and Huisman et al., 2005). The inﬂuential Whitehall studies, however,
have shown that behavioral risk is not the sole explanation for differential mor-
tality (see, e.g., Marmot et al., 1991). This latter ﬁnding has sparked research
that emphasizes long-term impacts on health of socioeconomic circumstances
before adulthood and childhood health conditions (see, e.g., Barker, 1995,
1997, Case et al., 2005, 2002, and Van den Berg et al., 2006), cognitive abilities
(Huisman and Mackenbach, 2007) and psychosocial reasons such as prolonged
exposures to stress (e.g., Macintyre, 1997, Smith, 1999).
Independent of the causes of differential mortality, an inverse relationship
between income and mortality risk has important implications for pension
policy (e.g. Whitehouse and Zaidi, 2008).3 Public pension policy in many
countries, including the Netherlands, aims at redistributing income from the
ﬁnancially better to the ﬁnancially worse off individuals. This redistribution
may be adversely affected by differential mortality because, on average, low-
income individuals receive public pension beneﬁts for a relatively shorter period
if the statutory retirement age is the same for all individuals (e.g., Nelissen,
1999). Likewise, for private pensions an inverse relationship between income
and mortality risk implies that, compared to high-income individuals, low-
income individuals’ internal rate of return from a uniformly priced private
pension plan is, on average, lower because their lower life expectancy results
in receiving the beneﬁts of the pension plan for a relatively shorter period
(Bonenkamp, 2009, Brown, 2002, Hári, 2007, Menchik, 1993, Simonovits,
2006). These policy concerns are exempliﬁed by the recent proposed pension
reforms in the Netherlands that take explicitly into account this disparity by
facilitating workers in low-income sectors to receive a pension at most two
years before the (proposed) statutory retirement age of 67 (Stichting van de
Arbeid, 2010).
To gain insights into the size of the above mentioned differences in life
expectancy between low and high-income individuals, we empirically quantify
3For a discussion on the implications for public health policy we refer to epidemiological
studies such as Huisman et al. (2005) and references therein.Section 6.1 Introduction 161
the association between individual income and remaining life expectancy at
65, the statutory retirement age in the Netherlands.
The contribution of this study to the empirical literature on the relationship
between income and mortality risk is threefold. First, in contrast to previ-
ous studies for the Netherlands that have most often examined the relation
between education and mortality risk (e.g., Kunst and Mackenbach, 1994,
Van Kippersluis et al., 2011), we estimate the association between income
and mortality risk for individuals aged 65 or older. Moreover, we quantify
the association between income and remaining life expectancy at age 65 by
making use of Monte Carlo simulations. We choose age 65 because that is the
statutory retirement age in the Netherlands after which all individuals receive
(i) a public retirement pension that is independent of earnings history4 and (ii),
an occupational pension that depends on earnings history (see e.g., Nelissen,
1999). Because this retirement income consists primarily of pension income
and is therefore closely related to individual earnings history, it serves as a
good proxy for an individual’s lifetime income.
Second, in contrast to most previous studies that, depending on data avail-
ability, have used either individual income or the sum of individual and spouse’s
income (i.e. household income), we make a distinction between individual
income and spouse’s income. This allows us to examine a frequent claim in
the literature that material hardship, measured by household and not only
individual ﬁnancial resources, matter for health status and mortality risk (e.g.,
Martikainen et al., 2001). Indeed, for most women from the cohorts in our anal-
ysis, mortality risk is perhaps more likely to be negatively related to spouse’s
income than their own income because many have left the labor force at the
time of marriage or birth of a ﬁrst child. In the health stock (economic) model
of Grossman (1972) an explanation for an association between spouse’s socioe-
conomic position and individual mortality risk is that a spouse may improve
the efﬁciency of an individual’s investment in the health stock. The higher the
partner’s socioeconomic position, the greater the improvement and the lower
mortality risk.5
4 Eligibility and amount depend only on the years of recorded residency in the Netherlands
between the ages of 15 and 65 (2% of the full public pension beneﬁt for each year).
5In the model of Grossman (1972, 2000) health deteriorates with age at a relatively slower
rate for individuals with a higher socioeconomic position which, in his model, implies that
individual’s socioeconomic position is positively related to both (lifetime) income and life
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A sociological explanation is that households have a shared lifestyle that is
inﬂuenced by both partners (e.g., Torssander and Erikson, 2009). Our empirical
model cannot discriminate between these different explanations but can test
whether individual mortality for both men and women is associated with a
spouse’s income as well as the individual’s income. Should we ﬁnd that spouse’s
income is (negatively) associated with individual mortality risk, this could be
interpreted as support for one of the above explanations. Limited empirical
evidence is available on this issue and the exceptions being McDonough et al.
(1999) for the U.S. and Torssander and Erikson (2009) for Sweden who report
that for women, but not for men, spouse’s income is negatively associated with
individual mortality risk.
Third, our empirical model controls for unobserved individual-speciﬁc
characteristics (i.e., random effects). This is of importance as it is inherent in
the analysis of mortality risk that with age the sample becomes more selective
in terms of both observed and unobserved characteristics. As a result, failing
to control for this “dynamic selection” may bias the results (Cameron and
Heckman, 1998, Van den Berg, 2001). Yet most of the studies cited above
use (pooled) cross-sectional data, hence do not control for dynamic selection.
Duration data make it possible to control for dynamic selection by including
random effects. Nevertheless, using duration data, Hupfeld’s (2009) model
does not include random effects and Van den Berg et al. (2006) mention that
including random effects does not affect the estimated impact of economic
conditions early in life on individual mortality risk. Our empirical analysis
uses panel data that are representative of the 65+ population and the model
includes random effects to take into account dynamic selection. Nonetheless,
a model complication does arise for individuals who enter the panel after
age 65. That is, given the dynamic selection process, random effects at age
65 imply a dependency between these random effects and the covariates at
later ages. To take this complication into account, we include dynamic sample
selection correction terms that control for this dependency at the age of entry
for individuals who enter the sample after age 65.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 describes the data. Sec-
tion 6.3 outlines the empirical model for analyzing mortality risk and explains
the estimation procedure. Section 6.4 reports the analytical results, and sec-
tion 6.5 summarizes the main ﬁndings and concludes the chapter.Section 6.2 Data 163
Data 6.2
The data are taken from the 1996–2007 Income Panel Study of the Netherlands
(IPO, Inkomens Panel Onderzoek, CBS 2009a) and the 1997–2008 Causes of
Death registry (DO, Doodsoorzaken, CBS 2009b), both gathered by Statistics
Netherlands. The IPO, a representative sample of the Dutch population, consists
of an administrative panel dataset of about 92,000 individuals, randomly
selected in 1996, which increased to about 99,000 individuals in 2007 because
of population growth. Sampling is based on individuals’ national security
number, and the selected individuals are followed for as long as they are
residing in the Netherlands on December 31 of the sample year. The dataset
also includes individuals living in institutions for the elderly, such as nursing
homes. Individuals born in the Netherlands enter the panel for the ﬁrst time in
the year of their birth; immigrants to the Netherlands, in the year of their arrival.
An individual exits the panel on death or emigration from the Netherlands.
Hence, the only reasons for panel attrition are mortality and emigration.6
The IPO contains data on the demographic characteristics and income
of each member of a selected individual’s household obtained from ofﬁcial
institutions; most particularly, the population registry and tax ofﬁce. The
DO, on the other hand, provides information on date and cause of death for
all residents deceased during the 1997–2008 period. These data come from
medical records provided by medical examiners, who are legally obliged to
submit them to Statistics Netherlands. The DO dataset also assigns a personal
identiﬁer that allows determination of whether an individual in the IPO has
died by the next calendar year.
We select individuals aged 65 or over, who, because of population ageing,
make up 12.8% of the sample in 1996 and 13.9% in 2007. This raw dataset
consists of 151,120 observations for 21,159 individuals over the 1996–2007
period. We remove about 5% of the observations because of missing income
information, about 1% because of missing values on marital status and 0.05%
because of negative income. These exclusions affect relatively more men than
6The annual rate of attrition in survey data tends to be 20% or more (e.g., Attanasio and
Emmerson, 2003), meaning that a strong relationship between attrition and, for instance,
health status may lead to inconsistent estimates of the association between income and
mortality risk. A further drawback of survey data is that individuals living in institutions for
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women (11% vs. 4%). Nonetheless, once we control for gender, the mortality
rate among the individuals excluded is not signiﬁcantly different from the
mortality rate among those included, which suggests that these exclusions do
not yield an endogenous sample selection.7 Panel attrition for reasons other
than mortality (i.e., because of emigration or missing values) is about 0.3% per
year. The resulting sample consists of 19,258 individuals, 11,601 female and
7,657 male. Of these individuals, 42% enter the panel at the age of 65, while
the remaining 58% enter the sample at a later age. The total sample contains
141,725 observations.
6.2.1 Variable de￿nitions and descriptive statistics
The analysis is based on the variables gender, age, marital status, and income.
We deﬁne age as the individual’s age on January 1 of each year because in the
Netherlands, the calendar year is also the ﬁscal year for income measurement,
meaning that this choice ensures that income at age 65 is measured over the
ﬁrst entire calendar year of retirement. Table 6.2.1 and 6.2.2 report the number
of observations by age and gender and the distribution of marital status by age
and gender. The marital status variable distinguishes between a single adult
household that includes divorcees (hereafter, ‘single’), a married or cohabiting
couple (‘married’), and a widowed individual. The differences in marital status
across age and gender result from the recognized fact that, on average, women
live longer than men. These differences result in, for instance, an increasing
proportion of women with age (last column, table 6.2.1) and, at a given age,
relatively more widowed and fewer married women than men (table 6.2.2).
The IPO income data are based primarily on tax records and contain detailed
and accurate information on all income components. Here, income is gross
of income tax and social insurance contributions and is measured in 2005
euros using the consumer price index. Individual income is the sum of pension,
labor, transfer, and capital income. Table 6.A.1 provides an overview of these
components and their deﬁnitions for both men and women and shows that
over 90% of retirement income is pension income. All income components are
7The p-value corresponding to the null hypothesis of no difference is equal to 0.261.Section 6.2 Data 165
Table 6.2.1: Number of observations by age and gender
Share of
Age Men Women Men (%) Women (%) women (%)
65–69 17,504 23,349 32.0 26.8 57.2
70–74 15,943 21,558 29.2 24.7 57.5
75–79 11,530 18,593 21.1 21.3 61.7
80–84 6,305 13,307 11.5 15.3 67.9
85–89 2,577 7,085 4.7 8.1 73.3
90–94 664 2,692 1.2 3.1 80.2
95+ 94 524 0.2 0.6 84.8
All 54,617 87,108 100.0 100.0 61.5
Table 6.2.2: Marital status by age and gender
Marital status men Marital status women
Age Single Widowed Married Single Widowed Married
% % % % % %
65–69 14.3 7.0 78.7 13.1 24.1 62.8
70–74 10.4 10.7 78.9 12.5 37.2 50.3
75–79 8.7 17.1 74.2 11.8 52.4 35.8
80–84 8.3 26.2 65.5 11.7 66.6 21.7
85–89 7.8 41.3 50.9 12.1 77.4 10.6
90–94 6.3 59.9 33.7 14.1 81.6 4.3
95+ 4.3 62.8 33.0 16.0 83.0 1.0
All 10.9 14.8 74.4 12.4 46.4 41.2
observed for the individual and, in couple households, also for the spouse. The
analysis excludes any income from other household members.8
As shown in table 6.2.3,9 the mean income of single and widowed men is
higher than that of single and widowed women, and the distribution of income
for single and widowed men is wider than the distribution of income for single
and widowed women. The income distribution for men shows a decrease in
median income with age. This ﬁnding most likely results from changes in the
income distribution over birth cohorts (Knoef et al., 2009). In addition, the
8About 8% of households have other household members, mostly children. Excluding these
households would not affect the main results of this study. In addition, the main results are
also unaffected by using a standardized (equivalized) income concept or using pension income
only.
9Following Statistics Netherlands guidelines, we do not report statistics based on a number
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Table 6.2.3: Distribution of individual income by marital status,
age, and gender (euros)
Single and widowed men Single and widowed women
Age Mean 25th Median 75th Mean 25th Median 75th
perc. perc. perc. perc.
65–69 22,283 14,454 17,942 25,180 19,894 13,827 16,270 21,757
70–74 22,143 14,628 18,130 24,925 19,684 13,926 16,374 21,380
75–79 22,945 14,474 18,198 26,077 19,407 13,829 16,145 20,621
80–84 22,342 13,710 17,079 24,921 19,115 13,524 15,560 19,905
85–89 20,387 13,151 15,957 22,885 18,674 13,069 15,046 19,215
90–94 20,797 12,944 15,341 23,556 18,428 12,411 14,586 18,351
95+ 18,210 12,868 15,213 20,000 19,055 12,203 14,169 18,249
All 22,163 14,194 17,640 25,045 19,345 13,597 15,843 20,518
Married men Married women
Age Mean 25th Median 75th Mean 25th Median 75th
perc. perc. perc. perc.
65–69 23,699 13,480 18,021 27,595 9,558 7,862 8,088 9,050
70–74 21,463 12,434 16,376 24,881 9,242 7,882 8,088 8,672
75–79 20,715 11,831 15,563 23,995 9,294 7,882 8,088 8,572
80–84 19,930 11,373 14,787 23,610 9,447 7,882 8,088 8,657
85–89 19,182 10,777 13,602 22,028 9,639 7,882 8,104 8,957
90–94 16,846 10,000 12,119 16,854 9,476 7,983 8,104 9,197
95+ 22,604 9,984 12,702 32,184 - - - -
All 21,809 12,391 16,469 25,324 9,407 7,882 8,089 8,818
income distribution for married women is rather compressed, partly because
many retired married women have no earnings history10 and receive only public
pension beneﬁts but also because pre-1990, part-time work often came with
no pension plan or a pension plan that had a relatively high threshold before
contributions could be made.
A comparison of the tables for married men and women reveals that
women’s income accounts for, on average, one-third of household income.
The rank correlation between the individual’s and the spouse’s income is about
0.10 (not shown in a table).
10In our sample, about 25% of married women aged 65–69 receive an occupational pension;
for women aged 70–74, this ﬁgure is about 20%, and for women aged 75 or over, it is about
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Di￿erential mortality 6.2.2
Deﬁning mortality as being deceased in the following year, about 38% of the
individuals died over the sample period. The results in table 6.2.4 conﬁrm the
accepted patterns that mortality risk increases with age and that men have
a higher mortality risk than women. Likewise, age-speciﬁc mortality risk is
lower among married individuals than among single or widowed individuals.
In addition, the sample statistics on mortality risk by gender and age compare
favorably with the population statistics from the Human Mortality Database
(HMD column); that is, the differences between the two by age and gender are
small.
Table 6.2.4: Mortality risk by gender, age, and marital status. The HMD
columns provide population statistics from the Human Mor-
tality Databasea over the 1996–2006 period.
Mortality risk, men Single Widowed Married All HMD
Age % % % % %
65–69 4.6 3.4 1.5 2.1 2.2
70–74 5.8 5.5 3.5 3.9 3.8
75–79 8.3 8.6 6.1 6.7 6.4
80–84 13.6 13.0 9.8 11.0 10.8
85–89 23.8 18.5 15.9 17.6 17.5
90–94 33.3 30.2 24.1 28.3 27.5
95+ - 33.9 32.3 35.1 41.8
All 7.2 10.6 4.5 5.7 5.7
Mortality risk, women Single Widowed Married All HMD
Age % % % % %
65–69 1.6 1.7 1.0 1.3 1.2
70–74 2.7 2.5 1.6 2.1 2.0
75–79 4.9 4.3 3.0 3.9 3.5
80–84 8.2 8.1 6.8 7.9 6.6
85–89 12.8 13.6 10.8 13.2 12.4
90–94 20.3 20.3 19.8 20.3 21.7
95+ 33.3 35.2 - 34.9 36.2
All 5.3 6.9 2.3 4.8 4.7
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Table 6.2.5: Mortality risk (%) by age, gender, and income quartilea
Panel A Single and widowed men Single and widowed women
Income quartile Income quartile
Age Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1/Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1/Q4
65–69 5.5 4.2 3.4 3.8 1.4 2.7 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.9
70–74 6.6 7.5 5.2 3.5 1.9 3.8 2.5 2.4 1.8 2.1
75–79 12.0 8.2 6.9 7.3 1.6 6.2 4.7 3.5 3.5 1.8
80–84 16.4 12.1 12.2 11.4 1.4 10.1 7.7 7.1 7.5 1.3
85–89 22.1 19.1 18.8 15.6 1.4 17.8 11.3 11.2 12.1 1.5
90–94 35.7 30.8 27.0 23.5 1.5 22.3 22.4 17.9 16.3 1.4
95+ - - - - - 40.3 33.7 26.7 30.0 1.3
All 12.6 9.3 7.5 7.3 1.7 9.8 6.2 5.0 5.2 1.9
Panel B Married men Married women
Income quartile Income quartile
Age Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1/Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1/Q4
65–69 3.2 1.8 1.0 1.0 3.3 1.5 1.0 0.8 0.7 2.1
70–74 4.6 3.6 3.3 2.3 2.0 2.3 1.2 1.5 1.3 1.7
75–79 7.2 6.5 5.4 4.6 1.6 3.4 2.9 2.5 3.2 1.1
80–84 11.3 10.0 8.5 8.2 1.4 7.6 7.2 6.9 5.3 1.4
85–89 17.1 13.4 16.5 15.5 1.1 11.8 10.1 9.5 11.8 1.0
90–94 28.3 20.4 21.4 14.7 1.9 34.8 14.8 6.3 26.5 1.3
95+ - - - - - - - - - -
All 7.1 4.8 3.4 3.0 2.4 2.8 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.4
Panel C Married men Married women
Spouse’s income quartile Spouse’s income quartile
Age Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1/Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1/Q4
65–69 1.8 1.3 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.1 1.1 0.8 1.7
70–74 4.3 3.1 3.1 3.3 1.3 2.1 1.1 1.7 1.6 1.3
75–79 7.2 6.4 5.1 5.5 1.3 2.9 3.1 3.6 2.7 1.1
80–84 11.8 9.2 8.9 9.6 1.2 8.2 7.5 5.5 5.5 1.5
85–89 16.2 17.4 15.5 14.5 1.1 13.2 6.1 11.0 11.0 1.2
90–94 25.4 32.5 15.6 26.3 1.0 27.5 16.7 19.4 10.7 2.6
95+ - - - - - - - - - -
All 5.3 4.4 4.4 4.0 1.3 3.1 2.0 2.3 1.9 1.6
a The income quartiles are reported in table 2.
In table 6.2.5, panel A, we pool the results for single and widowed indi-
viduals as mortality risk by income quartile differs little between these two
groups. Panel A shows that mortality risk decreases as income increases for
single/widowed men and women, an effect that is strongest up to the third
quartile. One measure of differential mortality is the ratio of mortality riskSection 6.3 Mortality risk model 169
among individuals in the ﬁrst quartile of the income distribution to mortality
risk among individuals in the fourth quartile (columns Q1/Q4).
A comparison of panels A and B reveals that differential mortality is stronger
for married men than for single/widowed men (2.4 vs. 1.7) but weaker for
married women than for single/widowed women (1.4 vs. 1.9). These statistics
are in line with ﬁndings of other European studies but lower than those reported
for the U.S. (see the introduction). Overall, differential mortality appears to
decline with age. Interestingly however, as illustrated in panel C, when spouse’s
income is considered, a differential mortality pattern emerges for both men
and women, one that, although weaker for men, is similar to that produced
for individual income. We are not aware of any comparable statistics in the
literature.
Mortality risk model 6.3
This section outlines our empirical model for analyzing mortality risk. As
discussed in section 6.2, we observe whether or not an individual is deceased
in the subsequent year. Speciﬁcally, we consider the following latent variable
model that relates next year’s mortality risk, at age (a + 1), to individual’s
characteristics at age a
Ha+1 =  a   Xa   "a,
(
Ma+1 = 1 if Ha+1 < 0
Ma+1 = 0 otherwise
(6.3.1)
In the context of this study, and in line with Grossman’s model, the latent
variable Ha+1 can be thought of as an individual’s stock of health. If next year
this stock falls below a certain threshold, normalized to zero in equation (6.3.1),
the individual is deceased. The variable Ma+1 denotes observed mortality at
age (a +1), and Ma+1 is equal to one if an individual became a years old and
died at age (a+1), and zero otherwise. a is an age-speciﬁc intercept, while Xa
is a (1k) vector of an individual’s observed characteristics at age a, including
marital status and income, with a corresponding (k  1) parameter vector
.  denotes an individual’s unobserved characteristics, i.e. a random effect,170 Association between Income and Remaining Life Expectancy Chapter 6
and is assumed to be constant over time and independent of the covariates
at age 65. This assumption does not, however, exclude dependency between
the covariates and  at later ages. We also assume that the random effect
is normally distributed with a zero mean and 2
 variance and that the error
term "a follows a logistic distribution and is independently distributed across
individuals and time with a zero mean and a variance normalized to 2=3.
6.3.1 Dynamic selection
Inherent in any study of mortality risk over the lifecycle is recognition that the
population at risk changes with age. By explicitly accounting for random effects,
our model allows for sample selection by age on the basis of both observed and
unobserved characteristics. Not accounting for such dynamic selection may
yield inconsistent estimates of a and  (Cameron and Heckman, 1998, Van
den Berg, 2001). If mortality risk is negatively related to income and positively
to unobserved characteristic(s) (), low-income (high-income) individuals with
a low (high)  value are more likely to survive another year than low-income in-
dividuals with a high  value. Hence, in this example, dynamic selection results
in a population at risk in which the correlation between  and income becomes
increasingly positive with age up to a certain age and then decreases thereafter
as the sample becomes more homogenous with respect to income and .
When all individuals are observed from the age of 65, the model takes
dynamic selection into account. However, as reported in section 6.2, 58% of
the individuals enter the sample after age 65 and dynamic selection implies that
these individuals, having survived from age 65 to the age of panel entry (),
are a selective sample (of their cohort) in terms of their covariates (including
income) and . A post-65 entry thus produces the empirical complication of
a dependency between the random effect and the covariates, a dependency
that, as already explained, changes with the age of entry. Ideally one would
like to control for this by explicitly modelling the probability of survival up to
the age of entry (see, e.g., Ridder, 1984) but this would require data on the
covariates from the age of 65 up to the age one year before entry, which we do
not have. The solution we propose here is to explicitly account for the change
in the dependency between random effects and income at the age of entry,
thereby maintaining the random effects assumption at age 65. Essentially, usingSection 6.3 Mortality risk model 171
the formula below, we parameterize the change in the dependency between
the covariates and the random effect  at the age of ﬁrst observation  for
individuals who enter the sample after the statutory retirement age of 65
 = e X
+ (6.3.2)




((2k +2)1) parameter vector 
. Scaling the effects of the covariates at
age  with the factors ( 65) and ( 65)2 takes into account, for instance,
that the dependency between the random effect and income becomes more
positive with age and at some age decreases as the sample becomes more ho-
mogeneous.  is a random effect that is assumed to be independent of e X and
normally distributed with a zero mean and 2 variance. Consistent estimates
of the a’s and  are obtained under the additional assumption formalized
in equation (6.3.2). Testing the joint hypothesis 2 = 0\
 = 0 tests for the
presence of random effects and the implied need to include dynamic sample
selection correction terms (i.e., the additional covariates e X).
Estimation, identi￿cation, and empirical speci￿cation 6.3.2
Given the model outlined above, age-speciﬁc mortality risk conditional on
observed and unobserved characteristics can be written as follows
Pr
 








The condition Ma = 0 formalizes the fact that all individuals in the population
at risk are alive at age a, and F(.) is the logistic cumulative distribution function.
Equation (6.3.3) is the basis for a likelihood function in which we integrate out
the unobserved individual speciﬁc effect. With i denoting the individual, (i)
is the age of the individual when ﬁrst observed in the sample and A(i) is the
age of the individual when last observed in the sample. The variable m(i) is
equal to one if the individual is deceased by age A(i)+1, and zero otherwise.
Maximum likelihood estimates of the model parameters are given by172 Association between Income and Remaining Life Expectancy Chapter 6
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where  = (65,...,T),11 N is the number of individuals, and  is the cu-
mulative normal distribution function. The estimated model is often referred
to as a random effects panel data logit model (Wooldridge, 2001). Equation
(6.3.4) imposes proportionality between the age pattern, the covariates, and
the random effect to ensure identiﬁcation of the random effects distribution
(see e.g., Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). For individuals who enter the sample
at age 65 no dynamic sample selection correction terms are included (as for
these  = 65, hence e X(i) is a vector with zeros) and identiﬁcation of the 

parameters is solely established by having individuals who enter the sample
after age 65. We estimate the model separately for men and women.12
To estimate the association between the individual and spouse’s income
and mortality risk, we parameterize equation (6.3.1) as follows


























The associations between mortality risk and individual income (Y I
a) and spouse’s
income (Y P
a ) are given by the parameters 3  7, and spouse’s income is equal
to zero for a single or widowed individual. The main advantage of this speci-
ﬁcation is that it nests two empirical speciﬁcations used in the literature and
discussed in the introduction. The ﬁrst nested model, which refers to the
hypothesis 4 = 6 = 7 = 0, is that in which only individual (and not spouse’s)
income has a direct association with mortality risk. The second nested model,
11T is the maximum age an individual may reach.
12We use the xtlogit command of the software package STATA (www.stata.com) for estima-
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which refers to the hypothesis 3 = 4 \5 = 6 \7 = 25, is that in which
household income rather than individual and/or spouse’s income is associated
with mortality risk.
MARRIED is a dummy variable equal to one if the individual is married
(including cohabitation) and zero otherwise; WIDOW is a dummy variable
equal to one if the individual is widowed and zero otherwise. The reference
category for marital status is a single adult household. Besides controlling
for time effects, we also test for age-speciﬁc intercepts instead of a linear age
function – which is brieﬂy discussed in the next section.
Monte Carlo simulations 6.3.3
Whereas the parameter estimates of the model outlined above provide insights
into the direction and relative size of the associations between the covariates
and mortality risk, they offer no clear insights into the quantitative association
with remaining life expectancy at age 65. Therefore, the second part of the
empirical analysis simulates remaining life expectancy at 65 and examines how
it is associated with individual and spouse’s income by gender and marital
status at the age of 65. The model can thus be seen as a period-age model that
conforms to the life tables used by Statistics Netherlands to calculate life ex-
pectancy based on the age-speciﬁc mortality risks of the current population (Van
der Meulen and Janssen, 2007).13 We use the estimation results of the model
outlined in sections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2 to simulate remaining life expectancy at age
65 (see appendix 6.B for the technical details of the Monte Carlo simulations).
Although income during retirement depends on lifetime earnings, the way
that these two relate depends on the rules of the public and private pension
systems. Hence, in the simulations, we take these rules into account when
calculating income during retirement conditional on income before retirement
(also known as pension-related gross yearly salary), reported in table 6.4.1 for
several types of households.
As explained earlier, the occupational pension income an individual receives
in addition to the public pension is dependent on this gross pension-related
13Theoretically, a cohort approach represents an alternative methodology. However, the
available data do not allow for this method because, ideally, all individuals in the chosen
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salary. In the simulations we assume that individuals have lived in the Nether-
lands from the age of 15 onward and are therefore entitled to a ﬂat rate public
pension beneﬁt that depends only on household composition. We also assume
that, in the case of a married couple, the spouse’s age is the same as the age
of the individual. The baseline cases are individuals with a pension-related
gross yearly salary equal to the median income in the Netherlands in 2005,
which is 29,500 euros for full-time employees and 14,750 euros for part-time
workers.14 We further assume that the occupational pension is based on 40
years of employment. In the cohorts included in the analysis, most men worked
full time before the age of 65, but most women either did not work (or are not
entitled to occupational pension beneﬁts) or worked mostly part time (about a
quarter) before the age of 65. Not only do the household types in table 6.4.1
take these situations into account, but even when other household types or dif-
ferent assumptions of spouse’s age, employment history, and part-time earnings
are considered, the main simulation results for deviations from the baseline
are rather insensitive to (minor) changes in the baseline cases.
The rules we apply for calculating income during retirement conform to
the rules applied by the largest pension funds (see the footnote to table 6.4.1).
For instance, they take into account that when a woman becomes widowed,
she is entitled to a part of the deceased husband’s occupational pension. In
the simulation exercise, for each household type, we consider differences from
the baseline situation that result from changes in the pension-related gross
yearly salary. Hence, in the simulation results, median income refers to median
pension-related gross salary (see table 6.4.1), low income refers to a pension-
related gross salary based on minimum wage throughout the working life,
and high income refers to a pension-related gross salary based on twice the
median income (see table 6.A.2, appendix 6.A). These income classiﬁcations
correspond roughly to the averages in the lowest and highest income quartiles
for the different household types.
6.4 Empirical results
The estimation results for the model outlined in section 6.3 are reported in
table 6.4.2 and discussed in section 6.4.1. The simulation results are given in
14 Source: https://statline.cbs.nl (Statistics Netherlands). We assume that a part-timer works
half time with a median income equal to 50% of that of a full-time worker.Section 6.4 Empirical results 175
Table 6.4.1: Income during retirement for different household types (euros)
Cells: Yearly amounts in 2005 euros
Statutory minimum wage, full time 16392
Public pension for a single person household 11705
Public pension per person for a two person household 8018
Baseline situation
Pension-related gross yearly salary, mediana
Man (full time) 29500
Woman (part time) 14750
Annual income during retirement by household typeb
Single person household
Man (employed full time before age 65) 20650
Woman (employed part time before age 65) 16178
Couple, before age 65, the man was employed full time and
the woman was not employed
Man married at age 65 16962
Woman married at age 65 8018
Household income while married 24980
Man is widowed 20650
Woman is widowed 18094
Couple, before age 65, the man was employed full time and
the woman part time
Man married at age 65 16962
Woman married at age 65 12490
Household income while married 29452
Man is widowed 23845
Woman is widowed 22567
a Source: https://statline.cbs.nl, Statistics Netherlands. The (ﬂat) rate public pension depends
only on household composition and years of resident in the Netherlands. Pension-related
gross salary refers to the salary on which the occupational pension is based and that is
received in addition to a public pension.
b In these calculations we assume that (i) men worked full-time and women, if worked, worked
parttime before age 65, (ii) a part-timer works half time with a median income equal to 50%
of that of a full-time worker, (iii) individuals have lived in the Netherlands from the age of
15 onward, (iv) in the case of a married couple, the spouse’s age is the same as the age of
the individual, (v) the occupational pension in based on 40 years of employment. The rules
we apply are roughly conform to those of the largest pension funds in the Netherlands and
take into account widowhood. Occupational pension income is calculated based on pension-
related gross salary (Y) and using the formula max(0,0.7FTE(Y  10=7franchise)). A
widowed individual receives max(0,5=70.7FTE(Yp  10=7franchise)), where Yp
refers to the pension-related gross salary of the deceased spouse. The franchise is set equal to
11705 euro (the public retirement pension received by a person living alone). FTE is equal to
one if the individual was employed full-time and 0.5 if employed part-time.176 Association between Income and Remaining Life Expectancy Chapter 6
table 6.4.3 and discussed in section 6.4.2. In the following discussion we use
a 5% level of signiﬁcance. It is ﬁrst worth noting, however, that we ﬁnd no
nonlinear age effects (in the index). We have examined this aspect using a
model that contains a nonparametric speciﬁcation of the age dependency of
mortality risk and statistical tests have revealed that for both men and women,
the nonparametric age function can be restricted to a linear function of age.15
6.4.1 Estimation results
An interpretation of the estimated associations in table 6.4.2 between marital
status and mortality risk requires taking into account spouse’s income, which is
at least equal to the public pension beneﬁt. We return to this in section 6.4.2.
As shown in table 6.4.2, individual income is negatively associated with
mortality risk for both men and women and the parameter estimates are
roughly of the same magnitude. Based on these estimates, we calculate that
the negative association between income and mortality risk diminishes after
about 130,000 euros (which is around the top 0.2 percentile of the income
distribution). Moreover, although the negative association between mortality
risk and spouse’s income is insigniﬁcant for men and only signiﬁcant at a 10%
level for women (see the second last row of table 6.4.2), it is of roughly the
same magnitude for both. In addition, the test statistics for men and women
indicate that we do not reject the hypothesis that it is household income rather
than individual and/or spouse’s income that is associated with mortality risk
(see the last row of table 6.4.2).
The estimate of the standard deviation of the random effect is signiﬁcant for
both men and women, which suggests the presence of unobserved individual-
speciﬁc heterogeneity (random effects). The standard deviations are, however,
relatively small compared to the standard deviation of the error term in equa-
tion (6.3.1), which is equal to
p
2=3  1.81. As shown in table 6.4.2, we
also test for the importance of controlling for random effects and the implied
dynamic sample selection correction terms, as formulated in equation (6.3.2).
These tests suggest a rejection of the null-hypothesis of no random effects (and
15See appendix 6.A. The p-values corresponding to an LR-test of model 2 against model 1 in
table 6.A.3 and of model 7 against model 6 in table 6.A.4 are 0.33 and 0.18, respectively.Section 6.4 Empirical results 177
Table 6.4.2: Estimation resultsa
Dependent variable: Mortality risk Men Women
Covariate, parameter, Eq. (6.3.5) parameter parameter
estimate S.e. estimate S.e.
Constant 0 -11.636 1.054 -11.337 0.891
Age 1 0.132 0.016 0.109 0.014
Single 0.000 0.000
Married 1 -0.872 0.142 -0.352 0.136
Widowed 2 -0.436 0.104 0.014 0.107
(Individual income/10,000) 3 -0.214 0.041 -0.271 0.048
(Spouse’s income/10,000) 4 -0.097 0.124 -0.103 0.056
(Individual income/10,000)2 5 0.008 0.002 0.010 0.003
(Spouse’s income/10,000)2 6 -0.003 0.015 0.002 0.004
(Individual income/10,000)  7 0.028 0.016 0.015 0.022
(Spouse’s income/10,000)
Standard deviation random effect  0.365 0.176 0.233 0.047
Log-likelihood value -10888.9 -14823.3
Number of observations 54617 87108
Number of individuals 7657 11601
Number of parameters 36 36
Test of hypothesis p-value p-value
Random effects and dynamic sample 0.000 0.090
selection correction termsb
Individual incomec 0.000 0.000
Spouse’s incomed 0.554 0.091
Household income vs. 0.709 0.356
individual/spouse’s incomee
a The estimates of all model parameters are reported in tables A3 (model 2) and A4 (model 7),
appendix 6.A.
b H0 : 2 = 0\
 = 0 (equation 6.3.2)
c H0 : 3 = 5 = 0
d H0 : 4 = 6 = 7 = 0
e H0 : 3 = 4,5 = 6,7 = 25
the implied correction terms) for men, but for women only at a 10% level
of signiﬁcance. Tables 6.A.3 (model 5) and 6.A.4 (model 10), appendix 6.A,
report the estimation results for the model that excludes random effects and
dynamic sample selection correction terms. We do not discuss these in detail but
conclude, in line with Van den Berg et al. (2006), that overall the differences
with the estimates of table 6 are relatively small.178 Association between Income and Remaining Life Expectancy Chapter 6
6.4.2 Simulation results
The Monte Carlo simulations are based on the estimation results in table 6.4.2.
These simulations, whose results are given in table 6.4.3, quantify the associa-
tion between income and remaining life expectancy at the age of 65 in 2005 by
gender for the different household types and income scenarios (see tables 6.4.1
and 6.A.2, appendix 6.A). The point estimates of (unconditional) remaining
life expectancy at age 65 are 16.0 years for men and 18.4 for women.16
As discussed in section 6.3, the baseline situation is for median income
individuals and considers three types of households. For single men, remaining
life expectancy is almost 12 years and for single women about 18 years (ﬁrst
column, ﬁrst two rows of table 6.4.3). Remaining life expectancy at 65 is
considerably higher for married individuals, about 16 years for married men
(ﬁrst column, third row) and 20 years for married women who have been
employed part time (ﬁrst column, last row). The estimated differences between
single and married individuals are signiﬁcant: 4.4 years for men and 2.0 years
for women.17
Next, we consider for each household type differences from the baseline
situation that result from changes in income. The second and third columns
report on the change in remaining life expectancy associated with a 10% higher
than median income for either the man or the woman in each of the three
household types. As table 6.4.3 shows, this association differs little across
gender and household type: the point estimates vary between 0.16 and 0.20
with standard errors equal to 0.04. These estimates imply that life expectancy
at age 65 for individuals with a 10% above median income is about two to
two-and-a-half months higher than that for individuals with median income.
In addition, the fourth and ﬁfth columns report the differences in remaining
life expectancy between low and median income individuals for the different
household types. An individual on minimum wage or with no earnings (low
income) during the working life receives only a public retirement pension
beneﬁt during retirement. For both men and women, and irrespective of
marital status at age 65, the difference in remaining life expectancy is less
16For this purpose, we estimate the mortality risk model using only age and year dummies.
The simulation-based estimates for remaining life expectancy are 15.99 (0.49) for men and
18.41 (0.38) for women.
17Estimates of these differences are 4.396 (0.515) for men and 2.032 (0.774) for women.Section 6.4 Empirical results 179
than one year (fourth and ﬁfth columns). The differences in remaining life
expectancy between high-income individuals, those who earned twice the
median income during the working life, and median income individuals are
reported in the sixth and seventh columns. For men and women, the point
estimates of these differences fall between 1.53 (for married women) and 1.91
(for single men). A comparison of the differences between these two extremes
reveals that the difference in remaining life expectancy at age 65 between
low-income individuals with only a public retirement pension and high-income
individuals with twice the median income is about two-and-a-half years for
both men and women.
Finally, we turn to the association between remaining life expectancy at
65 and spouse’s income. As shown in the fourth and sixth rows of table 6.4.3,
compared to married women whose spouse earned median income, remaining
life expectancy at age 65 of women whose spouse earned a 10% above the
median income is 0.18-0.19 years higher (about two-and-a-half months). For
married men (ﬁfth line), however, this difference is small and insigniﬁcant. In
contrast, the difference in remaining life expectancy at 65 between women
with a low-income spouse and women with a high- income spouse (see columns
four and six, last row) is more than two years (1.62 - (-0.79)). This difference
is explainable in two ways. First, spouse’s income is negatively associated
with women’s mortality risk, albeit only at a 10% level of signiﬁcance (see
table 6.4.2). Second, and more important, marriage is negatively associated
with mortality risk and women beneﬁt, on average, from an extended duration
of marriage when married to a high-income man. For men, however, we ﬁnd
no such indirect association because, having on average a shorter life span than
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Summary 6.5
This analysis quantiﬁes the association between individuals’ income and re-
maining life expectancy at the statutory retirement age in the Netherlands of 65.
For this purpose, we estimate a mortality risk model that explicitly controls for
unobserved individual-speciﬁc heterogeneity (random effects) using adminis-
trative data taken from the 1996–2007 Income Panel Study of the Netherlands
supplemented with data from the Causes of Death registry.
Our main empirical ﬁndings are threefold. First, concerning model spec-
iﬁcation we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant presence of unobserved individual-speciﬁc het-
erogeneity (random effects) for men and for women only at a 10% level of
signiﬁcance. In our application the effects on the estimates when excluding
random effects and the required dynamic sample selection correction terms
are relatively small and, in other words, random effects play only a minor
role in our mortality risk model.18 Nevertheless, our ﬁndings underscore the
importance of controlling for random effects and dynamic sample selection
correction terms if inconsistent estimates are to be avoided.
Second, concerning the association between spouse’s income and individual
mortality risk we ﬁnd that, conditional on marital status, spouse’s income is
only weakly (at a 10% level) associated with mortality risk for women. The
literature suggests that an association with spouse’s income might exist if what
matters for health or mortality risk is material hardship, measured by household
and not only individual ﬁnancial resources (e.g., Martikainen et al., 2001) or
if couples have a shared lifestyle that is inﬂuenced by both partners (e.g.,
Torssander and Erikson, 2009). Our ﬁndings do not provide strong support
for such explanations. This perhaps surprising conclusion could be interpreted
as evidence that early life health and socioeconomic circumstances (before
marriage) are important contributors to later life differential mortality (see,
e.g., Case et al., 2005, 2002). This suggests that public health policy such as
(indirect) subsidized and universal health care for children and (means-tested)
child allowances may reduce later life differential mortality.
Third, concerning the association of individual income with mortality risk
we ﬁnd that individual income is about equally strong and negatively asso-
18For completeness, table 6.A.5 (appendix 6.A) reports the simulation results based on a
mortality model that does not control for random effects and dynamic sample selection. The
differences with table 6.4.3 are also small.182 Association between Income and Remaining Life Expectancy Chapter 6
ciated with mortality risk for men and women. The difference in remaining
life expectancy at age 65 between low-income individuals with only a public
retirement pension and high-income individuals with twice the median in-
come, is about two-and-a-half years for both men and women. As discussed
in the introduction, public pension policy in many countries, including the
Netherlands, aims at redistributing income from the ﬁnancially better to the
ﬁnancially worse off individuals, a redistribution that is adversely affected by
this difference because low-income income individuals, on average, receive
public pension beneﬁts for a relatively shorter period. Likewise, this difference
in life expectancy implies that, compared to high-income, low-income indi-
viduals, on average, receive a worse deal from a uniform priced pension plan
because they collect the beneﬁts of such a pension plan for a relatively shorter
period. Our ﬁnding of a two-and-a-half years difference in life expectancy
between low and high-income individuals is close to retirement window of two
years (between ages 65 and 67) that is part of the proposed pension reforms
in the Netherlands. Although the public pension beneﬁts will be adjusted in
an actuarially fair way when retiring before the newly proposed statutory re-
tirement age of 67, through collective agreements on a sector or ﬁrm level this
loss of income can be compensated via the occupational pension.19 This may
mitigate the adverse income redistribution effects that result from differential
mortality. In this respect, our ﬁndings underscore the importance to allow for a
retirement window and leaving it up to the individual worker when to exit the
labor market within this window; a decision that will presumably depend on
his or her health and life expectancy.
19This compensation is made possible because in low-income sectors people have a below
average life expectancy and pension premiums are based on population life expectancy. We
refer to Stichting van de Arbeid (2010) for details on all proposed reforms to the Dutch pension
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Extended estimation results 6.A
Table 6.A.1: Components of individual income during retirementa
Male income components
Age Public Occupational Labor Transfer Capital
pension pension income income income Total
% % % % % %
65–69 51.8 39.7 3.9 1.4 3.1 100.0
70–74 52.3 37.9 2.4 2.2 5.3 100.0
75–79 53.9 35.1 1.3 2.9 6.9 100.0
80–84 56.5 31.1 0.9 3.6 8.0 100.0
85–89 61.9 26.3 0.6 3.3 7.8 100.0
90–94 66.6 22.7 0.5 2.4 7.8 100.0
95+ 67.5 25.8 1.6 0.9 4.1 100.0
Total 53.6 36.4 2.4 2.3 5.4 100.0
Female income components
Age Public Occupational Labor Transfer Capital
pension pension income income income Total
% % % % % %
65–69 80.9 13.2 1.3 2.2 2.4 100.0
70–74 79.0 14.0 0.8 2.6 3.6 100.0
75–79 76.3 15.3 0.6 3.1 4.8 100.0
80–84 74.4 16.5 0.6 3.4 5.2 100.0
85–89 73.9 16.7 0.6 3.5 5.4 100.0
90–94 75.3 15.2 0.5 3.0 6.1 100.0
95+ 75.7 15.4 0.2 3.0 5.7 100.0
Total 77.7 14.7 0.8 2.8 4.0 100.0
a All residents from the statutory retirement age of 65 onward receive a public
retirement pension. Occupational pensions, on the other hand, are related to
the individual’s own employment or the employment of the spouse (in case of
widowhood) before age 65. They therefore include private annuities, which may
be more common among the self-employed. Labor income includes both work-
related earnings and income from self-employment. Transfer income includes mainly
alimony payments or receipts and rental subsidies. Capital income includes primarily
interest, dividends, and income from real estate. A few income components might
be considered household rather than individual income, e.g. rental subsidies. These
components are recorded on an individual level by Statistics Netherlands. More
details on the components of income and their deﬁnitions can be found in Knoef et
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6.B Monte Carlo simulations
The Monte Carlo simulations are based on the distribution function of remaining
life duration at age 65 and carried out as follows. First, as a baseline, we deﬁne
a group of reference individuals with the same characteristics; for instance,
married men with median income. The estimates of the parameters of equation
(6.3.1) together with the assumption that the error term in equation (6.3.1)
follows a logistic distribution enable calculation of the probabilities that at age
65 each individual in this reference group will be deceased by the subsequent
year. Next, we compare these probabilities with random drawings from the
uniform distribution to simulate whether or not each individual is deceased
in the subsequent year (see e.g., Law and Kelton, 1982). Finally, we simulate
age by age the mortality status for each individual in the reference group up
to the age of 105. We assume that next year’s mortality probability is equal to
one at age 105. In this way, we obtain the simulated mortality status for each
individual in this group from age 65 up to age 105. We use these sequences to
calculate the mean remaining life duration at 65 for this homogenous reference
group of individuals. We then rerun these simulations with a change in one of
the covariates (e.g., a different income level) so that, all other factors being
constant, the differences between these simulation outcomes and the baseline
simulation outcomes can reveal this covariate’s association with remaining
life expectancy at 65. For reference individuals who are married at age 65
the simulations take explicitly into account that the spouse may die and the
individual becomes widowed. We perform these Monte Carlo simulations for
10,000 (identical) individuals. The standard errors for the differences from the
baseline situation are based on 100 drawings from the asymptotic distribution
of the parameter estimates.Bibliography
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